War rhetoric of a little ally
Political implicatures and Aznar’s legitimatization of the war in Iraq

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In this paper we examine some of the properties of the speeches by Prime Minister José María Aznar held in Spanish parliament in 2003 legitimating his support of the USA and the threatening war against Iraq. The theoretical framework for the analysis is a multidisciplinary CDA approach relating discursive, cognitive and sociopolitical aspects of parliamentary debates. It is argued that speeches in parliament should not only be defined in terms of their textual properties, but also in terms of a contextual analysis. Besides an analysis of the usual properties of ideological and political discourse, such as positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation and other rhetoric devices, special attention is paid to political implicatures defined as inferences based on general and particular political knowledge as well as on the context models of Aznar’s speeches.

Keywords: political discourse, political cognition, political rhetoric, political implicatures, legitimation, Critical Discourse Analysis, Iraq, war

Introduction

In this paper we examine some properties of the belligerent parliamentary rhetoric of Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar in support of military action of the USA and its allies against Saddam Hussein in 2003. One of the interesting contextual features of Aznar’s speeches in the Cortes was that they defied a vast popular majority, of more than 90%, against a war in Iraq without UN-backing, even among his own party, the Partido Popular. Aznar totally ignored both the biggest demonstrations ever held in Spain (more than a million people in Barcelona alone), as well as the opposition of all other parties,
including his own coalition partners, and thus risked to lose many votes in the approaching municipal elections of May 2003. Although he was not personally up for re-election at the next general elections in 2004, why would a prime minister thus commit political suicide by slavishly following President George W. Bush as a small-time ally-at-war who is barely taken seriously internationally? Because of the conservative ideology shared with the current U.S. administration? Because of genuine worries about the weapons of mass destruction Saddam Hussein allegedly had? Or perhaps in order to enlist Bush’s support for the local fight against the terrorist organization ETA?

This paper will not engage in these or other political speculations about Aznar’s decisions to support the war against Iraq, but more concretely examine some of the properties of the speeches that are the discursive expressions of Aznar’s public reasons. I shall do so against the background of broader questions about the legitimization of state violence and war, especially after the attack against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, on September 11, 2001, and the international antiterrorist hysteria that followed it.

More specifically, I shall focus on what I shall call the political implicatures of Aznar’s speech, that is, the specific political inferences that participants in the communicative situation, for instance MPs in a parliamentary debate, may make on the basis of (their understanding of) this speech and its context.

My general framework is a multidisciplinary brand of critical discourse analysis (CDA) that tries to ‘triangulate’ social issues in terms of a combined study of discursive, cognitive and social dimensions of a problem (Van Dijk 1993, 2003). Thus, in our case, we are interested not just in describing some interesting properties of political rhetoric, but in order to explain them, we need to relate them to such sociocognitive representations as attitudes, norms, values and ideologies, e.g., those that Aznar shares with his party, as well as to the sociopolitical context of his speeches in contemporary Spain. That is, Aznar’s political discourses and their properties are ultimately to be treated not only as texts but also as expressions of political cognition and political actions in political processes, such as party propaganda and parliamentary decision making at the national level, as well as diplomacy, coalition building and power politics at the international level. This is especially true for political discourse, whose analysis should not be limited to structural features of text and talk, but also account for their conditions and functions in the political process.

Our corpus consists of four interventions by Aznar held during parliamentary sessions on February 5, 19, and March 5 and 29, 2003. However, I shall cite examples only from his first speech of February 5, and focus only on his own
contributions, and ignore, in this paper, the contributions of other politicians and the discursive interactions of the debate.

**Theoretical framework**

*Parliamentary debates*

Against the background of earlier work in CDA in general, and on political discourse in particular, the theoretical framework of this study first of all focuses on the structures and functions of parliamentary debates. Such debates are forms of institutional verbal interaction as well as a specific genre of political discourse, and their general properties may thus be analyzed in the broader frameworks of these discourse categories. As a genre of political discourse, parliamentary debates are local manifestations of the global political acts of legislation, governing, and control of government. More specifically, such debates feature speeches of MPs and members of government that pragmatically function as presenting and legitimating government decisions and policies, supporting the government, and engaging in opposition. Relevant analyses of parliamentary debates should therefore focus on these global functions, and it will thus be assumed that also the structures of the speeches in these debates may described as implementing local moves in the overall realization of these global political functions. It is within this framework that I shall define and use the notion of 'political implicature' below.

Parliamentary debates have a number of formal properties that shall largely be ignored in my analysis, such as speaker and turn-taking control by the Speaker or President, order and change of speakers according to membership of government or opposition parties, ritualized form of address (e.g., ‘Su Señoría’ in Spanish), and the formal lexical and syntactic style of prepared addresses and official reactions to previous speeches. Also because our data are taken from the official record, there are hardly any spontaneous forms of speech and interactions, such as overlaps, repairs, false starts and incomplete sentences.

Politically more interesting in this case, and hence more relevant in a CDA framework, are the semantic and rhetorical properties of Aznar’s speech. Thus, in a speech legitimating Spain’s participation in the war in Iraq, we may not only expect the usual global strategies of legitimation, such as the legal, moral or political justification of such participation, but also the well-known global semantic strategies of positive self-presentation of *Us* and negative
other-presentation of Them. As is the case for many other political discourses after September 11, We represent the western democracies that fight against terrorism or ‘rogue states’, and They are the terrorists or states that threaten us, in our case specifically Saddam Hussein. Such semantic polarization may be rhetorically emphasized in the usual way, e.g., by hyperboles and metaphors about our good things and their bad things.

Although there are few general semantic constraints on parliamentary debates, which after all may be about many different topics, these overall semantic and rhetorical strategies of ingroup and outgroup polarization are quite general, and also dependent on the political functions of such debates. That is, governments and the MPs that back them will typically present their own policies and actions in a positive light, and opposition MPs will do, by definition, the ‘opposite’: negatively describe, condemn or attack such actions and policies. In my analysis I shall merely summarize some of the specific forms this semantics and rhetoric takes in the speech of Aznar.

Context models

There is another fundamental aspect of parliamentary debates: context. That is, many of the formal, semantic and rhetorical aspects of parliamentary debates are hardly specific, and may be found also in other formal encounters or in other political discourse. This means that most of the unique properties of this genre of political discourse are contextual: Who are speaking and listening, what are their roles, what kind of actions they engage in, with what intentions, and so on. As suggested above, it is here that we must observe the political functions of the debates, as interactions between MPs, as engaging in specific political actions, and with specific political goals.

This formulation of the contextual dimension of parliamentary debates is however rather informal. Theoretically, it should be emphasized that there is no direct relationship between text and context when context is defined in terms of these aspects of the political situation: MPs and their roles, actions and goals. Rather, contexts can only influence what people say or understand when defined in terms of subjective, participant constructs. It is not the social or political situation itself that influences text or talk, but rather the way individual participants represent, understand or otherwise construct the now-for-them-relevant properties of such a situation. Thus, contexts are not objective, or ‘out there’, but subjective constructs of participants. In terms of contemporary cognitive psychology, this means that contexts are mental models represented
in episodic memory: context models. These context models control many of
the properties of the production and comprehension of discourse: speech acts,
style, lexical selection, formats, rhetoric, semantic strategies and so on.

Although unique in each communicative situation, while representing each
participant’s ad hoc construction of the communicative situation, the general
format of context models is necessarily more general, though culturally vari-
able. MPs need not invent each time the standard categories of the structure
that organizes their context models of the debates they participate in.

Political implicatures

The feature of Aznar’s speech I would like to focus on are the political impli-
catures of his speech. These implicatures must be defined within the frame-
work of the theory of context briefly summarized above, that is, in terms of the
participant’s context models of their own political identities, roles, goals, ac-
tions and beliefs. I have chosen the term ‘implicature’ rather than ‘implication’
because the inferences involved are not semantic, but pragmatic or contextual.
Aznar’s speech of course also has many semantic implications, for instance
when he describes the ‘bad’ behavior of Saddam Hussein. Most of these se-
monic implicatures are, in our case, about Iraq and Spain’s policy. That is, they
are inferred from the topics talked about as well as from the general knowledge
we have about Spain, terrorism, international policy, Iraq, and so on. Much of
the understanding of the speeches in this debate involves the production of
these semantic inferences, some of which quite general, others more personal
and variable. Thus, when Aznar in the beginning of his speech defines the situ-
ation in Iraq as a “crisis that confronts” the international community, then the
(political) implication is that Iraq is a threat for ‘us’.

Implicatures on the other hand are usually defined as weak semantic impli-
cations or pragmatically in terms of contexts (Atlas 2000; Gazdar 1979; Grice
1989; Levinson 2000). My use of the term will here be limited to the pragmatics
of context, and I shall thus define political implicatures as implicatures that are
specifically based on the political context. For example, if Aznar emphasizes that
despite his support for the war in Iraq, his policy is a peaceful one, he not only
makes an assertion about the war in Iraq and his policies — to be analyzed in
semantic terms — but this assertion should also be understood as the defense of
government policy of the Prime Minister, of the leader of the government party
Partido Popular (PP), and as reacting to critique from citizens and the opposition
parties, and with the political aim to legitimate highly controversial decisions.
Thus, each fragment of his speech may also be analyzed in terms of its functions in the current political interaction, locally within parliament in the current debate and more globally in the current political situation, such as legitimating his own policies and delegitimation the opposition, among other strategies.

Political implicatures are assigned by the participants as inferences from three sources:

i. participants’ representations of the structures of the discourse and its meanings (such as their mental model of the situation in Iraq),

ii. participants’ context model of the current communicative situation,

iii. participants’ more general knowledge about the political situation in the world and in the country.

In the examples below, I shall show in more detail how such implicatures may be derived. This will be done more or less informally, but it should be stressed that in a theoretically more explicit account, we would need to spell out in detail the contents of the context models, as well as the strategies of inference that allow participants — in this case MPs — to make such inferences. Approaches in CDA, conversation analysis and political discourse analysis that ignore a cognitive component either need to disregard such ‘unobservable’ implicatures or reduce them to properties of discourse or undefined contexts. Also, a satisfactory account of (pragmatic) political implicatures, presupposes an explicit theory of context, as briefly summarized here.

That such implicatures are actually relevant for political discourse analysis is not only obvious for participants and analysts alike if they share the relevant political knowledge of the current political situation, but more specifically may also be explicitly signaled by the participants in their reactions to previous speeches. This is, however, not a necessary condition of our analysis — political implicatures may also be assessed indirectly by later interviews of participants, or by other methods — and need not be signaled explicitly in a speech of participants. Indeed, they are routinely understood and only presupposed in later talk and text. Later commentary in the media on parliamentary debates often precisely focuses on these tacit political implicatures of such debates. Political implicatures explain that and why political participants say the things they do. They define the fundamental political point of parliamentary debates in the first place, such as ‘doing’ government and ‘doing’ opposition, and more generally the institutional and political power play enacted in parliaments. Through an analysis of political implicatures, thus, we show why ongoing political discourse is relevant for the political process.
Method

In my analyses below I shall select a number of characteristic fragments of Aznar’s speech as they implement the usual properties of political discourse as we know them from the literature, such as positive ingroup and negative outgroup descriptions as well as other strategies of parliamentary debates. This selection and brief characterizations show how Aznar is engaging in political discourse and its well-known structures and strategies, and more specifically in the case of the debate about the war in Iraq. At the same time, these examples and their (largely semantic) analysis should provide insight in a political issue, namely how political leaders manage the legitimation of controversial policies. There is no explicit discovery procedure for these political discourse structures, and hence for the selection of the fragments analyzed, otherwise than those predicted by theories of political discourse in general, and theories of parliamentary debates in particular.

Besides these brief standard analyses, the analysis will focus more in detail on the political implicatures of each fragment, thus accounting for the political functions and rationale of this debate in the Spanish Cortes. I suggest that this is probably the way MPs and other observers, as well as by the knowledgeable public at large, understand the debate. Obviously, a complete analysis of all political implicatures of this speech would require hundreds of pages of detailed description, so we shall limit ourselves to a limited number of characteristic examples.

Defining the situation

Many types of discourse, such as editorials and also speeches in parliament, feature an initial schematic category that might be called Defining the Situation. Such a category is sequentially relevant in discourses whose main aim is to make comments on a social or political situation, to recommend specific actions, or to justify or legitimate actions. Thus, if one wants to explain or justify why one acted in a specific (usually criticized) way, it makes sense to describe a situation in which such acts appear necessary, logical, comprehensible, unavoidable or otherwise acceptable. Typically, there are normative rules (and international law) that in specific cases allow people or States to defend themselves when they are attacked — and U.S. politicians, scholars and military have justified the Iraq war on such grounds (for analysis of such forms of
legitimation, see, e.g., Borch and Wilson 2003; see also Chomsky 2003; Christopher 2003; Daalder and Lindsay 2003; Dinstein 2001; Falk 2003; Gareau 2004; Newhouse 2003; Nye 2000; Rodin 2002; Walzer 2004).

Thus, if Aznar is required to defend his very unpopular Iraq policy, he first needs to lay out a political situation that makes such policy understandable, reasonable, and legitimate. This is indeed what he does, as from the first words of his intervention, in which he defines the situation as a crisis:

(1) “El señor PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO (Aznar López):
Señora presidenta, señorías, al comenzar el periodo de sesiones,
comparezco esta tarde ante la Cámara para informar a SS.SS. de la
posición del Gobierno ante la crisis que enfrenta a la comunidad
internacional con Irak.”

Since politicians, parliaments and especially governments need to take action when there is a ‘crisis’, this is a persuasive way to define the initial situation. Indeed, also the opposition no doubt describes the current situation as a crisis, if only because of the looming war threatened by the USA and the UK. Note though that even in this very first sentence, Aznar does not blame the crisis on those who started it with their war plans, such as the USA and the UK, but on Iraq. The obvious political implication of his first definition of the situation, thus, is that it is Iraq that is responsible for the crisis, and the choice of the word ‘enfrenta’ (confront) further confirms that ‘we’ are the victims of this confrontation. Secondly, the crisis is not defined as facing Aznar’s government alone, but as a crisis that affects the whole international community. Such a formulation, and its (weak) implications, is one of the ways in which arguments can be opposed that claim that this is a conflict only as defined by the USA and its allies, and not by the international community.

Besides these (semantic) implications, there are however also a number of political implicatures of this speech. From the start and throughout, Aznar shows that he is acutely aware of his own position, that of his party, as well as of the opposition and the population at large, in the question of Iraq. In the current situation in parliament, thus, it is crucial that not only the ‘content’ of his speech be an efficient contribution to the general strategy of legitimation of his policies, but that he be seen and accepted as a good, responsible party leader and prime minister, and that, hence, the opposition have no ‘point’. Thus, instead of directly starting with his report of the government’s policy in Iraq, Aznar prefaces his statement with an explicit deictic formula describing his own ‘appearance’ in parliament.
Such performatives may just be a more or less formal way of speaking, but in this case they also have specific political implicatures: Aznar had been accused by the opposition as well as by the media and other elites of ignoring parliament and public opinion by not informing them about government policy on Iraq. Thus, by making his own ‘appearance’ and ‘report’ for the MPs explicit in the very first sentence of his speech, he politically implicates that (i) he is doing his job as MP, (ii) he listens to the opposition and the country and hence is a good democrat, (iii) that the earlier critique against him is not or no longer relevant, and (iv) that those who formulated the critique — such as the oppositional PSOE — have no point. These and possibly other political implicatures may be seen as part of one of the forms of contextual polarization and face management, that is, of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, and of course of political counter-attack.

At the same time, Aznar politically implicates that his government is part of *us*, that is, the ingroup of the ‘international community,’ an implicature that has a whole series of other political implicatures, namely that his policies are in line with the international community, and therefore legitimate, and that the opposition, which does not want to join the war (and which when they came to power in March 2004 immediately decided to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq), is not part of the international community, and hence less legitimate in its claims. Indeed, following the political logic of President George W. Bush, one might further infer that if the opposition is not *with* the ‘international community’ (that is, the USA, the UK and some other countries), then it is against them, and possibly even playing in the hands of the enemy, Saddam Hussein.

As suggested before, the formulation of these implicatures is informal, but will have to do for the purposes of this paper. A more formal account would have to make explicit the precise context models of Aznar and the MPs, so that it can be shown how previous political knowledge, the representation of the situation and the mental model representing the semantic interpretation of this fragment all provide the information necessary to derive these plausible political inferences.

After this initial, and hence thematic or global definition of the situation (as headlines do at the beginning of a news article), and its overall contextual implicatures, Aznar needs to provide specifics of the situation of crisis, and further arguments that allow him to define the situation as a crisis in the first place, and that also explain the position of his government in this crisis. This is indeed what he does, by now explicitly attributing the crisis to Iraq:
(2) “La crisis es consecuencia del reiterado incumplimiento por parte de Irak de sus obligaciones internacionales y de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. A poco que hagamos memoria, vemos que no es más que un nuevo episodio del problema surgido en 1990, cuando el régimen iraquí invadió Kuwait. (Rumores.)”

Note that Aznar here does much more than merely accuse Iraq as the cause of the crisis. Among other things, he says, does and implies the following:

a. By modifying non-compliance of Iraq with the word “repeated”, he semantically emphasizes the seriousness of non-compliance, and hence the seriousness of the crisis, thereby adducing further grounds to accuse Iraq and to legitimize the war. Such a rhetorical emphasis presupposes the normative or legal inference that if a negative act (such as non-compliance) is not unintentional or exceptional, and does not occur for the first time, its repeated nature makes it intentional and the perpetrator more guilty.

b. By referring to international obligations and the Security Council of the United Nations, he emphasizes that Iraq is defying the world’s highest authority, and official earlier resolutions. Again, this emphasizes the ‘official’ guilt of Iraq, as well as the legitimacy, if not the obligation, to condemn Iraq and take action against it.

c. In the second sentence, Aznar refers to the (first) Gulf War, in which Iraq’s (Saddam Hussein’s) aggression was obvious because of its invasion of Kuwait. By calling the current situation a continuation of that invasion, Aznar politically implies at least two other things: That Iraq, despite the fact that it did not invade another country now, is still guilty of provoking an international crisis, and secondly that in the same way as in 1990, international (armed) action against Iraq is legitimate. That this implication is understood, but rejected as a legitimatization of war now, is obvious from the protests of other MPs (described here as “rumores” — noise — in the transcript of the Diario de las Sesiones).

This further definition of the situation as a crisis provoked by Iraq, at the same time emphasizes the seriousness of the crisis as well as the guilt of Iraq, as a challenge to the highest authority in the world, as a form of political aligning himself with such authority (the Security Council and the United Nations), and finally to legitimate international action because of the repeated and continuous challenges to the U.N., already begun with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
In other words, the initial definition of the situation is one that Aznar carefully articulates in a way that is consistent with his own policy. That is, his speech not only provides a description of an international crisis, and not only is formulated in such a way that the mental model of the event it expresses and conveys is the one preferred in this process of persuasion. At the same time, the implications of this definition provide as many arguments for the political legitimatization of his own policies: to define the current situation as a crisis, to accuse Iraq as being non-compliant and hence as in breach of international resolutions, to define this challenge as a continuation of the aggression against Iraq, and hence the legitimacy to confront Iraq with armed intervention as was the case in the Gulf war. Indeed, since there are many other dictatorships in the world, the fact that Saddam Hussein oppresses the people of Iraq, is as such no international legitimization for war against him, so that it is imperative to marshal any evidence or argument that finds him guilty of current breaches of international law, or that defines his current position as the same as the one that provoked the earlier (legitimate) war. We see that Aznar carefully follows this legitimatization strategy in his speech. Although these implications are local legitimatizations of his own policy, they are at the same time international in scope, and overlapping with those of U.S. and UK foreign policy.

But Aznar is not only aligning himself internationally with Bush and Blair, but in parliament he needs to defend such policy against fierce opposition, and in Spain against a nearly unanimous popular condemnation. This means that we should also draw the political inferences of his speech in terms of the relation with the stance of the parliamentary opposition and public opinion, that is in terms of contextual implicatures. In other words, Aznar does not only speak about Iraq or about his government policy, but also needs to manage his power in parliament and the country. He does so, implicitly, through a polarization according to which he associates himself with the Good Guys, and those who oppose the war as supporting Saddam Hussein, the enemy. Again, this move is part of the ideological strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. By doing so, he not only legitimizes his own policy but also delegitimizes those who oppose the war, and especially also the political opposition parties, such as the PSOE, the Socialist Party of Spain. As suggested above, such political implicatures are inferred from a combined general knowledge of politics and a more contextual understanding of the current political situation, for instance in Spain. The sequence of political inferences might in that case be something like this:

- I am doing what I am supposed to do according to the rules.
– (Therefore) I am doing my job as prime minister.
– (Therefore) I follow the rules of our democracy.
– (Therefore) I am a democrat.
– (Therefore) I am a good politician.
– (Therefore) There is (now) no reason to criticize me or my government.
– (Therefore) The criticism of the opposition (or others) is unfounded.
– (Therefore) The opposition is not doing its job well.
– (Therefore) The opposition is no good.

Empirically such inferences are warranted when consistent with the way competent political participants actual do understand Aznar’s statements in this way, an understanding that may become manifest in the way they react to his speech.

Positive self-presentation

As we have seen also for Aznar, speakers prefer to describe themselves in positive terms. This tendency is part of well-known interactional and sociocognitive strategy to present oneself in a positive light, or at least to avoid a negative impression and in general to manage the impression on our interlocutors. The same is of course true in most forms of public discourse, where making a good impression may even be more important than in informal everyday life conversations, for instance because of the more serious impact on a larger audience, as well as the possibility of professional or political damage that may be the result of a ‘wrong’ presentation of Self. This is particularly important in politics, where especially opposition politicians, as well as the media, and indirectly the public at large are critically listening, and where a faux pas may cost votes at the next elections. We may therefore expect that also Aznar will engage in extensive and varied forms of positive self-presentation, especially given the devastating critique his position on Iraq received in the media, from most other political parties as well as from the vast majority of the population at large. Probably on few topics in recent Spanish history, opposition against government policy had been so pervasive. In other words, Aznar has some serious image repair to do. Let us examine some of these moves. Here is a first example, right at the beginning of his speech:

(3) “Esta comparecencia continúa la información proporcionada a SS.SS. por el Gobierno anteriormente. En concreto, el Gobierno
ha informado sobre la situación de Irak por medio de la comparecencia de la ministra de Asuntos Exteriores en un total de cinco ocasiones, la última el viernes pasado ante la Comisión correspondiente. Yo mismo he comparecido para dar cuenta de la posición del Gobierno en otras dos ocasiones. El Gobierno también ha contestado por escrito a diversas preguntas que se le han formulado sobre la cuestión. A la comparecencia de hoy seguirán otras mías o de los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores y de Defensa, en función de los acontecimientos y según la forma que requiera la evolución de esta crisis, conforme al Reglamento de la Cámara.”

Why would Aznar enter in so much detail about his repeated ‘appearances’ in parliament? The rather obvious answer is in terms of its relevance in relation to the (presupposed) critique of the opposition, the media and others, namely that Aznar, unlike Tony Blair, hardly tried to explain or justify his policies about Iraq, and thus had shown his arrogance in the face of massive public opposition to the war. That is, in order to show that he is *not* arrogant, but democratic, listens to the people, and follows (as he says explicitly) the rules of parliament, he emphasizes his repeated compliance with the democratic rules. He need not explicitly say that he is democratic and otherwise respecting the wishes of parliament, but this passage politically implicates such meanings for a politically knowledgeable audience. At each point of his speech, Aznar carefully measures the possible political implications of what he is saying, emphasizing the points that show that he (or his party) is complying with basic political rules of democracy, as well as with more general social norms and values — and conversely, justifying or de-emphasizing in many ways those elements of his words and his policies that might be interpreted negatively, thereby aiming to avoid or to challenge a bad impression.

Throughout his speeches, Aznar engages in many other forms of positive self-presentation. Let us examine some other examples:

(4) “El Gobierno, señoras, desea la paz y está trabajando activamente para asegurarla.” (p. 11250).

(5) “España ha mantenido siempre una actitud constructiva en el conflicto de Oriente Medio.” (p. 11253).

(6) “Señora presidenta, señoras, soy bien consciente de que lo que esta tarde tratamos en la Cámara es algo que afecta de manera profunda a
los sentimientos, también a las convicciones y también, por supuesto, además, a la razón. Siento el mayor respeto por todas las posiciones que se puedan manifestar en esta sesión… (Rumores.). (…) Nadie tiene el monopolio de la razón, como nadie tiene el monopolio de los buenos sentimientos. Comprendo que lo que tratamos son decisiones difíciles y que ninguno querríamos estar en la situación que estamos.”

These are three different types of self-presentation, namely when the speaker speaks for his group or organization (here, the government), as in example 4, when the speaker speaks for his country (example 5), and when the speaker speaks for himself, as in the last and most significant example. Whereas the first two kinds of self-praise are typically political, the last one is personal, and intended to emphasize the good character of the speaker. In all cases, these forms of self-congratulation are interactionally occasioned, and respond to real or possible criticisms of his opponents — as they define the political context of Aznar’s speech. Example (5) is the most obvious case, since Aznar and his government have been widely accused of warmongering, so he needs to emphasize that he and his government are (of course) in favor of peace — a self-evident and well-known topos, widely used even to legitimize war and aggression, and part of the overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation: We are peaceful and merely defending ourselves, whereas They are aggressive and warmongering.

We shall see later that in this and many other passages, however, Aznar always adds that this peace should be peace “with security”. The second case is more general, and responds to the real or possible critique that by joining the USA in a war against Iraq, Spain may lose its credit with the Arab states. The third form of self-presentation, which may also be described as the first part of a (complex) disclaimer, namely as a form of apparent empathy, is intended to show that he is not the ruthless statesman who disregards the feelings, opinions and reasons of all those who are against the war — namely the vast majority of the Spanish population and all political parties in parliament except his own. Disregarding these feelings and beliefs would not only allow the conclusion that he personally lacks feelings and consideration, but perhaps even more crucially that he is not democratic by not considering the opinions of all those who oppose the war. Indeed, respect is one of the major values both in everyday interaction as well as in politics. It is important that he emphasizes these characteristics, especially in the face of multiple critiques among other politicians, the media and the population at large that his pro-war policy ignores the opinion of the vast majority of the people in Spain. In the last part of example
(6), he continues this important section of his speech with a topos of equality, formulated in the form of a repeated negation and parallelism to emphasize its effect. This fragment may also be interpreted as (part of) a standard disclaimer, namely as an apparent concession (“I may be wrong, but…”), but given the political context, the interpretation should rather be that Aznar does not accept that the “good feelings” are only on the side of the opposition. However, in the rest of the sequence, as well as in the speech as a whole, Aznar nevertheless disregards these feelings of “comprehension” and ask for a “responsible” (and hence not emotional) support of his policies, so that his positive moves may be interpreted as the first part of a long disclaimer. Indeed, as suggested, in another move of positive self-presentation that also has a function as a legitimation of his policies, Aznar then adds that a “firm and resolute” response to Saddam Hussein is a “responsible” policy, because only in this way the best interests of Spain are served:

(7) “Y la que le corresponde tomar a un gobierno español que atienda a los intereses permanentes de nuestro país.” (p. 11254).

(8) “Creo sinceramente que hoy estoy cumpliendo lo que reclamé cuando encabezaba la oposición, lo que me comprometí al ser elegido presidente del Gobierno, lo que creo más razonable y lo que creo que conviene mejor a España y a los españoles.”

Note that in these examples, which are the final words of this speech before thanking the president of the Cortes, he interestingly combines various forms of positive self-presentation, such as a eulogy of his government, with an emphasis of personal commitment, reasonableness and sincerity. Politically most relevant, of course, is his claim that the policy of his government is good for the country. Personally and interactionally however, it is more important that he comes across as credible and honest.

The analysis of these few examples is not merely another illustration of the well-known strategy of positive self-presentation and its functions in political speeches. My point, and the rationale for this article, is that the informal analysis of various types of positive self-presentation and facework provided above highlights a series of political implicatures that cannot simply be described in a semantic analysis, but presuppose detailed contextual knowledge of the current political situation in Spain and the world (the Iraq crisis), at a more global level, and the communicative and political situation in the Cortes during the speech, at the local level. There are many ways and levels to ‘understand’ this speech, and one, politically relevant one is what Aznar’s political concerns are,
and why each move in his speech also has a very specific function in the political process. These functions are relevant and understood by all knowledgeable participants but are seldom made explicit, and are embodied in the political implicatures that participants derive at each point of a political speech.

**Negative other-presentation**

In political and other ideologically-based discourse, positive self-presentation is usually combined with *negative other-presentation*, or derogation, following the well-known social psycho-logic of ingroup–outgroup polarization. Thus, in speeches that are intended to justify or legitimatize war, derogation of the ‘enemy’ is of course crucial, as we also have seen in the speeches of Bush, Blair and those who support them. Although first considered and supported as an ally (e.g., against Iran), especially since the occupation of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein was generally portrayed as the West’s preferred villain, both in politics and the media (Martín Rojo 1995). So it is not surprising that in the wake of the sudden interest of Bush & Co for “rogue states” and “global terrorism” after the September 11 attacks, Saddam Hussein soon become the number one rogue, when Osama Bin Laden could not be captured after the attacks. This and related backgrounds and legitimatizations of the war against Iraq of course also play in the discourses of the allies of the USA, namely the UK and Spain, and we may therefore expect extensive derogation of Saddam Hussein also in Aznar’s speeches. Moreover, these arguments are strong not only because Hussein was undoubtedly a dictator who had savagely oppressed the people of Iraq, but also because these arguments could, as such, hardly be challenged by a leftist opposition that could not agree more. Thus, bashing Saddam is perfectly consistent with a humanitarian, leftist perspective, and therefore strategically an excellent ploy. If the war against Saddam Hussein was not strictly legal, there was at least a good argument for its legitimacy if the argument were purely humanitarian. However, as we know, in order not to break international legal conventions, the threat of weapons of mass destruction had to be alleged as the official motive for the war, and not because Saddam Hussein was a dictator or violating human rights — since that argument would apply to many other countries and dictators.

It is not surprising therefore that Aznar emphasizes the negative characteristics of the enemy, Saddam Hussein, such as in the following passage
“El de Sadam es un régimen de terror que no ha dudado en emplear armas de destrucción masiva en las guerras que ha promovido contra sus países vecinos y contra su propio pueblo.”

An analysis of this and other passages is consistent with earlier work on political rhetoric in general and on Saddam Hussein in particular, and will not further detain us. Thus, we find the usual forms of hyperbole, extreme case formulations, and a specific set of lexical items (such as “terror”, “armas de destrucción masiva”) among many other forms of negative person and group characterization. My main point in this paper is not merely the usual description of political rhetoric and legitimation, but a study of some of the contextual functions of such strategies in the current political situation and the political process. Why is it politically relevant and important now to repeat and emphasize that Saddam Hussein is a very bad guy? After all, there is no disagreement about this at all with the opposition or public opinion at large, so there is no particular point for an argument or a form of persuasion here. So, what are the political implicatures of Aznar’s current derogation of Saddam Hussein? Let us spell out a few of them:

- If the socialist opposition (mostly the PSOE) does not want to go to war against Saddam Hussein, then they are in fact playing in the hand of Sad-dam Hussein. Since we all know that he is an appalling dictator, the opposition are nevertheless supporting him, even against the interests of the Iraqi population. This is obviously inconsistent with the humanitarian and social values of the (socialist) opposition. So, by not supporting the war against Saddam Hussein, and hence our policies, the socialist opposition is betraying its own principles, and hence cannot be trusted.

- On the other hand, since Aznar does want to support a coalition that wants to fight such a terrible dictator as Saddam Hussein (because he is a danger for the world and his own people), then Aznar is doing my duty as responsible prime minister.

- By describing and emphasizing those characteristics of Saddam Hussein as they were highlighted also by the USA, such as the invasion of Kuwait, his earlier breaches of UN resolutions, the alleged weapons of mass destruction and the links with terrorist organizations, Aznar shows the alignment of his government and party with those of a powerful ally. That by itself may be seen as a legitimate policy, but also shows the political ‘family resemblance’ between Aznar and Bush, as fellow conservative politicians. For the same reason there is much less emphasis on the serious violations
of human rights by Saddam Hussein — which would be much more typical for the opposition.

- By emphasizing the danger ‘for all of us’ of the possibility that the weapons of mass destruction may be used by terrorists, through their alleged links with Saddam Hussein, Aznar shows his legitimate concern as responsible leader, and at the same time politically implies that the opposition obviously does not have that concern, and hence disregards its social responsibilities.

Of course several other implicatures may be formulated, but the point is clear that what Aznar says about Saddam Hussein has little to do with his personal or ‘real’ opinions about the dictator, but rather with the overall strategy of legitimating a war against such a tyrant. The political implicatures of such a negative other presentation of the dictator is thus again a way of positively presenting his own position and policies, and hence those of his party and government, while at the same time disparaging those of the opposition. A detailed, negative description of the horrible violations of human rights by Saddam Hussein would not have satisfied these political functions: they would be inconsistent with the main arguments of the USA, against international rules (that do not allow removal of terrible dictators), and too consistent with the attitudes of the opposition. Indeed, awkward questions may then be asked about the earlier support of Saddam Hussein by the USA, e.g., by the supply of toxic gas, and other weapons, when the dictator was their ally against Iran. In other words, negative other presentations in political discourse are not just a description of a bad guy, but rather a politically relevant selection of, and emphasis on what are the currently politically relevant ‘bad’ things that need to be highlighted in discourse. The analysis of political implicatures makes such tacit ‘tactical’ reasons explicit.

Peace, security and terrorism

Aznar’s slogan in this debate, as is the case more generally, is “paz y seguridad”, peace and security, a slogan that is repeated in many forms in his speech, as in the following examples.

(10) “Primero, el Gobierno está trabajando por restablecer la paz y la seguridad. El interés del Gobierno es obtener una situación de paz con seguridad.”
(11) “Desearía que convinieran conmigo en que una postura firme y resolutiva para desarmar a Irak en un plazo inmediato es lo responsable, lo lógico e inteligente para las aspiraciones de paz y seguridad de la comunidad internacional, que también son las de nuestro país.”

The first part of the binomial expression is in line with a major value, and shared by the majority of his opponents, even when these are not exactly pacifists, but only oppose this war. It is the kind of value, aim and principle that is unassailable. However, it is the combination with the second concept that makes the slogan interesting, and characteristic of his conservative government, also in questions of immigration, and in line with similar slogans in the USA and Europe: security has become the keyword of the post September 11 politics, also in domains that have little to do with terrorism. In many countries, citizens are manipulated into believing that society has become increasingly insecure, and mobilized to support a sometimes draconian curtailment of their civil rights. Terrorist attacks are selectively (and gratefully) focused upon, both in politics and the media, to sustain that continuous fear. That many more citizens die of other avoidable causes that could be combated with much less money and less limitations of freedom, is of course no issue in such belligerent ideologies and policies. Thus, if we read the slogan as it is really intended, Peace, but security, it takes the more transparent form of a well-known disclaimer, that of the Apparent Concession, in which the first part is the part that satisfies the strategy of positive self-presentation (‘we want peace’, ‘we are peaceful’), comparable to the well-known counterpart in racist disclaimers (‘we are not racists’). The crucial, second part then becomes the essential condition and the principal aim of the discourse, consistent with the overall strategy of well-known security text and talk of the national security state. No further analysis is needed here why terrorism serves Bush, his party, the Pentagon budget, the curtailment of civil liberties, and especially the businesses involved in war and security. Such analyses have been provided repeatedly by other authors.

Besides the general semantic and political analysis of the disclaimer, relevant for us are the political implicatures of such a slogan: why does it serve Aznar here and how? Again, we witness that the fundamental contextual strategy is one of positive political self-presentation for the public or the voters at large, on the one hand, and the derogation of the opposition, on the other hand. In the same way as Law and Order is the slogan to combat crime and emphasize and implement conservative values, Peace and Security serves to appeal to the fears of people who feel insecure, and need a strong government that will primarily satisfy the fundamental needs of security. Aznar, Bush and
Blair know that most citizens — no more than they themselves — are not really worried in their daily life about what happens in Iraq or the Middle East, or about weapons of mass destruction, and maybe not even about lack of peace somewhere else in the world. Hence, to legitimate power policies and wars, it is essential to use the vague general concept that does matter for many people: feelings of (in)security. In (10) therefore, the slogan is not just that Aznar and his government want Peace and Security, but are actively engaged in trying to establish it (“trabajando”). At the same time, the corollary is the political implicature that if the opposition only wants peace, they are not offering what people want most: security. Thus Aznar is implicitly able to disqualify the leftist opposition as mere pacifists.

These implicatures also function locally — that is, they are relevant in the local political context in Spain — when Aznar indirectly and sometimes directly links Iraq and Saddam Hussein with international terrorism, and international terrorism with local terrorism of ETA. Peace in such a context may be a less appropriate term, but security of course is. In other words, the slogan at the same time functions politically as a way to emphasize the positive role of the conservative government in the fight against ETA, as also several other passages in his speech show:

(12) “(...) este Gobierno ha querido desempeñar un papel activo en esta crisis internacional pensando en la nueva amenaza que hoy supone el terrorismo, especialmente si tiene a su alcance medios de destrucción masiva.”

(13) “... el Gobierno entiende que hay un riesgo gravísimo y un vínculo amenazador entre la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva y el terrorismo. Sé bien que no es agradable precisar estos riesgos, pero sé muy bien que no estamos hablando, señoras, de ninguna fantasía. No son hipótesis de ciencia ficción. Hemos visto hace pocos días en Londres y también, por desgracia, en Barcelona que hay grupos terroristas dispuestos a atacar causando el mayor daño y destrucción posibles y que cuentan con sustancias que podrían causar centenares, si no miles, de muertos. Después del 11 de septiembre ningún gobernante responsable, ante su conciencia y ante su país, puede ignorar esta realidad.”

(14) “La lucha contra el terrorismo es el principal objetivo, apoyado por las fuerzas parlamentarias, de la política exterior española. Hemos impulsado la lucha contra el terrorismo y contra la proliferación de
armas de destrucción masiva en nuestras relaciones bilaterales y en todos los foros internacionales.”

(15) “España ha impulsado con toda sus fuerzas estas políticas y vemos con satisfacción cómo la lucha contra estas lacras ha escalado posiciones en la agenda de la comunidad internacional hasta convertirse en objetivo básico de ésta. Sabemos que ello nos ayudará — ya lo está haciendo — en nuestra lucha contra el terrorismo de ETA y creemos que es un deber específico de España ofrecer su cooperación a otros países señalados por el terrorismo. Creo que la pasividad ante estas nuevas amenazas es nuestro mayor peligro.”

These examples barely need further contextual and political analysis. International terrorism has become the main argument for the security policies of Bush, Aznar and other leaders, especially when associated with weapons of mass destruction. But although that alone is a sufficient legitimation for them to go to war, Aznar locally needs to do more than that. So he repeatedly emphasizes the local relevance of this struggle by constructing a link with local terrorism of ETA. Since the public at large as well as the socialist opposition share the main aims of the struggle against ETA assassinations, Aznar strategically uses this argument to argue for a broader, international struggle against racism by asserting that this will also be relevant locally. That international terrorism, and of course Iraq, has nothing to do with the actions of ETA, is of course irrelevant for such an argument — they simply have the concept of ‘terrorism’ in common — a well-known move of amalgamation. Another political implicature is to accuse the opposition of inconsistency: If you are against ETA terrorism, you should also actively fight international terrorism. In the last sentence of (15) he actually makes this implicature someone more explicit: the danger consists in not taking action. Interestingly but typically, by the well-known move of conversion, it is pacifism and not terrorism that is the main problem for Aznar. Note finally, that the topic of terrorism threat is thus becoming a standard argument that needs no further proof, that is a *topos*, that can be used in any argument, for instance to increase defense spending, engaging in war and to curtail human rights — all in order to enhance security.

When international terrorism finally also hit home, as it did one year later, on March 11, 2004, with the train massacre in Madrid, causing 190 deaths, Aznar seems to get the ‘proof’ he wants — namely that international terrorism is also locally relevant. Ironically, however, again for the same local reasons mentioned above — the alleged amalgam of international (‘islamist’) terrorism and ETA terrorism — Aznar at first wanted to make the media and the public
believe that the attacks were perpetrated by ETA, for the obvious reason that this would even more vindicate his aggressive anti-ETA policy and get him votes. However, the public and the media resented such obvious manipulation just two days before the national elections and voted him out of office. Independently of the public response, however, what we can learn about the political implicatures of Aznar’s speech of February 5, 2003, is important. Namely, we learn that it is always crucial to sustain international policies with local policies, and strategies to get votes and to delegitimate one’s political opponents. Hence the link established with ETA and the focus on national security, and the feelings of safety of the citizens. Indeed, this is basically the same strategy Bush followed in the USA to legitimate the war against Iraq.

Other strategies

With these examples of Aznar’s political rhetoric we not only have witnessed some of the common properties of political discourse and legitimation, such as the strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, but also some principles underlying the contextual interpretation of such discourse in terms of political implicatures. The other global and local strategies of Aznar’s speech function in a similar way, and may thus be summarized more briefly.

Internationalism

Aznar repeatedly refers to the UN and the international community, first of all in order to legitimate the war and his support for it as beneficial for the whole world — which, in the words of Bush, Blair & Co, will be “safer without Saddam Hussein”, and secondly to hide that the war in Iraq was precisely not supported by the UN or the Security Council:

(16) “El Gobierno ha mantenido desde el comienzo de esta última crisis una postura coherente con la legalidad internacional, la defensa de los intereses de la nación y sus obligaciones internacionales, por este orden.”

The political implicatures of this example are quite explicit by Aznar’s emphasis that not only his policy is legitimate — and hence the aims of the opposition inconsistent with international ‘legality’ — but also that the government is primarily thinking of the national interest, and hence that an international
action is actually in favor of Spanish citizens. This again politically implies that those who oppose that policy are not working in the best interest of Spanish citizens. Indeed, here and elsewhere Aznar actually emphasizes that the opposition is placing itself outside the international consensus — a well-known move of conversion when he knows that it is the war policy of Bush and himself is nearly universally condemned. Hence his support for UN resolutions is mere political lip service. At the same time, emphasizing the interests of the nation is also a counterweight against possible critique, also in his own party, that ‘internationalism’ may be inconsistent with ‘nationalism’, on the right, and the interests of the people, on the left.

The number game

A well-known ploy of argumentation is the number game, which we also know from the rhetoric against immigration. In Aznar’s speech, the number game has several functions, such as to convey objectivity and precision, and hence credibility, and specifically to emphasize the truth about Saddam Hussein’s non-compliance with international resolutions. The number game is also a rhetorical move of emphasis and hyperbole:

(17) “No ha dado cuenta del agente nervioso VX producido y no declarado (Rumores.); no ha explicado el destino de 1.000 toneladas de agentes químicos que conservó tras la guerra con Irán; no ha dado cuenta de 6.500 proyectiles para carga química; no ha demostrado la destrucción de 8.500 litros de ántrax; no ha detenido la producción de misiles con un radio de más de 150 kilómetros: no ha revelado el destino de 380 propulsores de misiles con agentes químicos que fueron introducidos de contrabando en el país el mes anterior.”

Obviously, the precise numbers do not matter here — and the fact that even weeks after the occupation of Iraq none of all this has been found shows that these numbers were largely speculative or relative to innocent chemicals. The political point and implicature of the number game however is its rhetoric of objectivity and credibility — Aznar’s shows that he is well-informed, that he has done his homework. The opposition in this case has less of case against him, and cannot use numbers to support its pacifist policy. At the same time Aznar of course uses these ‘facts’ as proof about the bad character of Saddam Hussein, which is again one argument in the legitimation of the support of the war. Hence, the number game is an example of a more general type of strategy that may be called ‘facticity’. This strategy not only plays a role in argumentation
and legitimation, but also in the context political interaction, namely to signal truth and precision, and hence competence and credibility. The facts as such matter little, the political point is to appear credible. The same is true for much media discourse.

**Consensus**

A well-known political move is that of Consensus, that is asking for or affirming that policies are not partisan but in the national interest, and hence should be supported by the opposition. Thus, Aznar uses this ploy to emphasize the relevance of the unanimity of Resolution 1441 of the UN, which is now brought to bear in a request for support for action against Iraq. But as is also the case for immigration policies both in Spain as elsewhere, ‘threats’ from outside are typically met with a call for national consensus. This also happens here, when Aznar requires national unity in the fight against terrorism. The political implicature of this move is that opposition, and lacking support for government policies, in fact means acting against national interests, and against political common sense — thereby discrediting the opposition. A somewhat stronger version of this move is that of Necessity: We have no other way than to honor our international obligations. This is not only a well-known and effective semantic strategy of argumentation and hence a valid form of legitimation, but again also has the political implicature that Aznar is taking his international ‘obligations’ seriously, and hence is a honorable statesman — whereas the ‘pacifist’ opposition on the other hand does not do so. There are many other moves in his speech that have similar functions, but the examples given above should suffice as illustrations of the nature of the war rhetoric and legitimation by Aznar in the Iraq crisis, as well as the relevance of the notion of political implicature.

**Concluding remark**

Although this paper cannot possibly do justice to all the structures, moves and strategies of Aznar’s speeches in parliament about Iraq, we now have a first glimpse of some of the main characteristics of these speeches. There are few surprises, in the sense that the large majority of the moves and strategies are quite classical in political and ideological text and talk, such as positive self-presentation and negative other presentation, as well as a number of familiar rhetorical and argumentative ploys, such as the use of statistics/numbers,
consensus, internationalism, authorities, comparisons and examples to justify current policy and action.

Theoretically more interesting, however, is the notion of ‘political implicature’, based on inferences from combined general political knowledge and models of the current political situation. For Spain, this means not only that participants need to share knowledge about the current political situation in Spain as represented in their episodic mental models, but also of the context models that control de very speech of Aznar, including setting, participants, aims and so on. These implicatures are the political ‘subtext’ of the speeches, and the way he wants that his audience understands him. These political implicatures are what define also the political functions of the speech in the political process, and focus especially on Aznar’s role as prime minister, party leader, as well as the legitimacy of his government and its international policies. At the same time, the implicatures have the function to derogate and attack the opposition in the public sphere. It is this political analysis of the speech that may be a contribution to the study of the political function of the speech in the political process.

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Falk (2003): NOT FOUND!


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