1. Introduction

Ideological analysis of language and discourse is a widely practised scholarly and critical endeavour in the humanities and the social sciences. The presupposition of such analyses is that ideologies of speakers or writers may be ‘uncovered’ by close reading, understanding or systematic analysis, if language users explicitly or unwittingly ‘express’ their ideologies through language and communication.

Despite these widespread practices and assumptions, however, the theory that relates discourse and these ‘underlying’ ideologies is far from explicit. Indeed, in discourse studies, as well as in cognitive and social psychology or the social sciences, we do not know much about how exactly ideologies are either developed by or through discourse, on the one hand, or how they control or otherwise influence text and talk, on the other hand. In this paper, therefore, I summarize some theoretical assumptions developed in my current project on discourse and ideology, and discuss some specific issues that have so far been ignored in the practice of ideological discourse analysis.

2. Social-political discourse analysis

In order to formulate our research goals in a broader framework, it should first be emphasized that ideological discourse analysis should be seen as one specific type of socio-political analysis of discourse. Such an analysis, among other things, attempts to relate structures of discourse with structures of society. That is, social properties or relations of, e.g., class, gender or ethnicity, are thus systematically associated with the structural units, levels, or strategies of talk and text embedded in their social,
political and cultural contexts. The same is true for the relations between social organizations, institutions, groups, roles, situations, power, or political decision making, on the one hand, and discourse structures, on the other hand. (Fairclough, 1989, 1992; Kedar, 1987; Kramarae, Schulz and O’Barr, 1984; Kress, 1985; Ng and Bradac, 1993; Wodak, 1989).

In such an account, language users are defined as members of communities, groups or organizations, and are supposed to speak, write or understand from a specific social position. Ideological analysis then examines what ideologies are typically associated with that position, for example, in order to defend or legitimate that position, typically so by discourse. In relationships of dominance, such ideological discourse may thus serve to sustain or challenge social positions.

This socio-political approach to ideological analysis is classical, but hardly explicit. Rather crucially, it fails to tell us how exactly social positions of language users or of the groups of which they are members affect (or are affected by) text and talk. Men, and not women, may have recourse to specific topics, lexical style or rhetoric, or vice versa, and the same may be said for whites vs. blacks, old vs. young people, or police officers vs. suspects. As is the case in sociolinguistics, such an analysis hardly goes beyond correlational description: It neither explains nor specifies how such group members may thus express their social positions, that is, what discourse production processes are involved in ‘expressing’ such positions.

Trivially, since groups and institutions, as such, do not write or speak or understand discourse, there is no way social structure itself may directly affect text and talk, unless through the agency of communicating individuals as members of groups or social categories. That is, as is the case for many other forms of social and political analysis, a fully fledged explanation of the relations between discourse and society needs to cross the well-known macro-micro and society-individual divide (Alexander, Giesen, Munch and Smelser, 1987; Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel, 1981).

This means that we need a theoretical interface where the social and the discursive can ‘meet’ and be explicitly related to each other. One candidate for this interface is situated social interaction itself. Depending on one’s perspective or sociological theory, either the macro or the micro may be taken as more basic in such an account (Collins, 1981; Fine, 1991). Situations would then represent the unique combination of social members, categories, relations, processes or forces. For instance, a specific encounter between doctor and patient would be instantiating or enacting
more abstract structures of medical institutions in general, and relations
between doctors and patients in particular (Mishler, 1984; West, 1984). Talk of social members in such a context might instantiate, more or less
directly, one type of social relation, e.g., that of dominance, politeness,
assistance or solidarity. More specifically, this would probably entail the
use of expressions that may be intended or interpreted as signalling such
social relations, as may be the case for pronouns as markers of dominance
or politeness.

3. The socio-cognitive interface

Although this society-actor interface provides us with insight into one
dimension of the macro-micro divide, it is incomplete. What we also need
is a socio-cognitive interface. Arguments for the necessity of this
interface are the following:

(1) The very notions of (social) ‘action’ and ‘actor’ themselves have an
important cognitive dimension: Knowledge about conditions and
consequences, plans, intentions and goals of actions, as well as the
very action concepts themselves, are properties of thinking or of
mental representations, that is, of the mind (Aebli, 1980; Danto, 1973;
Whiteley, 1973; but see Coulter, 1989).

(2) The same is true for interaction, action co-ordination and the strategic
adaptation of action to the social context, which all require mental
representations of other actors (and their representations) as well as of
the relevant properties of the situation or context (Furnham and

(3) Similarly, the social macro-micro link – defined in terms of group
membership of social actors and of their actions taken as
instantiations of social relations, processes or structures – also needs a
cognitive dimension (Cicourel, 1973). Group members need to
identify and represent themselves as being members of groups in
order to be able to act ‘as’ group members. They bring to bear shared,
general knowledge about society and interaction in the competent
execution of their actions, as well as in the understanding of the
actions of others (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Farr and Moscovici, 1984).

(4) The same is a fortiori true for verbal interaction and discourse, whose
structures and meanings, planning and understanding, also need to be
formulated in terms of a cognitive account of the mind, involving
specific and shared knowledge and other social beliefs (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983).

Spelling out these arguments would require a lengthy theoretical and philosophical analysis, which cannot be given here. For our purposes, then, we shall simply assume that these arguments are valid, and that the relations between society and interaction, and hence between society and discourse, are necessarily indirect, and mediated by shared mental representations of social actors as group members. Indeed, the very knowledge of language and discourse is a prominent example of the shared social cognitions of groups and their members.

4. Ideologies

It will be further assumed that the same is true for ideologies. Ignoring a vast discussion of ideologies in the social sciences (CCCS, 1978; Eagleton, 1991; Larrain, 1979; Thompson, 1984), we shall here simply define ideologies as systems that are at the basis of the socio-political cognitions of groups (Lau and Sears, 1986; Rosenberg, 1988). Thus, ideologies organize social group attitudes consisting of schematically organized general opinions about relevant social issues, such as abortion, nuclear energy or affirmative action (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Depending on its position, each group will select from the general cultural repertoire of social norms and values those that optimally realize its goals and interests and will use these values as building blocks for its group ideologies. Thus, the value of ‘equality’ or the norm of ‘non-discrimination’ will be paramount in the ideologies of women, minorities and other dominated groups. Of course, this does not mean that the selection of basic values is consistent. People may find ‘equality’ and ‘economic freedom’ both equally relevant, and this will also show in the specific domain-relevant attitudes such ‘contradictory’ ideologies sustain, and ultimately also in their discourses (Tetlock, 1989).

Social representations are defined for groups, viz., as being shared by (the minds of) social group members (Farr and Moscovici, 1984). This means that we need to bridge the gap between such social cognitions and the personal cognitions (such as personal knowledge and experiences) underlying individual text and talk. Through other social representations, such as attitudes and socio-cultural knowledge, ideologies also influence this specific knowledge and beliefs of individual language users. These
personal cognitions, represented in mental models of concrete events and situations (including communicative situations), in turn control discourse, for instance in storytelling about personal experiences, or in argumentation about personal opinions (Garnham, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; van Oostendorp and Zwaan, 1994).

One of the main lacunae in both sociological and even psychological theories of ideology is an explicit account of the internal structures or organization of ideology. It may be assumed, as we did, that ideologies feature a group-relevant, self-serving selection of fundamental socio-cultural values. Since group relations and interests are involved, we may also assume that ideologies show a polarizing structure between US and THEM. If they should organize sets of domain-relevant attitudes, we may further assume that they feature a number of axiomatic propositions (e.g., ‘Women and men are equal’ in a feminist ideology). We finally take it that ideologies, just like other social representations, may have a standard schematic organization, consisting of a limited number of fixed categories. These categories may be the same as those of a self-group schema. That is, while underlying the self-serving interpretations of members of social groups, ideologies may in fact be the same as the representation a group has of itself (and of the relations with relevant other groups, e.g., opponents) in the social structure. If such is the case, an ideology might be constructed from such group-defining categories as Identity/Membership, Activities, Goals, Norms and Values, Social Position and Resources (van Dijk, 1995a, 1995b).

Contrary to many traditional approaches to ideologies, we do not assume that ideologies are necessarily ‘negative’ or ‘false’. That is, not only dominant groups may have ideologies used to legitimate their power or to manufacture consent or consensus (for discussion, see Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1980, 1990). Also oppositional, dominated groups may have an ideology that effectively organizes the social representations needed for resistance and change. Similarly, ideologies may organize attitudes and knowledge which, given a specific point of view or epistemic system of knowledge criteria (e.g., those of contemporary science), are ‘false’, but this is not a necessary property of all ideologies as we define them (for discussion, see, e.g., Eagleton, 1991).

Next, ideologies are not limited to groups that are related by dominance, power or struggle. We also have professional ideologies (e.g., of journalists and professors), institutional ideologies, and ideologies of many other groups in society. Relevant, according to our definition,
however, are the ‘group interests’ as defined by the categories of identity, activities, goals, norms and values, social position and resources. This of course often means that ideologies are involved in social conflicts between groups, but this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for the development and reproduction of social ideologies.

Finally, ideologies need not be detailed, complex systems, such as those of ‘socialism’, ‘liberalism’, ‘communism’, or ‘feminism’, among others. They may very well be limited to a few basic principles. Moreover, not all members of a group will have the same detailed ideological system. Usually specialized elites or ‘ideologues’ will have a more detailed system than other group members (Converse, 1964; see the various contributions to Lau and Sears, 1986).

We now have an outline of a viable interface between society and discourse, and between ideology and discourse, viz., along the group-actor dimension and according to the relations between shared social cognition and specific, personal or individual cognitions. This interface explains both the shared, social nature of text and talk, and the unique, variable, contextual and personal, properties of discourse (Billig, 1991). It explains why whites may act and speak as whites, e.g. in racist talk, but also why and how there is still considerable variation in such group-related talk (van Dijk, 1987, 1993). Details of the cognitive processes and representations involved in the relations between ideologies and attitudes, between knowledge or attitudes and models, or between models and textual structures are ignored here. Indeed, many of these aspects of social cognition are at present unknown. Figure 1 shows the various cognitive components involved in the relations between underlying ideologies in social cognition, mental models in personal cognition (episodic memory) and the actual comprehension or production of text or talk under the influence of mental models of the situation.

Relevant for our discussion are the links between discourse and ideology. Ideological discourse analysis presupposes insights into these links. Our outline of the relations between social and personal cognition suggests not only that the link between discourse and ideology is indirect and mediated by cognition, but also that, even within the cognitive framework, the link between ideology and the mental management of discourse is indirect. That is, between ideology and discourse we find more specific attitudes, knowledge, and particular mental models of events and contexts of communication. Moreover, language users are not only social members, but also persons with their own personal history (biography),
accumulated experiences, personal beliefs and principles, motivations and emotions, as well as a unique ‘personality’ that defines the overall type or orientation of their actions. Besides socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, actual text and talk will also be influenced by such personal cognitions.

Another major source of both individual and social variation of ideologies and their expression in discourse is the obvious fact that a person belongs to different groups and hence may share in different ideologies. These may of course be mutually incompatible, and this means that for each social context of interaction and discourse, language users may have to strategically negotiate and manage their possible different allegiances. This is also obvious in discourse, which may show results of such ideological dilemmas, of internal argumentation and insecurity, or of the social pressures individuals face in the realization of the ideologies of the different groups they belong to (Billig et al., 1988; Billig, 1991). Thus, a black woman journalist in the United States may have to combine the ideological systems of gender, ethnicity, profession and nationality, and conflicts between these are obvious, and this will also affect her social activities, her news reports and her other discourse, depending on the social situation (e.g., in the newsroom she will be expected to be professional - and American - first of all, and her other identities and allegiances may be marginalized, suppressed or otherwise restricted).

We see that before ideologies actually ‘reach’ discourse and its structures, there is a broad and complex range of mental factors that also may influence discourse production (or comprehension). For ideological analysis this means that ideologies cannot simply be ‘read off’ actual text and talk. Racist speakers will typically say ‘that they are of course not racist (but...)’ (van Dijk, 1984, 1987), male chauvinists will not always display their contempt of women, and corporate managers may be heard to engage in elaborate talk about human resources instead of profits.

In sum, linking the ‘surface’ of talk and text to ‘underlying’ ideologies is a process fraught with complexities and contradictions. Indeed, the most persuasive ideologies may seldom be expressed at all, and we need a series of theoretical steps to elucidate the indirect ideological control of discourse in such cases. This also explains the customary ideological variations and contradictions found in surveys, interviews or other discourse. Rather than to conclude that people do not have ideologies, or that these are ‘inconsistent’ systems of beliefs, the equally undeniable observations of frequent ideological stability across contexts.
and throughout groups suggests that group members often do have (sometimes simple) ideologies, but that because of other factors these ideologies may be expressed in variable ways by individuals in different contexts.

5. Discourse structures

The point of ideological discourse analysis is not merely to ‘discover’ underlying ideologies, but to systematically link structures of discourse with structures of ideologies. One need not be a discourse analyst to conclude that a news report, textbook fragment or conversation is ‘conservative’, ‘sexist’ or ‘environmentalist’. Our naive knowledge of language, discourse, society and ideologies usually allows us to make such inferences rather reliably. A more analytically explicit study of discourse, however, will need to spell out such intuitions, and to specify what expressions or meanings of discourse give rise to what kind of inferences or other mental steps.

Some of these discourse structures are straightforward. Since ideologies are the basis of our social judgements, and ideologically controlled propositions often are opinion statements, expressions of such opinions, e.g., those about ‘Others’, will often indicate what ideological constraints are involved. Lexical items chosen to describe others, as in the case of the well-known pair of freedom fighter and terrorist, when applied to the Contras and the Sandinistas by ex-president Ronald Reagan, are an example in kind. Slightly more indirect or ‘coded’ is the use of moderate (vs. radical) when describing groups, parties or countries that espouse our ideologies, that are our friends or that do not threaten our interests (Herman, 1992; Herman and Chomsky, 1988).

The ideological semantics underlying such lexical selection follows a rather clear strategic pattern, viz., that in general ingroups and their members, as well as friends, allies, or supporters, tend to be described in positive terms, whereas outgroups, enemies or opponents are described in negative terms. This is a familiar finding in intergroup theory, theories of stereotyping and (other) social cognition research (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Hamilton, 1991; Semin and Fiedler, 1992; Turner and Giles, 1981). That is, we assume that the mental representations of these groups in terms of attitude schemata and underlying ideologies will feature the overall evaluative concepts that also influence lexical selection (all other things – like context constraints – being equal). This may not only show in
adjectives or nouns used to describe ingroups and outgroups and their properties, but also in the complex structures that relate these groups with specific actions, objects, places, or events. African Americans in general, and young black males in particular, may thus be ‘associated’ with the inner city, with drugs, riots or welfare in many ways that, for specific texts and contexts, are as many codewords of the semantics of racist discourse.

If the overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation is a well-known way to exhibit ideological structures in discourse, we may predict that the following structures and strategies of text and talk may typically be ideologically relevant, depending on topic, context, speech acts and communicative goals, for ingroups and outgroups respectively:

**Describing/attributing positive action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ingroup</strong></th>
<th><strong>Outgroup</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis</td>
<td>De-emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertion</td>
<td>Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperbole</td>
<td>Understatement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topicalization</td>
<td>De-topicalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-sentential (micro)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-textual (macro)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High, prominent position</td>
<td>Low, non-prominent position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headlining, summarizing</td>
<td>Marginalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed description</td>
<td>Vague, overall description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribution to personality</td>
<td>Attribution to context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative illustration</td>
<td>No storytelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative support</td>
<td>No argumentative support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impression management</td>
<td>No impression management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reverse will be true for the description and attribution of negative actions, which generally will tend to be de-emphasized for ingroups (e.g., by denial, euphemisms, implicitness and detopicalization), and emphasized for outgroups. These principles are well-known in the social psychology of attribution and intergroup relations, and also apply to discursive strategies (Pettigrew, 1979; Stephan, 1977).
Disclaimers, such as “We have nothing against blacks, but ...” are an example of local semantic moves that combine such ideological strategies, in a way that the ingroup is presented positively (as being tolerant) or by denying a negative property (not being racist), whereas the second but-part (usually the dominant part) expresses a negative property of the outgroup (van Dijk, 1984, 1987). The positive first part may thus be interpreted as expressing a general socio-cultural value (like tolerance), but it at the same time functions as the enactment of a strategy of face-keeping and impression management that allows for the expression of prejudice in a normative situation in which the expression of prejudices is ‘officially’ prohibited.

Note that the (incomplete) list of discourse structures used to exhibit positive and negative judgements about groups applies to different levels and dimensions of text and talk. Thus, ‘emphasis’ is a very general structural notion, and may apply to the following levels (for discussion of the respective theories of these and other levels or dimensions of discourse, see e.g., the contributions in van Dijk, 1985).

- phonological structures (stress, pitch, volume, intonation)
- graphical structures (headlines, bold characters)
- overall ordering and size (first and later, higher and lower, bigger and smaller, primacy and recency)
- syntactic structure (word order, topicalization, clausal relations: main and subordinate, fronted or embedded; split constructions)
- semantic structures (explicit vs. implicit, detail and level of description, semantic macrostructures vs. details)
- lexical style (positive vs. negative opinion words)
- rhetoric (under- and overstatement, euphemism, litotes; repetition)
- schematic or superstructures (expressed – or not – in prominent conventional category, e.g., Headline or Conclusion; storytelling and argumentation)
- pragmatic (assertion vs. denial; self-congratulation vs. accusation)
- interactive (turn-taking: self-selection and dominance; topic maintenance and change; non-verbal communication: face, gestures, etc.)

In sum, language and discourse have a broad range of structural possibilities to emphasize and de-emphasize information and hence also the ideologically controlled opinions about ingroups and outgroups.
Obviously, such structures are not merely ‘expressive’ or coding for ideological positions, but also may play a role in the persuasion-reception dimension of communication. In that case, such discourse structures may be assumed to contribute to the desired mental models of events: All emphasized information or opinions (e.g., those expressed in headlines or those topicalized) thus tend to be construed in a prominent position in the mental model. This will facilitate organization, recall and hence the use of such ‘biased’ models in opinion formation and change.

Relative to ideologies, discourse structures always have the double function of enacting or ‘executing’ underlying ideologies on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of acting as a more or less powerful means of persuasion, that is, as strategic means to influence preferred mental models, and - indirectly - preferred attitudes and ideologies. It is in this latter way also that the formation, change and challenge of ideologies are a function of discourse structure.

6. Structures of ideologies and structures of meaning

In the previous section we have seen that both at the microlevel of lexicalization, sentence meaning and local sentence coherence as well as on the macrolevel of topics and overall meaning, discourse semantics may be multiply affected by underlying ideologies. Each of these lines of influence would need to be examined in much more cognitive and semantic detail, but the overall principle is clear: Meanings are manipulated, structurally, by the principle of ingroup favouritism and out-group derogation which is familiar in social cognition, and hence also in the analysis of ideologies.

If ideologies, as we have assumed above, are structured by group-schema categories, then we may expect that discourse meanings influenced by such ideologies typically feature information that answers the following questions:

- Who are We? Who do (do not) belong to Us?
- What do We do? What are Our activities? What is expected of Us?
- What are the goals of these activities?
- What norms and values do We respect in such activities?
- To which groups are We related: Who are Our friends and enemies?
- What are the resources We typically have – or do not have – (privileged) access to?
That is, when we examine discourses that generally function as modes of self-defence, legitimation, or explanation, or that have other self-serving functions, we would typically expect a prominent presence of meanings that can be interpreted as expressions of such categories.

Since ideologies are highly abstract, while having to function for many social domains and situations, it should be realized, however, that in concrete text and talk these categories may be specified for particular social issues. For instance, racist whites will not only talk about themselves and minorities in general, but may focus on ethnic or race relations in immigration, social welfare, education or politics. And feminist women may orient their discourses according to the ideologically founded attitudes about human rights and gender relations in general, but also focus on employment, affirmative action, sexual harassment, abortion, child care, and so on. Moreover, apart from ideologically generic statement, most ideological text and talk will of course deal with concrete events, situations and people, that is, with specific mental models that feature instantiations of such general, group-based opinions.

While such mental models allow for many personal experiences and opinions, and also combine with context constraints (as subjectively represented in mental context models), comparison of discourses by different group members in different contexts may allow for the discovery of linkages with ideologies and their structures. We may therefore predict that ideological discourse will typically be semantically oriented towards the following topics, local meanings and implications:

**Self-identity descriptions:** who are We, where do We come from, what are Our properties, what is Our history, how are We different from Others, what are We proud of; but also: boundary statements with respect to Others: Who will be admitted, what are the criteria of admission, who may immigrate, etc. Obviously, such self-identity descriptions will generally be positive.

This will typically be the case for those groups whose identity is threatened, insecure, or marginalized, such as women, minorities, immigrants, and so on; or, in a defensive way, for those dominant groups whose dominance is threatened. That is, self-identity descriptions are specifically relevant for those groups who are self- or other-defined mainly or exclusively because of their (e.g. more or less
permanent, inherent or attributed) characteristics, such as those of gender, race, ethnicity, age, religion, language, origin.

**Activity-descriptions:** What are Our tasks? What do We do? What is expected of Us? What are Our social roles, etc.?

Ideological activity description is typical for groups who are defined by what they do, such as professionals and activists. Thus journalistic, professorial, medical or environmental ideologies focus on what (good things) members do, such as writing news, doing research, healing the sick or protesting against pollution.

**Goal-descriptions:** Activities make ideological and social sense only if they have (positive) goals. Thus, ideological discourse of groups will typically focus on the (good) goals of their activities, such as informing the public or serving as a watchdog of society (journalists), seeking the truth or educating the young (professors) or saving nature (environmentalists). It should be emphasized that such goal-descriptions are by definition ideological, and not necessarily factual: This is how groups and their members see themselves, or want to be seen and evaluated.

**Norm and value descriptions:** Crucial in much ideological discourse are meanings that involve norms and values, about what We find good and bad, right or wrong, and what Our actions and goals try to respect or achieve. Thus, professors and journalists may emphasize their special focus on truth, factuality, and reliability in their accounts of the ‘facts’. Minorities and women may emphasize equality or justice, and corporate managers freedom (of the market, freedom from state intervention). In the description of Our opponents or enemies, We may thus expect an emphasis on the violation of such norms and values. Thus the Others will be typically undemocratic, intolerant, inefficient, impolite or unintelligent.

Position and relation descriptions: Groups define their identity, activities and goals largely also in relation to other groups. Professors with respect to students, journalists with respect to the public or their news actors, anti-racists by definition with respect to racists, and feminists with respect to chauvinist men. Influenced by this category, thus, we
may expect special focus on group relations, conflict, polarization, and negative other-presentation (derogation).

**Resource description:** Groups can generally exist and subsist only when they have access to general or specific resources. In intergroup conflicts and when such access is threatened or limited, ideological discourse will largely focus on such resources: Journalists will be keen to protect their sources or information, professors their expertise or knowledge (or the means to secure such knowledge), whereas minorities and women may precisely focus their discourses on the fact that they do not have equal access to valuable social resources such as status, respect, jobs, housing, income, equal pay, and so on. Some social groups are primarily defined in terms of their access or non-access to resources, such as the rich and the poor, the unemployed and the homeless, and in general the Haves and the Have-nots. At this point, we may expect elaborate semantic strategies that aim to defend (or attack) privileged access (the ‘right’) to resources, that emphasize a ‘natural’ control of such resources, and so on.

We see that an elementary analysis of ideologies in terms of a number of hypothetical categories that typically define major social parameters of groups also allows us to postulate typically group-oriented meanings in discourse, especially when the identity, goals, norms, position, and resources of the own group in conflict with that of others is concerned, and when the own group is challenged, threatened or dominated. When this is not the case, e.g., when dominance is not challenged, such ideological structures may simply be presupposed, or found commonsensical. In that case, ideological meanings need to be analyzed by making explicit such implied, taken-for-granted meanings.

**7. Analyses of examples**

After this brief summary of the theoretical framework that links ideologies and discourse, let us analyze some examples. As part of our ideological study of editorials and opinion articles in the U.S. ‘quality press,’ which we assume express the (comparatively small) range of the ideological mainstream in that country, let us analyze some opinion articles on a topic that is usually ideologically ‘hot’: terrorism. We selected the (23) op-ed
articles in the New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post (WP) that had the word ‘terror’, ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ in their subject-list, and which therefore topicalize terrorism as part of their (subjectively defined) macrostructure. Several of these articles comment on the bombing of the World Trade Center (henceforth WTC) in New York on 26 February 1993.

The op-ed articles in the NYT and WP reflect the mainstream definitions and perceptions of ‘terrorism’ in the U.S. and ‘Western’ media (Schmid, 1982; see also van Dijk, 1988). In 1993 most articles link this and other acts of political violence to Muslims, Muslim Fundamentalists, Arabs or the Middle-East (especially Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Israel/Palestine). This is a familiar property of the media coverage of Islam and Arabs (Chomsky, 1984, 1986; Said, 1981). Virtually no articles in the NYT or the WP link terrorism with other actors and places of political violence in the world (e.g., in Salvador), a form of topical and lexical exclusivity which alone expresses an ideological position (Chomsky, 1987, 1992a, b and 1993; Herman and Chomsky, 1988). There is one article on the Holocaust, and one on Northern Ireland.

One of the most striking ideological structures manifested in virtually all op-ed articles in the WP and NYT is blatant nationalism and ethnocentrism. US-THIS polarization characterizes, understandably, not only the opposition between US (Americans, westerners) and THEM (terrorists, Arabs, Muslim fundamentalists, etc.), but more generally Americans and the rest of the world, also in editorials and other op-ed articles. This is obviously also a result from the fact that the large majority of opinion articles are written by U.S. citizens (one article in the ‘terrorism’ data-base is written by an Israeli journalist, but he is also an associate of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy).

Ingroup-outgroup distinction, differentiation and polarization, which by our definition of ideologies as basic self-group schemata of social cognition, are the central characteristic of all ideologies, are marked in discourse structure first of all by personal and possessive pronouns (‘we’, ‘they’, ‘us’, ‘them’, ‘our’, ‘their’, etc.) but also by deictics, such as here and there. Here are a few fragments of a typical op-ed article occasioned by the bombing of the WTC in New York:

(1) In our radical interpretation of democracy, our rejection of elites, our well-nigh demagogic respect for the opinions of the unlearned, we are alone. (...) The demands of leadership, if not a sense of moral responsibility, will not permit us to abdicate our responsibility for
protecting innocent civilians and standing up against state-sponsored slaughter. But as we take on such roles, we will more often make enemies than friends, and some may have the means and, they think, the motives to hurt us at home. Among the rewards for our attempts to provide the leadership needed in a fragmented, crisis-prone world will be as yet unimagined terrorists and other assorted sociopaths determined to settle scores with us. We cannot afford to react by withdrawing from the world. Rather, we need to react prudently. (...).

(NYT, Mark D.W. Edington, 2 March 1993).

Ingroup-outgroup polarization is of course not limited to pronominal references or their full noun-phrase variants. Typical of such polarization is ingroup favouring and outgroup derogation, positive self-presentation and the association of ‘our’ group with all good things and ‘their’ group with all bad things. Thus, in Example (1), We are trying to provide leadership in a crisis-prone world (that is, the crisis is elsewhere), whereas They are sociopaths determined to settle scores with us. This writer even claims that we are alone in our radical interpretation of democracy, thereby also establishing a difference with the other democratic countries in the world. This means, according to this writer, that U.S. leadership will always be confronted with enemies. In sum, We in the U.S. are associated with positive values (democracy, responsibility), positive activities (leadership) and positive goals (protecting the innocent), as prominent categories of the ideological schema organizing this and similar opinion articles.

Self-glorification does not mean that there is never any self-critique. Ironically enough, however, even such critique often presupposes good characteristics: In face of the terrorists of the world, we are ‘too good’, ‘too democratic’, ‘too lenient’. Our democratic values do not allow us to establish a police state and to control all citizens. Yet, internationally, we should not be weak:

(2) On the international scene these days, our trumpets have sounded slightly sour and uncertain. Our pro bono military operations have been conducted with noticeable diffidence. And this has been noticed, in friendly and unfriendly quarters. Cops make enemies. The best cops are good diplomats, which we have not always been. The impression of weakness, even relative weakness, invites predation. (NYT, Robert Stone, 4 March 1993).
And if U.S. movies, though only fictionally, portray U.S. institutions as also involved in ‘murder, treason, terror, bombing and torture’, then The New York Times’s most prominent columnist, and previous editor, A.M. Rosenthal, a vociferous critic of international (and especially Arab) terrorism, is livid: One should not besmirch ‘our’ country in this way:

(3) But if there is a trend to movies showing American government as a pretty decent process run by pretty decent people, I haven’t seen it. (Ni’T, A.M. Rosenthal, 30 March 1993).

But then, Rosenthal was and is not interested in the complicity if not direct involvement with the terrorism of the military dictatorships or murder squads in e.g. Salvador and Guatemala, resulting in the death or maiming of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. Massive murder, when perpetrated by ‘friendly’ regimes, is of course not ‘terrorism’ (but at most ‘civil war’), and is not something for which the pretty decent process of pretty decent people can be blamed (see the studies by Chomsky, quoted above). For our analysis, this suggests that one of the major ideological strategies of such discourse is, indeed, to focus on or emphasize ‘their’ terrorism and to de-emphasize or simply ignore or deny our own involvement in state terror abroad. That is, the complement (or obverse) of positive self-presentation is silence, viz., the avoidance of negative self-presentation, or attacking our critics.

Interestingly, for most commentators democratic values in the U.S. do not seem to imply moderation and peacefulness. Peace is associated with appeasement, and the overall value implication of the articles might variously be described, depending on one’s ideological position, as ‘toughness’ and ‘aggressivity’, respectively:

(4) The Israeli and American Governments now obviously believe that not spreading the truth about a terrorist dictator [Saddam Hussein of Iraq], thus appeasing and strengthening him with respectability, will make peace with him more likely and more lasting. (NYT, A.M. Rosenthal, 12 March 1993).

(5) As the sole superpower, America will have to confront its challenges in the region and at home resolutely and perhaps brutally. Otherwise, the Islamic enemies of moderate Arab rulers will be doubly
emboldened if they can strike with impunity in their world and ours. (NYT, Bradford R. McGuin, 22 March 1993).

As may be expected, the ‘Others’ are our enemies (or imperfect friends), and will generally be described in terms that express the basic nationalist, ethnocentric, racist stereotypes associated with Muslims, fundamentalists, Arabs and foreigners, especially in the Third World (or outside the ‘West’). From the quality press one would expect that whereas terrorists who kill innocent civilians might be attacked in explicit terms, any form of generalization over whole world regions, nations, peoples or religions would be banned. Nothing is less true. There is constant generalization from specific persons and events to whole categories of people. For instance, Stone’s article, quoted in (2), is headlined The new barbarians, and thus prominently topicalizes the US-THEM divide by associating the Others with lack of civilization, with cruelty and primitiveness, a familiar racist categorization if specifically applied to non-westerners (van Dijk, 1993).

Let us examine a few of these negative Other-descriptions in more detail, since they represent the most obvious expressions of ideologically controlled prejudices and stereotypes as soon as they generalize from models to socially shared cognitions of whole groups:

(6) In striking at symbols, terrorists destroy the real lives of American working people, traumatize actual American children. (...) During the cold war, we lived in fear of nuclear holocaust. Now we know that if a nuclear device ever goes off in an American city it will not likely come launched from some Siberian silo. More probably, it will have been assembled by a few people, perhaps in the guise of immigrants, in that safe house with a view of lower Manhattan. (NYT, Robert Stone, 4 March 1993).

(7) Mideast terrorism originated in and is carried out from the capitals of those states that believe that their power at home and reach abroad are served best by inflaming hatred and organizing, financing or giving safe haven to gangs who will create paralyzing fear among domestic dissidents and foreign foes. (NYT, A.M. Rosenthal, 12 March 1993).

(8) If anything, the bombing [of the WTC] is evidence of a more frightening development: Hundreds of radical operatives live in the
U.S., making up a possible loose terrorist network that includes highly trained Islamic mercenaries. (...) Although the group’s roots are murky, the bombing could be the result of a new joint venture between secularist and fundamentalist terrorists. (...). If this investigation is to have any meaning, it must acknowledge the emergence of the frightening new brand of terrorism growing up on U.S. soil. (N-YT, Steven Emerson, 7 April 1993).

(9) Arab intellectuals poisoned their own minds with their obsession with Arab ‘identity,’ a supernationalism that overrode political liberty, human rights or mercy for their own people, and of course, intellect. (NYT, A.M. Rosenthal, 13 April 1993).

(10) But in the interest of Muslim and non-Muslim, it has to be said without evasiveness: around the world millions of Muslims, fearful of the contagiousness of Western political, religious and sexual freedoms, support fundamentalist extremism. (NYT, A.M. Rosenthal, 29 June 1993).

This is merely a small selection of the typical way ‘Arab’, ‘Mid-East’, ‘Muslim’ or ‘fundamentalist’ actions are being characterized. The initial analysis suggests that the discursive structures and strategies involved in this ideologically based description of the Others include:

**Negative lexicalization:** The selection of (strongly) negative words to describe the actions of the Others: destroy, traumatize, terrorism, paralyzing fear, inflaming hatred, gangs, murky, poisoned, obsession, extremism, etc.

**Hyperbole:** A description of an event or action in strongly exaggerated terms. In (6), for instance, the bomb attack at the WTC, in which only a few people died, or other, possible terrorist attacks, are compared with a nuclear holocaust.

**Compassion move:** Showing empathy or sympathy for (weak) victims of the Others’ actions, so as to enhance the brutality of the Other: destroy the real lives of American working people; traumatize actual American children; mercy for their own people
**Apparent Altruism move:** Related to the compassion move, this move is used to emphasize understanding for the position or interests of (some of) the Others. The move is called ‘Apparent Altruism’, because the argument is usually not developed, and merely has a disclaiming and positive self-presentation function (altruism is obviously a positive value): *But in the interest of Muslim and non-Muslim, it has to be said without evasiveness ...*. Similar moves are familiar in racist discourse about minorities and immigrants, who are also often urged not to come to ‘our’ country, or ‘to go back from whence they came’ in order to ‘build up their own country’, or to ‘avoid being exposed to popular resentment and discrimination’. That is, the Others are recommended to act ‘for their own good’, whereas the real ideological basis of such discursive moves is the interest of the writer.

**Apparent Honesty move:** The Honesty move is a well-known form of disclaiming possibly negative statements. One way to do this is to use phrases such as ‘Frankly...’, or ‘We should not hide the truth, and...’, and so on. Thus, Rosenthal in (10) also uses this move (*it has to be said without evasiveness*), which combines positive self-presentation (I am honest, I am not evasive), with negative other-presentation (indeed, Rosenthal is not intending to be honest about U.S. foreign policy). As with the other disclaimers, the ‘honesty’ involved here is therefore purely strategic and rhetorical: no ‘real’ honesty is involved.

**Negative comparison:** To emphasize the bad qualities of the Other by comparing the target person or outgroup with a generally recognized Bad person or outgroup. George Bush’s comparison of Saddam Hussein with Hitler during the Gulf War is a well-known example. Thus, the bombs and terrorism of *immigrants* may be rhetorically enhanced by comparing them to the *nuclear holocaust* that threatened us *during the cold war*. The nationalist one-sidedness of the comparison is obvious when we further observe that the *nuclear devices* of the cold war only seem to have been located in a *Siberian silo* and not in an American one.

**Generalization:** Generalizing from one person or a small group to a larger group or category. Thus, possible bomb attacks in the USA are no longer the (possible) actions of small groups of specific terrorists, but are more generally attributed to (a few) unidentified immigrants, and
hence to any immigrant, in (6). More blatant is Rosenthal’s claim in (10) that around the world millions of Muslims support fundamentalist extremism.

**Concretization:** To emphasize Their negative acts, another well-known move is to describe the acts in detail, and in concrete, visualizable terms. Thus, when immigrants are portrayed as building a nuclear device, they are actually ‘shown’ as doing so in *that safe house with a view of lower Manhattan*.

**Alliteration:** Phonologically based rhetoric is well-known in tabloid headlines and op-articles, and generally serves to emphasize the importance or relevance of the words thus being marked, as is the case for the alliteration in (7): *domestic dissidents and foreign foes*.

**Warning:** More generally, even without evidence about facts or probable developments, the opinion articles in the NYT and WP are emphasizing possible threats and terror. Doomsday scenarios are rife, and generally intended to both demonize the Others as well as call to action those of us (and especially the politicians) who are not taking things seriously enough. Thus Emerson in example (8) speaks of *hundreds of radical operatives* living in the U.S., *making up a possible loose terrorist network that includes highly trained Islamic mercenaries*. Speculation, fantasy and instilling fear for radical *Islamic mercenaries* – living among us – thus implement the familiar U.S. film-image and media-actor of the ‘killer on the loose’ threatening peaceful people. Note that negative lexicalization, hyperbole, generalization, religious prejudice and concretization may all be part of this persuasive portrayal of threat.

**Norm and value violation:** The most fundamental way of establishing a distinction between THEM and US is not only to describe ourselves in benevolent terms and them in negative terms, but to emphasize that the Others violate the very norms and values we hold dear. Thus, when Rosenthal blames (all?) *Arab intellectuals* for inspiring or condoning terrorism, because of their *supernationalism and obsession with Arab ‘identity’*, it is emphasized that they do so by ignoring the important values of *political liberty, human rights or mercy for their own people*. That is, by violating these norms and values, they have
placed themselves outside the realm of civilization, if not of humanity.

**Presupposition:** A well-known semantic device to indirectly emphasize our good properties and their bad ones is presupposition. That is, these properties are simply assumed to be known, as if they were common sense, and hence need not be specifically asserted. Thus, in Example (10) Rosenthal assumes that Muslims around the world are *fearful of the contagiousness of Western political, religious and sexual freedoms*, and thereby presupposes that indeed the West does have such freedoms. When casually presupposed like this, such an ideological proposition glorifying the ‘West’ is less liable to critique from those who have questions about the sexual and religious freedom propagated by the (Western) Catholic Church, and the political freedoms in Central and South America, or other countries usually considered to belong to the ‘West’.

**8. Conclusion**

We see that a variety of discursive structures and strategies may be used to express ideological beliefs and the social and personal opinions derived from them. The overall strategy of all ideology, as defined here, appears to be positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. This also implies various moves to mitigate, hide or deny Our negative acts or properties, and Their good ones. Thus, We are associated with positive norms and values, whereas They violate such basic principles of civilized social life. The negative acts of the Other can further be emphasized by hyperboles, concrete detailed descriptions, fear-arousing doomsday scenarios and warnings. Generalization allows writers to go from concrete events and persons to more embracing and hence more persuasive statements about whole other groups and categories of people, in our data especially Muslim fundamentalists and Arabs. Comparisons with Major Villains, or Recognized Evil, such as Hitler and the Holocaust, or Communism, is another efficient rhetorical ploy to emphasize how bad the Others are.

Politically speaking, this also allows a smooth transition from the anti-communist Cold War to the anti-Arab (and anti-Third World) Hot Wars as they are fought in the Middle East, Africa or Asia. That is, the U.S. still has an Enemy, and the implication and recommendation of the
opinion articles is therefore usually that the U.S. (its government, president or politicians) should act vigorously to contain that threat. Weakness and peace in that case means appeasement, and hence War.

Thus, the morally defensible critique of terrorism gets an ideologically much more general and political scope, viz., that relating to the interests and the (leadership) position of the USA in the world. Since various forms of terrorism sponsored by the U.S., Christian fundamentalism and intolerance, the role of Israel in the Middle-East conflict (and the occupation of Palestine), are ignored or de-emphasized in such opinion articles, the self-serving partisan nature, the nationalism and ethnocentrism of these articles is clearly ideological, and articulated along the fundamental ideological divide between the U.S. (or the West) and the Rest. All levels and dimensions of the discursive structures of the opinion articles express, with some variations, this basic ideology.

REFERENCES


