

14

News, Discourse, and Ideology

Teun A. van Dijk

INTRODUCTION

One of the fields where the studies of discourse and communication overlap is the theory and analysis of news. Research in communication studies has increasingly realized that its objects of study should also be examined as forms or socially situated text or talk. This new focus has especially been applied to the study of news in the press.

Although linguistics, semiotics and discourse studies have paid attention to news discourse since the 1970s, their orientation used to be limited to news structures, thereby ignoring many of the relevant contextual dimensions of communication, such as the sociology and economy of news production and the way recipients understand, memorize and integrate information and knowledge from news.

In this chapter we shall, on the one hand, review some earlier work on news, and, on the other hand, sketch how this important cross-disciplinary approach to news may benefit from other developments in the humanities and social sciences.

Since this integrated study of news-as-discourse-in-communication is still a vast field, this chapter shall specifically deal with one major dimension of such an approach: the *ideological* nature of news in the press. This perspective will be developed within the broader framework of a new multidisciplinary approach to the study of ideology in the social sciences.

DISCOURSE STUDIES

Before we deal with news and ideology, let me briefly recapitulate the theoretical and disciplinary background and some basic principles of a discourse analytical approach to news (see, e.g., Van Dijk, 1997). The new cross-discipline of *discourse studies* has developed since the mid-1960s in most of the humanities and social sciences. This development has taken place more or less at the same time as, and closely related to, the emancipation of several other new interdisciplines in the humanities, such as semiotics, pragmatics, sociolinguistics, and psycholinguistics. Yet, although initially “discourse analysis,” just like semiotics, was based on concepts from various strands of structural and functional linguistics, its later developments were inspired by new developments in the social sciences. Thus, anthropology began to pay attention to complex units such as “communicative events,” a direction of research commonly referred to as “the ethnography of speaking,” particularly influential within linguistic anthropology. Sociology made a profound impact on the

study of discourse within its ethnomethodological paradigm, focusing especially on the analysis of conversation and other forms of everyday interaction. And finally, as we shall see below in more detail, discourse studies have since the 1980s been increasingly applied in the field of communication in general and of mass communication in particular.

Although a vast cross-discipline such as discourse studies can hardly be summarized, some of its main tenets are as follows (for details and a wealth of further references, see Schiffrin, Tannen, & Hamilton, 2001; Van Dijk, 1997, 2007):

1. Contrary to traditional linguistics, the study of discourse is not limited to formal grammars or abstract sentences, but focuses on *natural language use* of real language users in real social situations of interaction and communication.
2. The unit of analysis is no longer the word or sentence, as in traditional grammars, but the structures and strategies of “whole” written or spoken *discourses* or *communicative events*.
3. Discourses, analyzed as complex phenomena in their own right (as is also the case for communication), are described at *many levels of structure* and made explicit in terms of a large variety of theories and (sub) disciplines, such as discourse grammar, semantics, stylistics, rhetoric, conversation analysis, narrative analysis, argumentation analysis, pragmatics, semiotics, and so on. These levels may be described by more local, micro-level analyses, on the one hand, and by more global, macro-level analyses, on the other. One basic principle of these analyses is that of *sequentiality*: Each unit at each level (word, sentence, meaning, speech act, turn, etc.) of discourse is produced, interpreted and analyzed as being conditioned by previously interpreted units. As we shall see, this also applies to the analysis of news reports.
4. Discourses are not limited to a “verbal” dimension only, but also have paraverbal and non-verbal dimensions, such as intonation, gestures and facework, on the one hand, and other “semiotic” dimensions such as sounds, music, images, film and other multimodal aspects, on the other hand. In other words, discourse is now understood as a complex multimodal event of interaction and communication.
5. Discourses as language use also presuppose cognitive aspects of production and comprehension, involving various kinds of mental strategies, knowledge, mental models and other representations in memory.
6. Discourses are studied in relation to various kinds of “situation,” such as interactional, social, communicative, political, historical and cultural frameworks, interpreted by the participants as relevant “contexts.”
7. Discourses are also being studied in the social sciences as social practices that play a crucial role in the reproduction of society in general, and of social communities or groups and their knowledge and ideologies, in particular. As such, discourse analysis has also contributed to the study of the reproduction of racism and other forms of domination and social inequality in society. Indeed, large domains of society, such as politics, the mass media, education, science and law, largely consist of many discourse genres and communicative events in their respective contexts. Thus, scholars in the social sciences often study text or talk, sometimes without awareness of the discursive nature of their data.

We see that the scope of (the objects of) discourse studies has been gradually extended in the last decades, from words to sentences and from sentences to discourses; from syntax to semantics to pragmatics; from microstructures to macrostructures, from monological texts to talk in interaction; from verbal text and talk to multimodal communicative events, from text (and talk) to con-

text, from social discourse and interaction to underlying cognitive processes and representations, and from individual discourse to social systems and domains of discourse and communication.

IDEOLOGY

Many of the observations made above for the complex object of discourse, also apply to the concept of ideology, which equally needs a multidisciplinary approach. This approach may be summarized in the following points (for detail, see Van Dijk, 1998):

1. The original notion of ideology as a “science of ideas” (proposed by Destutt de Tracy at the end of the 18th century) soon received a *negative connotation*, reflected also in the vague concept of “false consciousness” used by Marx and Lenin. This negative meaning has dominated both the study as well as the political applications of the concept of ideology until today, as we know from the work of Mannheim, Lukács, Althusser, Hall, Thompson and Eagleton, among many others.
2. Traditional approaches to ideologies largely ignored the *discursive* and *cognitive* dimension of ideology, despite the fact that ideas (beliefs) and hence ideologies are mental representations, and that ideologies are largely (re)produced by text, talk and communication.
3. A new, *multidisciplinary approach to ideology* should integrate a theory of ideology as a form of *social cognition* (as is also the case for ideology), a theory of the role of *discourse* in the expression and reproduction of ideology, and a theory of the functions of ideology in *society*, for instance in the (re)production of social *groups* and *group relations*.
4. Such a theory should not define ideologies as inherently negative, because ideologies as socially shared by groups are not only used to legitimate power abuse (domination), but also to bolster resistance, as is the case for the socialist, feminist or pacifist movements.
5. Ideologies are not just any kind of social beliefs, but the fundamental, *axiomatic beliefs* underlying the social representations shared by a group, featuring fundamental *norms* and *values* (such as those of freedom, justice, equality, etc.) which may be used or abused by each social group to impose, defend or struggle for its own *interests* (e.g., freedom of the press, freedom of the market, freedom from discrimination, etc.).
6. Ideologies may be seen as the basis of the (positive) *self-image of a group*, organized by fundamental categories such as the desired (valued, preferred) identity, actions, norms and values, resources and relations to other groups. Characteristic of such ideological structures is the polarization between (positive) Us (the ingroup), and (negative) Them (the outgroup). Thus, journalistic (professional) ideologies are defined in terms of typical actions of newsmaking, values such as press freedom, objectivity, fairness or the protected resource of information, as well as the relations to the readers, sources, news actors and the state.
7. Ideologies control more specific socially shared *attitudes* of groups (for instance, a racist ideology may control racist attitudes about immigration, integration, legislation, and so on).
8. Attitudes (such as those on immigration, divorce, abortion, death penalty, and other important social issues) are general and abstract, and may be more or less known and shared by their members who may “apply” them to form their own *personal opinions* about specific social events. These opinions may however be influenced by various (sometimes contradictory) ideologies as well as by personal *experiences*. That is, unlike relatively stable social group attitudes, personal opinions are unique and contextual: They always depend on the person and the situation at hand.

9. Ideologically influenced personal opinions about concrete events (such as the war in Iraq, or a terrorist bomb attack) are represented in *mental models*, held in Episodic Memory (part of Long Term Memory, as part of people's personal experiences).
10. These *ideologically biased mental models are the basis of ideological discourse*, and may influence all levels of such discourse, from its sounds or visuals, to its syntax, topics, meanings, speech acts, style, rhetoric or interactional strategies.
11. Since the underlying ideologies (and the social attitudes and personal opinions influenced by them) are generally *polarized*, this also tends to be the case for ideological discourse, typically organized by emphasizing the positive representation of Us (the ingroup) and the negative representation of Them (the outgroup)—and its corollary (mitigating the negative representation of Us and the positive representation of Them). We call this combination of general discursive strategies the “Ideological Square.”
12. Discourse usually does not express ideologies directly, but via specific group attitudes about social issues and personal opinions about specific events, and under the influence of the communicative situation as subjectively defined by the speakers or writers, that is, by their personal *context models*. Such context models may block or modify (mitigate or amplify) underlying ideological beliefs, when language users adapt to the situation, the audience, and so on. This also explains why ideologies are not always detectable in specific situations (Van Dijk, 2008a, 2008b).

NEWS AS DISCOURSE

The contemporary study of news has some parallels with the study of ideology: After and besides the more anecdotal accounts of news making and journalistic experiences, the modern study of news was originally mainly oriented toward social dimensions of news, such as news gathering routines and journalistic interactions as well as the organization of newspapers, rather than by cognitive and discursive approaches. The first systematic discursive and cognitive approaches to news structures, news production and news comprehension did not appear until the 1980s.

Thus, based on his earlier work on discourse structure and discourse processing, Van Dijk (1988a, 1988b) proposed a multidisciplinary theory of news, featuring a theory of news schemata defined by conventional categories of news discourse as a genre and social practice: Summary (Headline, Lead), New Events, Previous Events, Context, Commentary, and related categories that globally organize the (macro-level) topics of news reports in the press.

Bell (1991) in his book on language of news media adopted some of these categories, but added—correctly—the Attribution category, in which the writer or source (such as the reporter and his or her byline, the newspaper department, an international agency or a correspondent) may be mentioned, together with the date and place. Also, he mentions the category of Follow-Up as the category that organizes the information of events occurring after the major news event. He also connects such news schema categories with the well-known categories of conventional conversational stories, as investigated by Labov and Waletzky (1967) in their seminal article.

While “news stories” seem to be “stories,” they do not have the same schematic (superstructural) organizations as do everyday stories told in conversation: Everyday stories are more or less chronological, whereas news reports are organized by other principles such as relevance, importance and recency. What comes first is the headline and lead, the most important information of the discourse, a summary, as in many conversational stories, but then the story in a news report is delivered in installments—the most important information of each category comes first, followed by the less important information of each category. Also, the *formal* (“syntactic”) categories of

a news schema (such as Summary or Commentary) should not be confused with the semantic categories of news discourse (such as action, actor, etc.), because this would mean that news discourse has a segment in which only information about an actor is given, which is usually not the case: such information is provided together with information about events or actions.

Specifically relevant for this chapter is Bell's contribution to the study of the ideological dimension of news in the press, for instance with a systematic analysis of how the news may "mis-report" or "mis-represent" events. He emphasizes that such studies should go beyond earlier content analyses, critical linguistics and semiotic analyses by developing more explicit linguistic discourse analysis. He summarizes an earlier study of climate change coverage, in which news reports were sent back to (expert) sources with the request to indicate (in)accuracy. It was found that only 29 percent of the stories were absolutely accurate, 55 percent slightly inaccurate and 16 percent inaccurate (Bell, 1991, p. 217). Besides these quantitative measures of mis-representation, interesting for an ideological analysis of news is especially also *how* the news distorts the "facts" (as defined by the original sources!). Thus, one typical transformation is overstatement, which is of the same general category as overgeneralization as we know it from stereotypes and prejudices or "extreme case" formulations in conversations. In addition to a change of semantic content or meaning, such a structural transformation relation between source discourse and news discourse may also be called *rhetorical*, since rhetoric deals with the way information (meaning, content) is emphasized or de-emphasized—for various reasons. This may be to emphasize the bad characteristics of outgroups or the good ones of ingroups, as we shall see below, but also for dramatic effect: where scholarly discourse tends to hedge, media discourse tends to be much more categorical and exaggerated—with the tacit assumption that readers will be more interested in, or will better remember the "exaggerated" news. Besides misrepresentation, Bell also found various forms of misquotations and misattributions, as well as various forms of mis-editing.

NEWS AS IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

News structure analysis shows us *where* and *how* ideologies preferably manifest themselves in news reports. We have seen above that our new sociocognitive approach explains how underlying ideologies control more specific group attitudes and how personal mental models of journalists about news events control activities of news making, such as assignments, news gathering, interviews, news writing, editing and final make up.

These newsmaking activities are ultimately controlled by the specific, ongoing context model of the journalists about the relevant aspects of the social and political situation. Such context models of newsmaking include current setting (location, deadlines, etc.), news participants (reporters, editors, news actors, sources, etc.) and their roles, as well as current aims, and the social knowledge and ideologies of the participants. This also means that whatever other professional and social ideologies (including norms, news values, etc.) may be at work in news production, the constraints of the now relevant context, as defined by the participants, are the crucial filter that makes news more or less appropriate in the current social and political situation.

IDEOLOGY IN CLASSICAL STUDIES OF NEWS

Given the predominantly social approaches to news discourse, one would expect a vast literature on the ideological nature of news. Surprisingly, nothing is less true. Among the many thousands of articles on media and news in the database of the Social Science Citation Abstracts (World

of Knowledge), there are at present (July, 2007) only a dozen titles that feature both keywords “news” and “ideology.” And even the few articles whose titles suggest ideological news analysis, hardly deal with ideological news structures in much detail.

What about books? Some of the classical books on news and newsmaking published since the end of the 1970s do feature sections on ideology, but in those studies such accounts of ideology are more general—typically summarizing (neo) Marxist approaches and their influences, rather than integrating the notion in detailed and systematic ideological analyses of news in the press. This is not surprising, because classical theories of ideology were never developed, whether theoretically or practically, to account for language use, discourse and communication.

Interestingly, these pioneering theoretical and empirical studies of news (such as Chibnall, 1977; Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979; Glasgow University Media Group, 1976, 1980; Golding & Elliott, 1979; Tuchman, 1978) appeared more or less at the same time, nearly thirty years ago, as the first book in critical linguistics, edited by Roger Fowler and his associates (Fowler, Kress, Hodge, & Trew, 1979). This book may be considered as the first study of what later would be called, more broadly, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Fowler is also the author of one of the very few books that would later explicitly deal with news and ideology (Fowler, 1991). In other words, the end of the 1970s appears to be a fertile period of innovation, both in communication studies and in language and discourse studies. This is the period of consolidation of more social scientific and critical approach to language, discourse and communication that had been prepared in the 1970s.

Probably the most detailed, systematic and influential studies of news and ideology of the last decades may be found in the books by the Glasgow University Media Group about television news on industrial strikes (1976, 1980, etc.)—and later on other topics. From the start, this vast empirical project established a link between communication and discourse studies. Thus, in their *More Bad News* (1980) study, the authors emphasize the importance of new developments in linguistics, discourse and conversation analysis: News talk should be studied as a special case of talk in general, and language should not (only) be studied in abstract terms, as is the case of Chomskyan grammars, but should be seen as part of social life. The authors correctly observe that the formal linguistics of the time was hardly prepared to study ideology, and they therefore suggest that we look for inspiration in sociolinguistics, especially as developed by Bernstein, as well as to Sinclair and Coulthard’s (1975) ground-breaking book on discourse studies. To the Glasgow Group authors, news making is based on cultural routines and professional practices that are taken for granted and hence implicit and hard to observe directly. Analysis of news talk is therefore able to reveal the (usually not explicit or intentional) ideologies of journalists. However, the authors stress that industrial news does not simply reproduce ruling class propaganda, but is usually open to various interpretations. Despite this ideological ambiguity, a “preferred reading” of actions and events that is inimical to the interests of labour usually emerges. Such preferences are part of a general formula, frame or “restricted code” of reporting social conflicts that implies an ideological defense of the legitimacy of the status quo. The study examines how various properties of television news show both such underlying professional routines and social ideologies. For instance, both in words (“disruption,” “strike”) and in images, striking workers may be represented negatively, or as a problem for the citizens, but no such negative representation is given of the “actions” of employers (p. 177).

One of the classical studies that pays extensive attention to the role of ideologies in news rooms and news reports is Gitlin’s (1980) analysis of media coverage of the students’ movement in the United States. Unlike most other US researchers of the same period, he explicitly opts for a neo-Marxist, Gramscian framework, as exemplified by the (then still rather unknown) work of Stuart Hall in the UK, to explain his data. Gitlin, thus, is interested in hegemony in journalism:

By socialization, and by the bonds of experience and relationships—in other words, by direct corporate and class interests—the owners and managers of the major media are committed to the maintenance of the going system in its main outlines: committed, that is to say, to private property relations which honor the prerogatives of capital; committed to a national security State; committed to reform of selected violations of the moral code through selective action by State agencies; and committed to approving individual success within corporate and bureaucratic structures. (p. 258)

Gitlin, like Gans, finds that the ideologies of editors and reporters are quite similar, as is the case for journalists and most of their sources. In case of conflict, hegemonic boundaries are not overstepped: As he argues, the “work of hegemony, all in all, consists of imposing standardized assumptions over events and conditions that must be “covered” by the dictates of the prevailing in news standards” (p. 264).

Just like the other classical (sociological) books on news of the same period, Gitlin’s study emphasizes the routines of newsmaking which make reporting less burdensome. However, to remain credible and responsible in times of social upheaval, journalists may need to cover alternative groups (students, feminists) and thus be partly pulled to an alternative ideological direction. In this way, hegemonic frames may slowly shift if such coverage wants to be credibly consistent with how the world is perceived.

We may conclude from this brief review of the account of ideology in some of the classical books on news of the late 1970s and early 1980s that they *do* pay attention to ideology, but that such attention is largely limited to a relatively brief account of ideologies in the newsroom and of journalists, rather than of the properties of the coverage itself. Also, such an account is given in very general terms, and is not based on a detailed study of the ideologies of journalists. Fieldwork observations are the basis of the account of the general ideological consensus in the newsroom, and of the boundaries of possible variation under hegemonic influence of the newspaper as a bureaucracy and a business enterprise. These newsroom observations remain rather general, and hardly inquire into the ideological details of news values, news beats, interactions with sources, news formats, styles and contents, among other aspects of news making. In that sense, most investigations are contemporary studies of the sociology of bureaucratic and organizational routines and taken for granted knowledge and values. They do not provide sociocognitive and discursive analyses of the details of professional and other social ideologies, and how these impact on news production and news discourse.

CONTEMPORARY STUDIES OF NEWS AND IDEOLOGIES

The ideological backlash in the America of presidents Reagan and Bush—father and son—during the 1980s and 1990s was soon disturbed by the Gulf War and then 9/11 and the Iraq war—giving rise to renewed ideological critique of the news media. Whereas communism and anticommunism defined the ideologies of the Cold War, and the media had to confront the new ideologies of resistance, namely those of feminism, antiracism and pacifism, the last decade has seen the substitution of anticommunism by a compound mixture of antiterrorism and anti-Islamism, with a continuing undercurrent of old anti-Arab racism. Such ideologies were not just those of radical neo-liberal hawks, but due to the tragic events of 9/11 could be spread and inculcated among many ordinary people as well, not least in the media. Nationalism, patriotism and jingoism thus combined with the ideologies mentioned above to form the basis of an obsession with “homeland security” on the one hand, and the legitimation of the Iraq war, on the other. The media, as well as their contemporary critics, thus faced an ideological situation that was more complex than that of straightforward anticommunism, and that had only marginally gone beyond the standard

dominant ideologies of race, gender and class challenged by the civil rights and feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

Whereas classical studies focus on newsmaking, contemporary studies also pay attention to the effects and consequences of news. Van Dijk (1988b) presented a general theory of news structures, as organized by specific news schemas, as well as a theory of news production as special forms of (source) discourse processing.

Further, he also offered a series of critical case studies, including one of international news and local opposition groups, such as squatters in Amsterdam (Van Dijk, 1988a). The same book also features a vast case study for UNESCO of the international coverage in hundreds of newspapers in dozens of languages covering co-occurring major events of mid-September 1982 (the assassination of president-elect Bechir Gemayel of Lebanon, the occupation of Beirut by Israel and the accidental death of the Princess of Monaco, Grace Kelly). The results first of all showed that ideological differences in the accounts were less stark than expected. For instance, the coverage of the assassination of Gemayel in (then) communist *Pravda* of Moscow, *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) in China or *Granma* of Cuba, and in much of the (anticommunist) western press, showed many more similarities than ideologically based differences. It was concluded that the (Western) international news agencies on which most of these stories were based seem to successfully promote a global story format for the coverage of such events. The ideological slant of the communist papers was clearly against (the role of) Israel, but such a bias merely showed in a few negative labels such as "Zionist" to refer to Israeli forces. Similarly, arch conservative Chilean *El Mercurio* (supporting Pinochet's military regime) hardly reported negatively on the (violent) history of Falangist Gemayel. Overall, differences in style and content were more marked by other ideological dimensions, such as those between popular and quality newspapers within the same country.

The 1990s also witnessed the publication of some more specific articles on news and ideology. Meeuwis (1993) examined nationalist ideologies in reporting on the war in Yugoslavia—and especially focused on the unchallenged beliefs about ethnicity and interculturality. Kitis and Milapides (1997) advocated a detailed critical analysis of (also) the higher levels of news texts instead of a focus on local grammar or on production conditions of news. In a detailed analysis of a *Time* article about Greece, they show how one metaphor may dominate many of the syntactic and semantic properties of that article. Kuo and Nakamura (2005) compared how two ideologically different papers in Taiwan gave a different account of the same event, namely an interview with the Taiwanese First Lady. Although based on the same text in English (occasioned by her visit to the United States), the newspapers produced systematically distinct translations of the First Lady's interview in headlines; what is included or excluded, as well as differences of lexical choice, among other discourse properties. The authors show that such specific linguistic differences of news report may be explained in terms of the re-unification vs. independence ideologies of the two newspapers.

Van Dijk (1995) examined the relations between discourse semantics and ideology. In this contribution he provided a detailed analysis of news articles in the *New York Times* and *The Washington Post* and showed how various aspects of discourse semantics, such as topic, focus, propositional structures, local coherence, level of description, lexical items, implications and macrostructure may be influenced by underlying ideologies in the United States, for instance on Arabs. Following the overall strategy of the ideological square, the latter may be described in *New York Times* editorials as "terrorists," a description never used to describe Israelis killing Palestinians. Such polarized hyperboles for one side of the conflict, as well as the use of mitigated expressions for the description of friends, allies or other ingroup members, also extend to the pragmatic level, where friendly regimes who abuse human rights are typically *recommended*

to mend their ways in the softest of speech acts. In a systematic analysis of an op-ed article on Gadhafi by Jim Hoagland in the *Washington Post*, the author showed how various semantics structures, such as focus, topic-comment, foregrounding-backgrounding and related strategies of information distribution in discourse are influenced by the (conservative, anti-Arab, etc.) ideologies of the writer. Thus, not only are the negative actions of the Libyan “tyrant” and his “megalomania” highlighted in this article, his agency and responsibility are also pointed out through various strategies of foregrounding.

Scholars have already suggested that dominant political ideologies in various countries, as shared by the media, also explain differences in the account of international events: Enemy states and friendly states or allies are of course systematically covered in a different way, as Herman and Chomsky (1988) have shown. Fang (1994) shows this for *Renmin Ribao* and its coverage of riots and violence in countries that have friendly or inimical relations with China. For instance, opposition in countries that are inimical to China may typically be represented as “demonstration,” “struggle” or “protest,” whereas such mass action in friendly countries tends to be described as “clashes” or “riots.” Such tendencies may even be more pronounced in syntactic structure: Police action in inimical countries is largely described in the active voice, thus emphasizing the responsibility of the police (violence), whereas the passive voice tends to be used for police action in non-hostile countries inculcated thus reducing the active responsibility of the police.

NEWS PRODUCTION AND IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL

Not only is there a lack of an explicit theory of ideology, but we do not have at our disposal a detailed theory of discourse and a sociocognitive theory that explains how ideologies control processes of news production. Whatever the value of existing studies for our understanding of news production routines, news values or power relationships, they remain theoretically incomplete when it comes to providing a detailed account of the ideologies involved and the structures of news that are controlled by them. Given the aims of this chapter and this section, we shall now focus more on ideologically controlled news structures in general terms, rather than on the nature of the ideologies themselves, or on the (vast quantity of) individual authors and studies.

Racism and the News

International research on racism and the mass media has consistently shown that despite considerable variation among countries, periods and newspapers, the press continues to be part of the problem of racism, rather than its solution. These ideological influences of racism on newsmaking may be summarized by the following main findings of research (for details, see, e.g., Bonafous, 1991; Cottle, 2000; Hartmann & Husband, 1974; Henry & Tator, 2002; Husband, 1975; Jäger & Link, 1993; Martindale, 1986; Richardson, 2004; Ruhrmann, 1995; Said, 1981; Smitherman-Donaldson & Van Dijk, 1987; Ter Wal, 2002; Van Dijk, 1991, 1993; UNESCO 1974, 1977; among many other books and a vast number of articles):

1. *Hiring*: Many forms of ethnic bias defined below are crucially influenced by the fact that in *all* white-dominated societies, ethnic journalists are discriminated against in hiring, so that most newsrooms are predominantly white. And those (few) minorities being hired will tend to be recruited not only for their outstanding professionalism, but also because their ethnic ideologies (and especially their moderate antiracism) do not clash with those of the editors.

2. *News values*: Events are attributed higher news values if they are about “our own” people or when “our own” people are involved, whether or not these are “closer” geographically.
3. *Beats and sources*: In ethnic or racial conflicts, white elite sources are consistently given priority, attributed higher credibility, found more reliable and (hence) are more likely to be quoted as such.
4. *Selection*: Available news stories are more likely to be selected for inclusion not only if they are about people like us (see News values), but also when they are consistent with prevalent ethnic and racial stereotypes, as is the case for rioting blacks in the UK, black dictators in Africa or the terrorism of (Arab) Islamists.
5. *Salience* (placement and lay-out): News stories about ethnic-racial Others (minorities, immigrants, refugees, etc.) are distributed over the newspaper and the page not only by criteria of relative social or political importance or relevance, but also by ethnic-racial criteria: As a general rule, news about bad actions of Them, especially against (people like) Us, is more salient than the reverse.
6. *Topics*: Whereas (people like) Us may be represented as actors in virtually all kinds of news stories and on a large variety of social, political and economic topics, the coverage of Them tends to be limited to a few issues and topics, such as immigration, integration and race relations, crime, violence and deviance, cultural conflicts and entertainment (music, sports).
7. *Perspective*: Another global constraint on news stories is the ethnocentric perspective in the description of news events. Ethnic conflicts, problems of integration and cultural differences, for instance, tend to be represented from “our” (white) perspective, for instance in terms of Them not being able or wanting to adapt to Us, instead of vice versa.
8. *Formats, order and foregrounding*: Whereas topics are the global meaning of discourse, schemas define their overall format and order, such as the distinction between Headlines, Leads, and other categories of news (Main Events, Context, Background, History, Reactions, etc.). We find that negative actions and events of ethnic minorities or other non-European Others, for example, are not only preferably placed in the prominent positions of Headlines and Leads (because they are defined as topics), but also foregrounded in the overall order and categories of news reports.
9. *Quotation*: Given the ethnic bias of beats and source selection and evaluation, it may be predicted that those who are quoted as reliable sources or spokespersons tend to be Our (white) elites, rather than Their elites or spokespersons.
10. *News actor and event description*: Ethnic Others tend to be described more often in negative terms, whereas people like Us tend to be described positively or more neutrally, even when engaging in negative actions.
11. *Style*: At the more manifest levels of style, such as the selection of words, sentence syntax and other variable expressions of underlying global topics and local meanings, we find that lexical items used to describe Others and their actions tend to have more negative connotations.
12. *Rhetoric*: All properties of news described above may be emphasized or de-emphasized by well-known rhetorical figures, such as metaphors, hyperboles and euphemisms. Thus, the arrival of Others in Our country is consistently represented in terms of large quantities of threatening water: *waves, floods*, etc. and Their immigration as *invasion*, etc. On the other hand, Our racism will usually be described in terms of mitigating euphemisms, for instance in terms of *popular discontent* or as political *populism*, or reduced to less negative notions such as *discrimination, national preference or bias*.

Nationalism in the News

Journalists often identify not only with a language but also with a nation state, and in nationalist ideologies, the positive self-image is in terms of *Us* in our country, on the one hand, and *Them* in (or from) other countries, on the other hand, as we also have seen for racist ideologies, with which nationalist ideologies are closely related. In nationalist ideologies, identity is crucial, and associated with a complex system of positive characteristics about how we are, about our history and habits, our language and culture, national character, and so on (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1998).

As suggested above, nationalist ideologies also influence news and newsmaking, especially when journalists write about “foreign” events and people or about situations of wars, conflicts, terrorist attacks and international competitions. It is well-known that wars are not covered in terms of a mere conflict, but in strongly polarized terms, between (good) *Us* and (bad) *Them*, as soon as “our” country is at war, and “our” soldiers’ are involved (Adams, 1986; Glasgow University Media Group, 1985; Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeau, & Garland, 2004; Lewis, 2005; Morrison & Tumber, 1988; Schechter, 2005; Zelizer & Allan, 2003).

The norms and values associated with nationalism are those of patriotism and loyalty—especially made relevant in times of crisis or war. And the typical (“good”) actions recommended by nationalist ideologies is to defend the nation against invaders and foreign influences, both military and economic as well as cultural (language, arts, etc.). The most precious resource of the nationalist, thus, is on the one hand, “our land,” territory, etc., and on the other hand the symbolic resources of “our” culture, language, etc.

Nationalism is not merely manifested in times of war or serious conflicts, but also in many everyday news events. Thus, the nation may be “flagged” in many mundane ways in everyday discourse and also in the media (Billig, 1995). This may happen in the coverage of the actions of “our” politicians in international affairs, beauty contests reference to well-known national businesses and their products, as well as other symbols of “our” nation or culture: movies, film stars, writers, painters, and of course, in some countries, the Royal Family (Billig, 1992, 1995). Specifically prone to nationalist coverage in the mass media is that of international sport (Blain, Boyle, & O’Donnell, 1993).

Sexism and the News

Much of what has been said above regarding racist ideologies and their influence on the news also applies to patriarchal gender ideologies such as sexism or male chauvinism. By definition, the structure of the dominant ideology of sexism as an ideology is also polarized, as between *Us* (men) and *Them* (women), and especially between *Us* (“real” men) and *Them* (feminists). However, sexist ideologies are not limited to men, but may also be shared by those women who agree with (at least some) sexist attitudes. The structures of sexist ideologies are thus polarized between positive self-descriptions of men (e.g., as strong, independent, etc.) and other-descriptions of women (e.g., as weak, dependent, etc.), hence defining opposed identities, the characteristic activities of men vs. women, different norms and values, and different resources that define the power position of men in society.

Few of the studies of gender and news specifically focus on underlying ideologies. Rather, classical news values are discussed as the basis for discrimination in the newsroom, assignments and beats, sources and quotations, the style of coverage (objective vs. emotional), the type of stories, and so on. It is not easy to infer a detailed ideological system from such discussions, but the following gender-ideological propositions seem to have inspired these classical news values, the

hierarchy of newspapers as organizations, the organization of beats and assignments, as well as the overall topics and style of representing women and men (see, among many other references, the following books: Beyerly & Ross, 2006; Carter, Branston, & Allan, 1998; Cole & Henderson Daniel, 2005):

- Men are stronger (tougher, etc.) than women.
- Men are more competent than women.
- Men are more reliable than women.
- Men are more objective than women.
- Men's issues are more important than women's issues.
- Women (e.g., feminists) actively resisting the dominant patriarchal order are bad women.
- Women who directly compete with men (such as political candidates) are a threat to male domination.
- Women as victims are "good" women only if they have behaved appropriately, if not they are "bad girls" who deserve what they get.
- Men as perpetrators of violence against women have been provoked by women, or are victims of circumstances beyond their control.

CONCLUSIONS

As is the case for most public discourse, the news is imbued with ideologies. A detailed study of such ideologies in the mass media and other forms of public elite discourse contributes to our insights into their very reproduction in society. The review of theoretical and empirical research in this chapter leaves no doubt about the prominent role of the news media in the (re)production of ideologies in society. The evidence shows that on the whole, despite some variation between different (liberal vs. conservative, and popular vs. elite) newspapers, these dominant ideologies are associated with the very position and power of white, male, middle class journalists working within a corporate environment. Women, poor people, workers, black people, immigrants, and all those who have no access to, and control over public discourse are thus largely ignored, or represented negatively when seen as a problem or a threat to the social mainstream. To sustain existing powers, polarized (Us vs. Them) ideologies are necessarily aligned along fundamental dimensions of society, such as those of class, gender, and race (and the same is true for age and sexual orientation, not dealt with in this chapter). The elites that control the access to, and the contents and structures of public discourse, and that of the mass media, in particular, thus also are able to control the formation and reproduction of the very ideologies that help to sustain their power.

Such a conclusion is hardly new. However, so far it was rather a general assumption than proven in detail by a theoretically based analysis of ideologies, on the one hand, and of news reports, on the other hand. The study of social cognition, as well as the explicit analysis of text and talk was hardly mainstream in the social sciences in general and in communication and journalism studies in particular. This chapter has shown that a more sophisticated, multidisciplinary theory of news production, news structures and news reception, combined with new theories of ideology as social cognition and of news reports and news production as specific social and discursive practices, is able to account for the detailed mechanisms of the reproduction of ideologies by the mass media in general and by daily news reports in particular.

Unfortunately, most of the studies reviewed in this chapter (as well as in other chapters of this book) are not yet formulated in such a broad, explicit and multidisciplinary framework and limited to more traditional methods, such as content or frame analysis. Yet, even so they provide

sufficient evidence for our general conclusions about the role of news in the reproduction of sexism, racism, classism, and nationalism. Future studies will then be able to provide even more detailed and explicit analyses of news production routines and news report structures that provide insight into the deeper mechanisms of ideological reproduction in public discourse.

REFERENCES

- Adams, V. (1986). *The media and the Falklands campaign*. London: Macmillan.
- Bell, A. (1991). *The language of news media*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Beyerly, C. M., & Ross, K. (2006). *Women & media: A critical introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Billig, M. (1992). *Talking of the royal family*. London: Routledge.
- Billig, M. (1995). *Banal nationalism*. London: Sage.
- Bonnafoous, S. (1991). *L'immigration prise aux mots*. Paris: Éditions Kimé.
- Carter, C., Branston, G., & Allan, S. (Eds.). (1998). *News, gender, and power*. London: Routledge.
- Chibnall, S. (1977). *Law-and-order news: An analysis of crime reporting in the British press*. London: Tavistock.
- Cole, E., & Henderson Daniel, J. (Eds.). (2005). *Featuring females: Feminist analyses of media*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Cottle, S. (Ed.). (2000). *Ethnic minorities and the media*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
- Fishman, M. (1980). *Manufacturing the news*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Fowler, R. (1991). *Language in the news. Discourse and ideology in the British press*. London: Routledge.
- Fowler, R., Kress, G., Hodge, B., & Trew, T. (1979). *Language and control*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Gans, H. J. (1979). *Deciding what's news. A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news, Newsweek, and Time*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making & unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Glasgow University Media Group. (1976). *Bad news*. London Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Glasgow University Media Group. (1980). *More bad news*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Golding, P., & Elliott, P. (1979). *Making the news*. London: Longman.
- Hartmann, P. G., & Husband, C. (1974). *Racism and the mass media: A study of the role of the mass media in the formation of white beliefs and attitudes in Britain*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Henry, F., & Tator, C. (2002). *Discourses of domination. Racial bias in the Canadian English-language press*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (1988). *Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Husband, C. (1975). *White media and black Britain: A critical look at the role of the media in race relations today*. London: Arrow.
- Hutcheson, J., Domke, D., Billeaudeau, A., & Garland, P. (2004). US national identity, political elites, and a patriotic press following September 11. *Political Communication*, 21(1), 27–50.
- Jäger, S., & Link, J. (1993). *Die vierte gewalt. Rassismus und die medien* (The fourth power. racism and the media). Duisburg, Germany: DISS.
- Kitis, E., & Milapides, M. (1997). Read it and believe it: How metaphor constructs ideology in news discourse: A case-study. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 28(5), 557–590.
- Kuo, S. H., & Nakamura, M. (2005). Translation or transformation? A case study of language and ideology in the Taiwanese press. *Discourse & Society*, 16(3), 393–417.
- Labov, W., & Waletzky, J. (1967). Narrative analysis. Oral versions of personal experience. In J. Helm, (Ed.), *Essays on the verbal and visual arts*. (pp. 12–44). Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Lewis, J. (2005). *Shoot first and ask questions later. Media coverage of the 2003 Iraq war*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Martindale, C. (1986). *The white press and Black America*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- Meeuwis, M. (1993). Nationalist ideology in news reporting on the Yugoslav crisis: A pragmatic analysis. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 20(3), 217–237.
- Morrison, D. E., & Tumber, H. (1988). *Journalists at war: The dynamics of news reporting during the Falklands conflict*. London: Sage.
- Richardson, J. E. (2004). *(Mis)representing Islam. The racism and rhetoric of British broadsheet newspapers*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Ruhrmann, G. (Ed.). (1995). *Das Bild der Ausländer in der Öffentlichkeit. Eine theoretische und empirische Analyse zur Fremdenfeindlichkeit. (The image of foreigners in the public sphere. A theoretical and empirical analysis of xenophobia)*. Opladen, Germany: Leske.
- Said, E. W. (1981). *Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world*. New York: Pantheon.
- Schechter, D. (2005). *When news lies. Media complicity and the Iraq war*. New York: SelectBooks.
- Schiffirin, D., Tannen, D., & Hamilton, H. E. (Eds.). (2001). *The handbook of discourse analysis*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Sinclair, J., & Coulthard, M. (1975). *Towards an analysis of discourse: The English used by teachers and pupils*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Smitherman-Donaldson, G., & Van Dijk, T. A. (Eds.). (1987). *Discourse and discrimination*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
- Ter Wal, J. (Ed.). (2002). *Racism and cultural diversity in the mass media. An overview of research and examples of good practice in the EU member states, 1995–2000*. Vienna: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia.
- Tuchman, G. (1978). *Making news: A study in the construction of reality*. New York: Free Press.
- UNESCO. (1974). *Race as news*. Paris: Unesco.
- UNESCO. (1977). *Ethnicity and the media*. Paris: Unesco.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1988a). *News analysis: Case studies of international and national news in the press*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1988b). *News as discourse*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1991). *Racism and the press*. London: Routledge.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1993). *Elite discourse and racism*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Discourse semantics and ideology. *Discourse & Society*, 6(2), 243–289.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1998). *Ideology. A multidisciplinary approach*. London: Sage.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2008a). *Discourse and context. A sociocognitive approach*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2008b). *Society in discourse. How context controls text and talk*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1997). (Ed.). *Discourse studies. A multidisciplinary introduction* (2 vols.). London: Sage.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (Ed.). (2007). *Discourse studies* (5 vols.). London: Sage.
- Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Liebhart, K. (1998). *The discursive construction of national identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Zelizer, B., & Allan, S. (Eds.). (2003). *Journalism after September 11*. London: Routledge.