Discourse and Ideology

Teun A. van Dijk

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following fragment from a typical newspaper editorial:

> We have a spiralling population fuelled by uncontrolled immigration for which no provision has been made. This is a failure of public policy on a quite staggering scale.
>
> We are finally witnessing the full, malign impact of Labour's failure to control our borders.
>
> This Government has never actually had an immigration policy worthy of the name, simply a series of ad hoc measures with no intellectual coherence that has done nothing to curb – or even monitor – the influx of immigrants.
>
> The best estimate is that immigration has trebled over the past decade and that there are half a million illegal immigrants in this country. And an overloaded social infrastructure is not the only price we will pay. (*Daily Telegraph*, 7 January 2009)

Whatever the many other properties this editorial may have, most readers will agree that it expresses a negative opinion about the Labour Party and its immigration policy. For those readers who know the *Daily Telegraph*, this opinion is hardly surprising, given the conservative outlook of this British newspaper. Indeed, later in the same editorial the newspaper predictably praises the immigration policy of the Conservative Party.

What we characterized as the conservative 'outlook' of this newspaper is commonly also described as an *ideology*. This chapter aims to analyse this notion of ideology and especially the ways ideologies are expressed in, and reproduced by, discourse.

The first thing to observe about the notion of ideology is that in much of our everyday discourse it is used in a derogatory way when characterizing the ideas or policies of *others*:

whereas *we* have the truth, *they* have an ideology. Interestingly, such a derogatory use of the notion of ideology may itself be ideological when it expresses a polarization between an in-group and an out-group, between *Us* and *Them*. A well-known historical example is the widespread qualification of communism as an ideology in traditional anti-communist rhetoric of those who defended capitalism and the free market and who would hardly describe their own ideas as ideological.

This chapter presents a *theory* and *systematic analysis* of ideology that goes beyond such informal, everyday uses of the term and that does not necessarily imply a negative evaluation of ideologies or the people that share them. Under specific social, political, economic and historical conditions any group may develop its own ideology in order to defend its interests and to guarantee the loyalty, cohesion, interaction and cooperation of its members, especially in relation to other social groups or classes. This may mean that ideologies, as we define them, may be used not only to dominate or to oppress others, but also in order to resist and struggle against such domination, as we know of racist *vs*. anti-racist or of sexist *vs*. feminist ideologies. In the same way, group power may be abused or be used to resist such an abuse – depending on the sociopolitical circumstances.

Indeed, what may have been a liberating ideology yesterday may be an oppressive one today. For instance, whereas classical liberalism was once an ideology that advocated individual freedom and motivated the struggle against feudalism, today it may be adhered to by those who are against the freedom of racial or ethnic Others who want to migrate to 'our' country, as we can see in the editorial from the *Daily Telegraph*. Similarly, neo-liberalism may advocate the 'freedom' (and hence the power) of the market and oppose the kind of state intervention favoured by social democrats and socialists – who traditionally defended the interests and the rights of the workers, i.e., *their* freedom *from* exploitation. Hence the stance of the same newspaper against the British Labour party, in general, and against Labour's immigration policies, in particular – even when these policies today can hardly be called generous.

Ideologies, thus informally defined, are general systems of basic ideas shared by the members of a social group, ideas that will influence their interpretation of social events and situations and control their discourse and other social practices as group members. Thus, in order to persuasively formulate and propagate its anti-Labour and anti-immigration opinions based on its conservative ideology, the *Daily Telegraph* uses rhetorical hyperboles such as *uncontrolled*, *failure*, *staggering*, or *malign*, and metaphors such as *spiralling* and *fuelled* to attack Labour's immigration policies. At the same time it emphasizes the alleged danger of the arrival and presence of those it calls *illegal immigrants* in order to associate these with breaking the law and thus derogating (at least many of) Them as criminals, and hence as a threat to Us, English people.

From the informal observations of this example we may conclude also that an anti-immigration stance may not only be based on a racist ideology – if the Others are ethnically or racially different from Us – but also on a nationalist or xenophobic ideology that aims to defend 'our' nation (and its language, customs and culture) against the arrival and large-scale

settlement of *any* strangers. It is precisely through such public discourses as editorials that these kinds of ideologies are expressed and persuasively propagated among readers and hence reproduced in everyday life. Besides defining what ideologies are, this chapter will show how these are expressed and reproduced by socially and politically situated text and talk.

A NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF 'IDEOLOGY'

Although there is no space in this chapter to examine the history of the notion of ideology (dealt with in the several monographs referred to below), it should briefly be recalled that the first use of this notion, introduced by French philosopher Destutt de Tracy, more than 200 years ago, referred to a new discipline: *the science of ideas*. It was only later, especially with Marx and Engels, and more generally in Marxist approaches, that the notion acquired its negative connotation as a 'false consciousness', thereby referring to the misguided ideas of the working class about its material conditions of existence, an ideology inculcated by the ruling class as a means of exploitation and domination. Ideology was thus defined on the basis of underlying socio-economic structures of society and usually contrasted with *scientific knowledge*, for instance as proposed by Historical Materialism, as well as many other approaches in the social sciences until today. It was Gramsci especially who later emphasized the fundamental role of ideology as the *hegemony* of common sense, when bourgeois norms and values are adopted throughout society and domination need no longer be maintained by force.

Contrary to the still prevailing negative conception of ideology as false consciousness and as a means of domination we propose a more general, multidisciplinary theory that accounts for various kinds of ideology, including those of resistance. And instead of a materialist, economic basis for such ideologies, we would emphasize the sociocognitive nature of ideologies as the basis of the shared mental representations of social groups which in turn will control the social practices of members. We do agree, however, with the classic view that ideologies may be inculcated by specific groups in society, such as the *symbolic elites* that control the access to public discourse and hence have the means to manipulate the public at large.

Bibliographical Note

For the **history** and **introduction** to the concept of ideology, see the following books:
Billig (1982); Eagleton (1991); Larrain (1979); Thompson (1990). For **Marxism** and ideology: Abercrombie, Hill & Turner (1990); Althusser (2008); Carlsnaes (1981); Eagleton (1991); Laclau (1979); Larrain (1983); Parekh (1982); Rossi-Landi (1990); Sutton (1990).

ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

Before we examine the ways ideologies are expressed and reproduced by discourse, we need to analyse the concept of ideology in more explicit terms than the informal ones mentioned above, such as 'ideas' and 'false consciousness'.

In order not to depart too far from the informal uses of the notion, however, also the theoretical notion will retain that ideologies consist of 'ideas', or rather of what philosophers and psychologists call *beliefs*. That is, ideologies are, first of all, *belief systems*. This may be trivial, but it is still important because some authors will confuse ideologies as belief systems with *ideologically based practices* such as *discourse*. In the same way as we can distinguish between knowledge of a language (such as grammar, rules of discourse, etc.) and the actual use of that language in communication and interaction, we can distinguish between ideologies and their *uses* or *manifestations* in ideological practices.

Bibliographical Note

For the relations between ideology and **language**, see Blommaert (1999); Dirven (2001); Gee (1990); Hodge & Kress (1993); Malrieu (1999); Pêcheux (1982); Wodak (1989).
For ideology and **communication**, see Asperen (2005); Ballaster (1991); Fowler (1991); Garzone & Sarangi (2008); Mumby (1988). On ideology and **semiotics**: Larsen, Strunck & Vestergaard (2006); Reis (1993); Threadgold (1986); Zima (1981).

Secondly, such belief systems are not individual, personal beliefs, but social beliefs *shared* by members of *social groups*. In that sense, they are comparable to socio-cultural knowledge as it is shared by (epistemic) communities, as is also the case for languages shared by linguistic communities (see below for the differences between ideology and knowledge). This means that ideologies are a form of *social cognition*, that is, beliefs *shared* by and *distributed* over (the minds of) group members.

More specifically, for such beliefs to be shared by groups and their members, these must be beliefs that are *socially relevant* for them, for instance relevant for their interpretation of, and participation in, major events and actions of social life and the relations to other social groups. Thus, groups will develop different ideologies about their existence and history, about birth and death, gender, nature, organization, power, work, sex, competition, war, and so on. In order for ideologies to serve to defend the *interests* of a group, they will tend to articulate especially the relationships to other – dominant, dominated or competing – groups, for instance with respect to the scarce resources that are the basis of their power. In the example of the ideology of the *Daily Telegraph*, we have already observed the polarized nature of ideologies, such as those between Conservatives and Labour or between *Us* English and *Them* immigrants. Similarly, anti-racists will oppose racist practices, pacifists

will oppose militarists and their wars, and feminists will oppose sexist men (and women) and their beliefs and conduct.

Socially shared belief systems such as ideologies are more useful when they apply to many different events, actions and situations. This means that they need to be fairly *general* and *abstract*. Thus feminists may advocate equal rights and opportunities for women and men, and such a basic norm may be applied to situations in the home, at work, in politics and many other domains of everyday life. More *specific* beliefs, such as to favour a specific candidate in the elections or to participate in a demonstration, would in that case be ideological only when they are based on, or derived from, the more basic beliefs that form the ideology of a group.

Bibliographical Note

For ideology, **political theory** and **politics**, see Adams (1993); Ball & Dagger (1990); Bastow & Martin (2003); Freeden (1996); Leach (2002); Rosenberg (1988); Seliger (1976); Talshir, Humphrey & Freeden (2006); van Dijk (2008b); Wodak (1989); Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (1999).

Although all ideologically based beliefs may be called part of an ideology, we shall limit the notion of ideology to the *fundamental, 'axiomatic' beliefs shared by a group*, that is, *general* beliefs that control – and are often originally derived from – more specific beliefs about concrete events, actions and situations with which group members may be confronted. Again, comparing ideologies with natural languages one may say that the 'application' of general ideologies in specific situations may be compared to situated language use – as we know from the classical distinction between competence and performance or between *langue* and *parole*.

The idea of a shared or distributed ideology among the members of a group does not mean that all members will have exactly the same 'copy' of an ideology, nor that they will apply such an ideology in the same way. As is the case for language, ideologies may also be better known by ideological 'experts', the *ideologues*, than by lay members. Many ideological groups, especially those that have been institutionalized, may have special teachers (priests, gurus, party leaders, etc.) and special communicative events (schooling, catechism, manuals, leaflets, etc.) to teach or indoctrinate new members. It is also in this way that ideologies are acquired more generally, for instance through textbooks and the mass media.

Bibliographical Note

For ideology and **social movements**, see Andrain & Apter (1995); Garner (1996); Laraña, Johnston & Gusfield (1994); Jones (1984); Oberschall (1993); Rudé (1980); Wuthnow (1989).

Since people are member of different social groups, each person may 'participate' in various ideologies: one may be a feminist, socialist, pacifist, journalist, etc. and one's activities and discourses may then be influenced by (fragments of) several ideologies at the same time, even when on each occasion one or a few of such ideologies will be dominant – as is more generally the case for identities (see Chapter 13 by Anna De Fina).

Ideologies are not *acquired* or *changed* by group members overnight. They may take years to 'learn', for instance on the basis of personal experiences as well as public discourse and interactions with other group members. They may be slowly developed and adapted in many debates, manifests and other forms of in-group discourse, as was the case for liberalism, socialism, feminism, pacifism and environmentalism. Also, in this respect, ideologies are more like language systems than (sets of) variable personal opinions about concrete events. They are *defined for groups*, and not for individual members who will 'use', 'apply' or 'perform' ideologies in their everyday lives, for which we must account in a different way, namely in terms of *mental models* (see below).

Ideologies may control many kinds of social practice, and not just discourse. A sexist ideology may give rise to sexist talk, but also to (non-verbal) sexual harassment, gender discrimination or violence. *As emphasized above, it is inadequate to reduce ideologies to their discursive manifestations*. Ideologies, as such, are forms of socially shared and distributed social cognition *at the level of groups*. They are shared mental representations that are used or applied as a basis for the specific ideological conduct of group members – of which discourse is crucial, but still just one practice among many.

Bibliographical Note

For general **theories of ideology**, see Billig (1982); CCCS (1978); Thompson (1984); van Dijk (1998); Žižek (1994). For ideology and **social theory**, see, e.g., Agger (1992); Bailey (1994); Gane (1989); Kinloch (1981); Smith (1990); Zeitlin (1994).

Ideology and knowledge

Ideologies are different from other forms of social cognition, such as *knowledge*. We have seen that historically there has been a long tradition of conflict between what was (negatively) qualified as (mere) ideology, on the one hand, and (real, scientific, etc.) knowledge, on the other hand. Unfortunately, there is no space in this chapter to develop the complex relation between ideology and knowledge. We shall simply say that an ideology is shared by the members of a specific *group* and that the ideology generally is in the *interest* of a *group* – often featuring evaluative propositions.

Knowledge, on the other hand, as defined here, is shared by a whole *community*; it is presupposed in all public discourse of the community, and also by speakers of different ideological groups, and hence is a form of Common Ground. Crucially, knowledge is belief that has been 'certified' by the (epistemic) criteria of an (epistemic) community – criteria

that may vary culturally, historically and socially. Scholars will have other certification criteria or 'methods' to lay people, and we will have different ones today than existed five hundred years ago. In that sense, knowledge is always relative and contextual. However, *within* an epistemic community it is *not* relative, but assumed as a 'true' belief. That is, the relativism of knowledge is relative as well, as it should be.

Bibliographical Note

For ideology and **science**, see Aronowitz (1988); Diesing (1982).

According to this account, knowledge is more fundamental than ideologies, because ideologies, and an ideologically-based knowledge of groups, presuppose the shared knowledge of a whole community – that is, of *all* ideological groups. It is this feature of an epistemic Common Ground that enables mutual understanding and debate, even among ideological opponents, who may disagree about everything else.

Note that the relativity of knowledge also implies that what is knowledge for one community may be a mere belief, superstition or, indeed, a mere ideology, for others. As soon as there are significant social groups or institutions that will challenge general knowledge in a society, such knowledge may turn into debatable group knowledge or (counter) ideology – as was the case for the existence of God, the geocentric universe, the alleged intellectual inferiority of women or blacks, and so on. In other words, our theory of knowledge and ideology implies that beliefs which are generally accepted, shared and applied *as knowledge* in a community are by definition only 'ideological' from the perspective of another community, or at a later historical stage of the same community. In other words, beliefs count as knowledge in a community when the social practices, and hence all public discourse, of the members of the community presuppose these beliefs as being true-for-them.

Bibliographical Note

For the relations between ideology and **knowledge**, see Bailey (1994); Mannheim (1936); Dant (1991); van Dijk (1998). For ideology and **cultural studies**: Hall, Hobson, Lowe & Willis (1980); Morley & Chen (1996); Simons & Billig (1994).

The structure of ideologies

Although there has been a long tradition of philosophical and political thought about the nature of ideologies, little attention has been paid to the precise nature, the socio-cognitive structures, as well as the discursive reproduction, of ideologies. Indeed, a general, multidisciplinary theory of ideology and ideological discourse and other practices is still in its infancy.

- **Identity** (Who are we? Who belong to us? Where do we come from?)

- **Activities** (What do we usually do? What is our task?)

- **Goals** (What do we want to obtain?)

- **Norms and values** (What is good/bad, permitted/prohibited for us?)

- **Group relations** (Who are our allies and opponents?)

- **Resources** (What is the basis of our power, or our lack of power?)

Figure 18.1   Schematic categories of the structure of ideologies

As part of such a new theory, we must first characterize ideologies as forms of social cognition, that is, in psychological terms. In contemporary cognitive science, the vague notion of 'ideas' is generally analysed in terms of beliefs and belief systems, stored in 'semantic' Long-Term Memory, namely as specific *mental representations*. But what do such representations look like? What exactly is the *structure* of ideologies such as pacifism, socialism or neo-liberalism?

The easiest would be to represent ideologies as *lists* of ideological *propositions*, such as 'Women and men are equal', or 'War is wrong', and so on. However, lists are not very efficient to learn and use in concrete situations. Indeed, there are multiple mutual relationships between such propositions, and we should therefore rather think of ideologies in terms of specific *networks* (which might be related to the neurological networks of the brain – a topic we shall not deal with here) or other forms of *belief organization*.

Although as yet we do not know much about the mental organization of ideologies, analysis of ideological discourse and other practices suggests that ideologies will typically feature categories of propositions about the basic properties of groups, as in Figure 18.1.

These fundamental categories of the organization of ideologies form a general *schema* that reflects how groups will gradually develop a self-concept that is the result of their collective, shared *experiences* in society.

Ideologies as social cognition

Although ideologies are themselves belief systems and hence *cognitive constructs*, this does not mean that they are not *social* at the same time. On the contrary, as is the case for language, they are socially *shared* among the members of a *collectivity* and they are based on, and developed as a consequence of, *social interaction* in *social situations* that are part of *social structures*. This is how ideologies are developed *historically* for the group as a whole.

Once an ideology has been developed and has already spread among a group, new *individual group members* will learn it largely by inferences from the interpretation of the practices and especially of the *discourses* of parents, friends or colleagues, as well as the mass media. Some ideologies are acquired through specially designed educational discourse, that is, through the *teachings* of special group members (gurus, leaders, writers, priests, teachers: the *ideologues*). Indeed, people's personal experiences – as interpretations of events we shall call 'mental models' below – may be influenced by the ideologies they have acquired through discourse in the first place. For instance, workers do not spontaneously become socialists because of their miserable working conditions. They will only become socialists as a result of a complex process of 'learning' socialist ideas, consciousness raising, and ideological discourse, communication and interaction with (other) socialists.

Bibliographical Note

For ideology and **education**, see Apple (1979); Apple & Weiss (1983); Ward (1994).

Ideology vs. discourse

Since ideological discourse is by definition based on underlying ideologies, such discourse often shows some of the structures of these ideologies. We shall see below that this is indeed one of the ways by which we may analyse ideological discourse. Few data are better to study ideologies than text and talk, because it is largely through discourse and other semiotic messages, rather than by other ideological practices, that the contents of ideologies can be explicitly *articulated*, *justified* or *explained*, e.g., by argumentation, narration or exposition.

This does *not* mean that, methodologically speaking, we may circularly derive ideologies from discourse and discourse from ideologies, because – as we argued above – ideologies will also influence many other social practices, such as forms of oppression and discrimination or the struggle against them. Hence, the structures and contents of ideologies are different – for instance more general and abstract – from the ways they are used or expressed in discourse and other social practices. Indeed, we shall see below that discourse structures and ideological structures are only indirectly related through several intermediate cognitive levels. Thus one cannot always simply 'read off' the underlying ideologies of a discourse. We can *explain* ideological discourse structures (as well as other ideological practices) only *partly* in terms of underlying ideologies and only when taking into account intermediate levels of discourse production. Ideological discourses are also controlled by many other, non-ideological, constraints, such as the current goals, knowledge and conception of the current context of the participants.

This may mean that in specific communicative situations ideologies may not be expressed in discourse at all, or expressed in an indirect and transformed way. As we shall see below, relating discourse to ideology takes place at several levels of analysis, and hence is far from

circular: even ideological discourse is in many ways autonomous, and is always ultimately shaped by the *whole* context, of which the ideology of the participants is only *one* dimension.

An example: a schema of a professional ideology

As an example of the ideology schema mentioned above, consider the ideology of many journalists. Such a *professional* ideology first features the *identity* of a journalist as a professional (who in a given community is seen, accepted, hired, etc. as a journalist?); their typical professional *activities* (e.g., gather and report the news); their overall *goals* (to inform the public, to 'serve as a watchdog of society'); their *norms* (objectivity, fairness, impartiality, etc.); their *relations to other groups* (sources, readers, government, corporate business, etc.); and the main *resource* that defines their power in society (information). Note that the propositions organized by this ideological schema do not describe what journalists actually think and do, but how they *positively represent* themselves: they are *ideological* propositions. In other words, an ideology is like a basic *self-image* of a group, including the interests and relationships (power, resistance, competition) to other social groups.

Ideologies, norms and values

Note that ideologies as belief systems not only represent the (possibly biased, misguided) *knowledge* of a group, but also its shared *evaluations*, according to the basic community *norms* and *values* applied in its own activities as well as those of reference groups. Indeed, professional journalists will also have criteria that will allow them to recognize 'good' or 'bad' reporting – as is also reflected in professional codes of conduct. In other words, ideologies not only tell members of an ideological group what is 'true' or 'false', but also what is 'good' or 'bad', 'permitted' or prohibited', and so on.

Thus, one widespread value in many communities is *Freedom*. But depending on the interests of ideological groups this value may be differently construed in their ideologies, for instance as *Freedom of the Market* in neoliberal ideologies and as *Freedom of the Press* in the professional ideology of journalists. Evaluations of actions and events that are relevant for the members of an ideological group are thus evaluated on the basis of these ideologically applied general community norms and values. Although many ideologies are transcultural, this may also mean that if the basic values of a community are different the ideologies (such as liberalism, socialism or feminism) in that community may also be different from those in other communities.

Bibliographical Note

For ideology and the **bureaucracy**, see Burton & Carlen (1979); Hwang (1998).

ATTITUDES

We have defined ideologies as *shared*, *general* and *abstract* mental representations that should be applicable to the many situations in which ideological group members may find themselves. However, it is likely that ideologies control – and are originally derived from – shared beliefs about more *specific* issues that are relevant in the everyday lives of group members. In traditional social psychology such specific representations are called *attitudes*, a notion we shall here adopt (and adapt) because of its practical use and usefulness in ideological discourse analysis. As is the case for knowledge and ideologies, attitudes are also forms of *socially shared and distributed cognition*, and hence still fairly general and abstract and *not* ad hoc personal opinions (although these are also called 'attitudes' in much of social psychology).

Attitudes are ideologically-based belief clusters about *specific social issues*, such as abortion, euthanasia, immigration, pollution, freedom of speech and the press, the vote, and so on. While focused on relevant social issues, attitudes – as we would define them here – are more directly applicable in the ideological control of discourse and other social practices than the abstract ideologies on which they are based.

Indeed, members may barely be aware of the general ideologies influencing their concrete opinions and conduct. They are usually more conscious of group attitudes about concrete issues and will orient their personal opinions accordingly. For instance, under the influence of a dominant anti-feminist discourse, many young girls may even reject the general ideological label of being feminists, but still actually subscribe to many feminist attitudes, such as equal pay, freedom of choice in questions of abortion, and so on. The same may be true for workers who may not see themselves as socialists, but would agree with many socialist-based attitudes about hiring, firing and the rights of workers in general. And conversely, quite typically, people may be against immigration and the rights of immigrants but would emphatically deny propagating a racist ideology – as would be typically the case for the journalist(s) who wrote the editorial on immigration in the *Daily Telegraph*.

We can see that in the theory of ideology, attitudes – as defined – play a crucial *intermediary* role in our minds, namely to link very general ideologies to more specific social domains, issues and practices, and ultimately to discourse. And conversely, ideologies are not usually directly acquired by generalizing from discourse and other social practices, but as further generalizations and abstractions of specific attitudes: one gradually learns to be a feminist, socialist or pacifist by learning about specific feminist, socialist or pacifist issues.

Bibliographical Note

There are few book-length studies on the cognitive or social psychology of ideology. See, for example, Billig (1982); Aebischer, Deconchy & Lipiansky (1992); Fraser & Gaskell (1990); van Dijk (1998).

IDEOLOGICAL MENTAL MODELS

In order to relate ideologies and ideologically based attitudes to concrete discourse and other social practices of individual members in specific situations, we finally need another level of socio-cognitive analysis, namely that of *personal experiences*. Such experiences are represented as *mental models*, stored in our (autobiographical) Episodic Memory, part of Long-Term Memory. Unlike underlying ideologies and attitudes, models are *subjective*, *personal* representations of *specific* events, actions and situations – that is, how people personally interpret, live and remember the events in their daily lives. Besides personal knowledge, such models may also feature personal evaluative beliefs – *opinions* – as well as the *emotions* associated with such events.

Mental models formed by individual members of a social group may be ideologically controlled by socially shared group attitudes about a specific issue. Thus, feminists will typically have a feminist opinion about a specific case of sexual harassment. This is the social dimension of the mental models they share with other feminists, and explains why members of the same group will often have similar opinions about an event.

However, models are also representations of *personal* experiences, and hence are also influenced by current goals and earlier experiences that may be at variance with the socially shared attitude. This explains why in interviews, and other forms of ideological discourse, members of the same group may at the same time show considerable variations in their personal opinions, so much so that scholars have often doubted about the very existence of underlying attitudes and ideologies that may be generally shared.

A comprehensive theory of ideology that is analytically and empirically adequate should describe and explain **both** *the personal variation of ideological discourse and conduct,* **and** *the ideologically based opinions people have in common as group members*. Since mental models – as the interface between the social and the personal – feature both dimensions, they are ideal as a basis for the explanation of personally variable, but yet socially based, ideological opinions and discourse.

Since only group members as persons – and not groups – have bodies, this also allows ideologies and attitudes to be lived, expressed and 'embodied' in the mental models of personal experiences, as is typically the case for *emotions*. Thus, sexual harassment is not just lived as an instantiation of a feminist-based ideology against gender inequality or male oppression, but also felt as a deeply *personal* and *emotional* experience – even when later *accounts* of such an experience in storytelling may combine personal feelings with ideologically-based instantiations of general attitudes about sexual harassment.

Bibliographical Note

For ideology, **gender** and **feminism**, see Afshar (1987); Ballaster (1991); Charles & Hintjens (1998); Lazar (2005); Ryan (1992); Smith (1990); Wodak (1997).

Mental models are crucial in the account of discourse and other social practices and define how we will personally plan, understand, interpret, experience and later remember all the events and actions we are involved in. Ideologically 'biased' mental models control all our ideological practices and hence also our ideological text and talk. Mental models of discourse represent what the discourse is about, or refers to, and hence account for the semantics of discourse. We may therefore also call them 'semantic models' of discourse. In other words, to interpret the meaning of a discourse, language users will construe a subjective mental model for that discourse, possibly including their opinions and emotions about the actions or events that discourse is about. We can see that mental models play a central role both in discourse production as well as in discourse comprehension. It is through *personally variable but socially similar mental models* that members of an ideological group will interpret and represent all the social events that are relevant for a group and hence the discourses about such events.

Bibliographical Note

In this chapter ideologies are primarily defined and analyzed as socially shared mental representations of groups. Their individual dimension are accounted for in terms of the 'uses' of such ideologies and attitudes by group members, and in terms of evaluative and emotional aspects of subjective mental models representing the people's personal experiences. Such an approach is different from the traditional 'psycho-dynamic' approach to ideologies in terms of people's personality, as in the 'authoritarian personality' of Adorno (1950). This latter approach, combined with a more 'top down' collective approach, has recently found new advocates and generated new empirical research, for instance in the work of John Jost and associates (among many studies, see, for example, the review article by Jost, Federico & Napier (2009)). This work stresses that, in addition to situational conditions that create fear (as is the case for terrorist attacks), specific 'bottom up' personality properties, such as 'being open to new experiences' predispose people to leftists, liberal ideologies, whereas a preference for order, stability and loyalty tend to predispose people to 'elect' conservative ideologies.

Ideological context models

Special mental models, namely *context models*, are formed from the current, ongoing *experience of interaction and communication* defining the *context* of text and talk. For instance, journalistic practices are controlled by context models that will subjectively represent the writer's own identity, roles, goals, norms and resources as journalist, combined with previous, personal experiences during news gathering and news writing. Similarly, someone may typically speak *as a feminist* when participating in a debate on sexual harassment. This means that in her (or his) current, ongoing context model the speaker will represent her- or himself as a feminist, and such a context model will influence all the levels of discourse production or comprehension.

Context models are *subjective definitions* of the communicative situation. They control how discourse is adapted to the communicative situation, and hence define its *appropriateness*.

Besides representing the current identities of, and relations between, the participants such context models will also feature information about the Setting (Time, Place), identities and relations of participants, the ongoing social activity (e.g., news writing, a conversation, a parliamentary debate, etc.), as well as the goals, the knowledge and – indeed – the currently relevant ideologies of the participants.

Context models are the basis of the *pragmatics* of discourse. This may also require that the 'semantic' mental models about some experience (what we talk *about*) are adapted to the current communicative situation. It is not always appropriate (polite, relevant, etc.) to express what one knows, believes or feels. Thus, 'pragmatic' context models will control *what* we say and especially *how* we say it (style, register) in a specific communicative situation. And, crucial for our discussion, like 'semantic' mental models, context models may be ideologically biased. Thus men (and women) may not just express sexist opinions when talking *about* women, but also when talking *to* them – that is, represent themselves and their (relation to the) interlocutor in their context model in a sexist way.

This pragmatic account of discourse and ideology is crucial, because it shows more clearly what we have said above about the sometimes indirect relations between discourse and ideology. It is true that the discourse of group members may typically be influenced by the ideology of the group, but this always depends on the context as the participants define it. Depending on current aims and interests and the opinions or ideologies of one's interlocutors, one may conceal or only indirectly express one's ideologies. Indeed, in many situations such an ideology may not even be relevant, and one need not speak *as a group member* in that case. Feminists or pacifists do not always speak as feminists or pacifists in all situations. In other words, context models are always the ultimate 'filter' for underlying ideologies, even when the ideologies in that case may subtly 'leak' through such a filter of self-control, and be detected by sophisticated discourse analysis, as we know from such formulas as *I am not a racist, but …*

Bibliographical Note

On ideology and semantic **situation models** and **pragmatic (context) models** and ideology, see van Dijk (1998, 2008a).

IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE

Having sketched the nature of ideologies and the way these are related to concrete ideological practices, we now also know the socio-cognitive aspects of how ideologies are related to discourse, how they can be expressed or performed in discourse, and how they can be acquired and changed by discourse.

We have stressed that *ideologies are seldom expressed directly in discourse*, possibly with the exception of explicit ideological texts such as bibles, catechisms, party programmes, and

so on. More often than not, only fragments of ideologies will be expressed, for instance in the form of attitudes about specific issues, say in a debate about immigration or government policy, as we have seen in the editorial from the *Daily Telegraph*. And even then, such a shared attitude may be combined with personal experiences and opinions in the mental models of specific group members as language users.

In other words, it must be assumed, as we did above, that there are several layers of representation between general, abstract group ideologies on the one hand (as some kind of ideological 'deep structure') and concrete ideological text and talk (as ideological 'surface structure') on the other hand. We have argued that this may also mean that ideologies are not always directly visible or detectable in discourse, especially when context models block direct ideological expression as being inappropriate of otherwise a 'bad idea' in a specific situation. In that case, an analysis of the context may be necessary in order to show that the use of specific expressions (e.g., code words) in specific situations should be interpreted as ideological – as we know from the propaganda posters of racist parties in Europe.

Bibliographical Note

For ideological discourse analysis, see De Saussure & Schulz (2005); Fowler (1991); Fox & Fox (2004); Garzone & Sarangi (2008); Gee (1990); Larsen, Strunck & Vestergaard (2006); Lazar (2005); Pêcheux (1982); Pütz, Neff-van Aertselaer & van Dijk (2004); Schäffner & Kelly-Holmes (1996), van Dijk (1998, 2008b); Wodak (1989); Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (1999).

Constraints on ideological discourse analysis

For theoretical and methodological reasons, ideological discourse analysis should be guided by three fundamental constraints: 1) *discursive*, 2) *socio-cognitive*, and 3) *social* in a broad sense (including interactional, political, historical and cultural).

This means, first of all, that *any* discourse analysis, and hence also ideological analysis, should take into account the general properties of text and talk, and hence the relation between any expression or meaning with respect other structures in discourse. For instance, as is often the case, one may interpret a passive construction as an expression of an ideological strategy for mitigating the negative role of a dominant group. However, it should not be forgotten that passive sentence constructions may also be used in discourse for several other reasons, e.g., because the agent is unknown, or because the agent has already been identified and need not be repeated, but the focus needs to be on the victims of negative actions, and so on. In other words, there may be other than ideological constraints on the structures of discourse, and one should always take into account, first of all, the 'co-textual' function of any expression or meaning within the very discourse itself.

Secondly, ideological discourse analysis is obviously about discourse structures that are influenced – even if only very indirectly – by underlying ideologies as they are shared by the members of a group. In other words, only those structures of discourse should be called ideological that can be shown to be expressions of the underlying socio-cognitive representations (such as mental models and attitudes) that are controlled by the structures of the ideology of a group. This means that those ideological structures of discourse should be focused on that express or reproduce the identity, actions, goals, norms and values, group relations and resources of a group – if we assume that these are the general categories of the structures of ideologies. Language users may engage in a positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation for personal reasons alone, and not because they wish to speak or write *as a member of a group*. In that case, the mental model that underlies discourse is not influenced by socially shared ideologies or attitudes, but features personal opinions and experiences only, or opinions based on non-ideological attitudes shared by a group. For instance, not every negative discourse by a group of students about their professors is necessarily ideologically inspired.

Thirdly, besides these discursive and socio-cognitive constraints, all social practices and hence all text and talk are conditioned by the social environment, that is, by ongoing interaction, as well as by the identity, interests, goals, relationships and other properties of the communicative situation as the participants define it, that is, by the *context*. This means, as we have seen above, that speakers may well *not* express an ideologically-based perspective or opinion for contextual reasons, for instance because of politeness, fear of ridicule, and so on.

The expression or 'performance' of ideologically-based structures always needs to be analysed with regard to the ongoing, and possibly dynamically changing, *functions of discourse in the current context*. For instance, the *Daily Telegraph* typically expresses its anti-immigration attitude in a public editorial addressed to a Labour government. It may do so because, for several other ideological reasons, it is opposed to such a government, and hence hopes its editorial will have a significant political impact, for instance on readers/voters. In other words, its ideological editorial has ideological functions in the current communicative situation (knowing the kind of readers the newspaper has, knowing the current political situation, etc.). Now, if the Conservatives were to gain power, the context would be totally different, and although the negative attitude about immigration would remain the same, an editorial about immigration policies directed at a Conservative government would most likely be quite different.

In sum, ideological discourse analysis – that is, the identification and interpretation of discursive structures and strategies as the expression and reproduction of group ideologies – must always take into account the textual, cognitive and social (contextual) constraints on all discourse. Indeed, rather trivially, not all the structures of every discourse are always ideological! It is in light of these constraints that we shall finally examine some structures of text and talk that often – but not always – have ideological functions.

In the remainder of this chapter, we shall focus on the ways ideologies are being expressed, performed and (re) produced by text and talk. The theoretical basis of that

analysis, as we have outlined it above, is that ideological discourse is always controlled by the following fundamental underlying representations:

1   SOCIAL COGNITION

    a)   Socially shared representations of the whole community: socio-cultural **knowledge** or **Common Ground**.

    b)   Socially shared representations of a specific social group: specific **group knowledge** and **ideology** and ideological **attitudes**.

2   PERSONAL COGNITION

    a)   Subjective mental **event models** of the events talked or written *about* – defining the *semantic reference, truth, etc.* of discourse.

    b)   Subjective mental models – **context models** – of the current communicative situation *in which participants are currently involved,* defining the *pragmatic appropriateness* of discourse.

This means that, first of all, we may examine the ways *ideologies and their structures* will influence attitudes, mental models and finally discourse structures, though always under the control of context models, such as the current goals of the speaker or writer. This means that if ideologies are indeed organized according to the schema we proposed above, we may engage in a systematic and theoretically-based analysis of ideologies by examining how their categories show up in discourse.

The expression of ideological schemas in discourse

Following the ideology schema proposed above, we may assume that the following types of *meanings* tend to become manifest in ideological discourse:

- **Group identity and identification**   Topics about who we are; who are (not) typical members of our group; what the typical properties are for our group; who can or should (not) be admitted to the group; where we come from; what our history is; what our foundational texts are; who are our group heroes; what our symbols are, or other symbolic markers (flags, etc.); and, quite crucially, what our 'own' domain is where we are autonomous. In sum, this ideological category influences a vast number of possible discourse topics and local meanings related to the *history, properties* and *boundaries* of the group. Characteristic examples of ideologies that are largely based on this category are nationalism, Euro-centrism and racism.
- **Activity**   This category influences the way group members will define their typical role in society, what they will do, what is expected of them as group members. This category is especially important in professional ideologies, but also in some political and religious ones. Indeed, Christianity is not just self-defined in terms of its beliefs, but also in how Christians are supposed (not) to act towards their 'neighbours' – as laid down in the Ten Commandments. Hence, all topics of discourse that are about what *we as a group* do, or should (not) do, may be expressions of such an ideology, as are the social practices that are themselves controlled by the ideology.
- **Norms and values**   Ideologies, attitudes and the practices based on them are permanently controlled by norms and values. Thus, most opinions in the ideological discourse of group members may be based on the norms and values specifically selected and combined in each ideology, such as freedom, autonomy, justice, and so on – though redefined in terms of the interest of the group (e.g., freedom of the market, freedom of speech, freedom from discrimination, etc.). Thus, all references to what is good or bad, and what is permitted and prohibited, who are good and bad people, what

are good and bad actions, etc., are expressions that are typically influenced by this category of the ideology. This category is especially important in political and religious ideologies.

- **Group relations**   Central to most ideologies is the representation of the relation between our own (in-) group and other (out-) groups, between *Us* and *Them*. Given the positive bias in ideological self-schemas, we may thus expect a generally positive representation of Us, and a negative representation of Them, at all levels of discourse. This *ideological polarization* is so pervasive in discourse that we shall pay special attention to it below. Although relevant for most ideologies, this category is quite typical for racist, nationalist and political-economic ideologies (such as socialism and neo-liberalism), as well as most ideologies of resistance, such as feminism and pacifism, but less prominent in professional ideologies.
- **Resources**   Groups need resources to be able to exist and reproduce as a group. Journalists without information, professors without knowledge, etc. would not be able to exercise their power in society. Hence, ideological discourse may be geared to the (sometimes violent) defence of our resources, privileges or power, or precisely by our lack of them. Such ideologies and their discourses are typical for most ideologies, but quite explicit for resistance ideologies (feminism, socialism) and socio-economic ideologies (neo-liberalism, etc.).

We have now outlined the general influence of ideologies and their basic categories on discourse, for instance on the kind of overall topics and local meanings of ideological discourse. However, such an analysis is still quite general, and we need to go down to more specific ways in which ideologies will shape text and talk. Theoretically ideologies may influence any part of a discourse that may vary with the ideologies of the speaker. In other words, ideologies may in principle affect all discourse structures except those following the general rules of grammar and discourse. General rules hold for all speakers and hence for all groups in a language community, and hence must be ideologically rather neutral. An exception here are those rules that have been developed as a consequence of group control, as is the case for masculine plural pronouns in Spanish, that are also used to denote collectivities of men and women, or the – grammatically masculine – names of many professions. Hence, since there are a large number of discourse structures that can be ideologically controlled, we shall only focus on some characteristic ones, and refer to the general ideological schema above to find and analyse other ideologically-based structures and strategies.

The ideological square

One of the main overall strategies of ideological discourse control in discourse is a manifestation of the *Group Relations* category of the ideology schema, that is, the way in-groups

Emphasize *Our* good things	Emphasize *Their* bad things
De-emphasize *Our* bad things	De-emphasize *Their* good things

Figure 18.2   The Ideological Square

and out-groups are represented in text and talk, prototypically represented by the ideological pronouns *Us* and *Them*. Since the underlying ideological structure of that category is largely *polarized*, we may expect the same to be the case in ideological discourse. This happens in the following way, which we have called the *Ideological Square* because of its four complementary overall strategies.

The general meta-strategies of (de-) emphasizing, as we also know it from classical rhetoric (for instance in hyperboles and euphemisms) can be applied at all levels of multimodal text and talk, as we shall see in more detail below: at the level of sound and visual structures, of syntax and the lexicon, of local and global semantics, of pragmatics, of rhetoric, and of the schematic (organizational) structures of discourse. In the editorial from the *Daily Telegraph* we have already observed several hyperboles, that is, moves to lexically emphasize the 'bad' properties attributed to Labour and its immigration policy. Below we shall show in more detail how this was done in other examples of ideological discourse.

Positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation

The complex meta-strategy of the ideological square tells us that group members will tend to speak or write positively about their own group, and negatively about those out-groups they define as opponents, competitors or enemies, if only because the Others are different.

This basic property of groups and group relations, often observed in social psychological and sociological studies on intergroup perception and interaction, requires sophisticated discourse analysis in order to examine how it is deployed at all levels of text and talk. That is, discourse analysis goes beyond a superficial content analysis of positive or negative terms describing attributed in-group or out-group characteristics.

Discourse may affect the formation or change of mental models, and hence realize persuasive goals, in many more ways, from the sound structures of intonation and the visual structures of images, via the formal structures of syntax, style and rhetoric, to the complex semantic manipulation of local and global meanings and the pragmatic dimensions of speech acts and more generally the strategies of interaction.

Thus, emphasizing the negative characteristics of out-groups may be accomplished by such diverse structures and strategies as the following.

SEMANTIC STRUCTURES: MEANING AND REFERENCE

- **Negative topics** (semantic macrostructures) – any overall discourse topic describing *Them* as breaching our norms and values: deviance, threat, insecurity, criminality, inability, etc.
- **Level of description** (generality *vs.* specificity) – *Their* negative properties or actions tend to be described in more specific (lower level) detail than *Ours*.
- **Degree of completeness** (at each level of description) – More details will be mentioned, at each level of description, about *Their* negative properties or actions.
- **Granularity** (preciseness *vs.* vagueness) – *Their* negative properties or actions tend to be described with more precise terms than *Ours*.

- **Implications** (propositions implied by propositions explicitly expressed in discourse) – propositions may be used that have (many) negative implications about *Them*.
- **Presuppositions** (propositions that must be true/known for any proposition to be meaningful) – presupposing propositions (negative about Them) that are not known to be true.
- **Denomination** (of propositions: participant description) – *They* tend to be named or identified as different from *Us* (precisely as *Them*) – strangers, immigrants, Others, opponents, enemies, etc.
- **Predication** (of propositions: meanings of sentences) – any predicate of a proposition attributing negative characteristics to Them.
- **Modality** (modal expressions modifying propositions: necessity, probability, possibility) – negative properties of *Them* may be attributed as inherent, and hence as 'necessarily' applying to *Them*.
- **Agency** (role of the arguments/participants of a proposition) – emphasizing *Their* (and de-emphasizing *Our*) agency or active responsibility of negative actions.
- **Topic *vs.* comment organization** (distribution of given/known *vs*. new information in sentences) – as with presuppositions at the propositional level, negative participants may be assumed to be known, etc.
- **Focus** Any participant, property or action may receive special focus, e.g., by special stress, volume, size, colour, etc. (see below), in order to draw attention of the recipients – e.g. in order to emphasize negative agency of Them.

FORMAL STRUCTURES

- **Superstructures** (general 'formats', 'schemas' or overall 'organization' of discourse such as those of argumentation or narration). Specific semantic categories – e.g. with negative meanings about *Them* – may be **foregrounded** when placed in an irregular (first, earlier) position, e.g. in headlines or leads. Negative properties of *Them* may be emphasized by persuasive arguments and fallacies or by captivating forms of storytelling that also promote the later memorizing of such alleged negative properties.
- **Visual structures** that emphasize negative meanings: foregrounding negative acts or events in images; type, size, colour of letters and headlines; prominent position on page or medium (e.g. front page of newspaper); photographs representing *Them* as actors of negative actions; derogatory cartoons; preciseness, granularity, close-ups, etc. of negative representations in images or film.
- **Sound structures** that emphasize negative words: volume, pitch, etc. of phonemes; intonation of sentences (e.g. expressing irony, distance, scepticism, accusations, etc.); music associated with negative emotions (e.g. signifying threat, danger, violence, etc.).
- **Syntactic structures of sentences** (word order, order of clauses, hierarchical relations between clauses, etc.) – active sentences to emphasize negative agency (*vs*. passive sentences or nominalizations that de-emphasize agency); initial dependent *that*-clauses may express unknown or false presuppositions about *Them*.
- **Definite expressions** May express unknown or false presuppositions about *Them*.
- **Pronouns** May signal in-group and out-group membership, as in *Us* vs. Them, and in general different degrees of power, solidarity, intimacy, etc. when speaking to *Us* vs. *Them*.
- **Demonstratives** May signal closeness or distance to people being described, e.g. *those people*.
- **Rhetorical moves** Repetitions, enumerations, rhymes, alliterations to emphasize and hence draw attention to emphasize negative meanings about *Them*.

We can see from this (incomplete) list that there are many ways whereby language users may emphasize negative meanings/information about Others, and thus engage in the discursive reproduction of out-group derogation that is typical of ideological text and talk. They may do so by using (semantic) structures and strategies of meaning itself, such as selecting or emphasizing negative topics or person and action descriptions, but also by many formal

(visual, phonological, structural) means that may be conventionally used to emphasize these meanings and hence draw special attention to them.

Obviously the *same* semantic and formal strategies may be used for a positive self-description of in-groups and their members. In other words, and as stressed above, the general structures and strategies of discourse must themselves be ideologically neutral, since these may be used by any ideological group in the same community – they are linguistic and communicative resources that can be adopted by anyone. However, *what* is being (de-) emphasized by these discursive means is of course ideologically relevant. This also means that ideological analysis can never consist of only a *formal* analysis of text and talk: we always need to consider the *meanings* that express underlying ideological beliefs, as well as the *context*: who is speaking/writing about what, to whom, when, and with what goal.

SAMPLE ANALYSIS

Let us finally examine in some more detail another characteristic example of ideological discourse and show how its structures express and reproduce underlying ideologies. Although we could have selected a discourse exemplifying what we would call positive ideologies – e.g. those advocating justice, equality, equity, autonomy, etc. – we shall again use a discourse that exemplifies ideologies that are often deemed to be negative in democratic contexts. Such an analysis is more typical for Critical Discourse Studies, that is, a scholarly activity and movement that opposes power abuse and domination, such as racism, sexism, and so on.

As our example, we shall examine the intervention of a member of the Partido Popular (PP) in Spain, Ángel Acebes Paniagua, in the Spanish *Cortes* (Cámara de Diputados: Spanish Parliament), on 24 May 2006, addressing the Minister (Secretary) of Work and Social Affairs, Caldera, a member of the government led by PSOE (socialist) Prime Minister Zapatero, on the topic of immigration (see the Appendix for the Spanish original):

 1 Mister Minister, your first decision, nearly the only one your Government
 2 has taken, was to change the policy we had agreed with the European
 3 Union, and to realize a massive regularization process when already
 4 nobody was doing so in the European Union. Despite the warnings of this
 5 parliamentary group, of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the
 6 European Commission, that this would produce a most serious call effect
 7 (Commotion), you ignored this policy. The Prime Minister continued with his
 8 well-known policy of letting nobody spoil him a good headline, although it
 9 creates a problem for all the citizens.
10 The consequences soon followed and all Spanish citizens see them
11 every day: large groups assaulting our borders in Ceuta and Melilla –
12 there were 15 dead, Mister Minister; avalanches of people in the Canary
13 Islands – 2000 immigrants in one week, and each day 600 people enter
14 at La Junquera and through the mountain passes in the North, and many
15 more through the airports. The end result of your policy: one million more

16 irregular immigrants in one single year. You have broken all records of
17 incompetence (Commotion). You know what is most serious of all? These
18 avalanches have turned our borders into places where anybody can enter
19 as they please, and criminal gangs have taken advantage of that to enter
20 Spain. Crime taking place at our homes is due to criminal gangs that traffic
21 with human beings, engage in violent robberies, express kidnappings,
22 homicides. Of course one things leads to another, hence we insist on
23 efficient policies that resolve this problem, a problem that increasingly
24 worries the citizens. (Commotion). In the meantime, this Government, totally
25 overwhelmed, acts ridiculously, as you do when you say that all of Europe is
26 going to copy your policy … (Applause).

In order to show the international relations and coherence of widespread ideologies, we also chose this example because it deals with the same topic as the editorial of the *Daily Telegraph*, namely immigration; is also formulated by a member of a conservative institution, a political party; and is also critically directed at a 'Labour' government.

The ideological polarization here is articulated along two axes, the first one opposing the Conservative party and opposition for the Partido Popular to the socialist government, and the second opposing the autochthonous Spanish people to immigrants. Let us now compare how such underlying ideological structures have been expressed in this fragment.

The analysis of the positive self-presentation moves yields the usual ones for an in-group presentation of political parties in opposition when attacking the government. Although they are at the moment (2010) the political minority in Spain, their legitimization is sought first of all by claiming to be part of a European consensus (actually, the 2009 elections of the EU parliament showed that conservative ideologies, also on immigration, were dominant in Europe). Higher level political organizations may thus be used in ideological discourse as a warrant in an implicit argument sustaining the point of view that *Our* policies are good. Secondly, when issuing a warning that is also presented as being in line with the

Table 18.1   Positive self-presentation moves in the discourse of a conservative politician in the Spanish Parliament when talking about immigration

A. Conservatives (Partido Popular, 'Us')	Positive self-presentation
1 we had agreed with the European Union	• We are part of the international consensus
2 when already nobody was doing so in the European Union.	• Our policy is in line with EU policy
	• 'We told you so' → We know about politics
3 Despite the warnings of this parliamentary group, of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Commission, that this would produce a most serious call effect	• We agree with the policy of the large EU countries
	• We foresaw problems → We are competent politicians
4 (…) although it creates a problem for all the citizens.	• We care for the citizens → We take our role as representatives seriously → We are democratic
5 Of course one things leads to another	
6 hence we insist on efficient policies that resolve this problem,	• We understand the causality of the events
7 a problem that increasingly worries the citizen	• We take political action against a problem

Table 18.2 Negative You/Other-presentation moves in the discourse of a conservative politician in the Spanish Parliament when addressing the socialist government about immigration

B. Socialists (Government, 'You')	Negative Other/You-presentation
1 Mister Minister, your first decision, nearly the only one your Government has taken,	• → You (minister, government, PSOE) are lazy
2 was to change the policy (…)	• You deviated from a good, consensus policy; you are an exception in the EU
3 and to realize a massive regularization process	• You admitted a vast number of immigrants (hyperbole)
4 you ignored this policy.	
5 You have broken all records for incompetence	• You are incompetent (hyperbole)
6 The Prime Minister continued with his well-known policy of letting nobody spoil him a good headline,	• You (PSOE, government) are only concerned about your image → You are superficial → You are bad politicians
7 although it creates a problem for all the citizens.	• You do not care about the citizens → You are undemocratic
8 The consequences soon followed	• Your policy has (bad) consequences → Your policy is bad.
9 there were 15 dead, Mister Minister;	
10 The end result of your policy: one million more irregular immigrants in one single year.	• Your policy causes death → Your policy is lethal → Your policy is bad
11 You know what is most serious of all?	• Your ignore the seriousness of the question → You are frivolous → You are bad politicians
12 In the meantime, this Government, totally overwhelmed, acts ridiculously, as you do when you say that all of Europe is going to copy your policy …	• Your government is unable to solve this problem
• Your government is ridiculous
• No one follows your policy → Your policy is bad

EU consensus, the speaker also implies that they had foreseen the current problems, and thus also implies that they are good politicians. Next, the speaker seeks the legitimatization of the policies of the opposition party by repeatedly referring to the will and attitudes of the (autochthonous) citizens, and hence further implies that his party is (more) democratic because it cares for the people. We can see that positive self-presentation moves in a political discourse such as this are all geared towards one major goal: legitimatization.

In Table 18.2 we can see the complementary moves of the overall strategy of negative other-presentation. While directly addressing the Minister, first of all, opposition moves may be personal, e.g. when accusing the minister of being lazy and incompetent. Secondly, and more explicitly, the speaker derogates the Prime Minister and the government as frivolous and ridiculous, and hence delegitimatizes them as bad politicians. Thirdly, by accusing the current government as going against EU policy, he implies that they are politically deviant, and hence bad. And since the government is accused of ignoring the wishes of the people, they are not only neglecting their job as representatives and current leaders of the people, but also losing all democratic legitimacy. In other words, a negative other-presentation is articulated along the criterion of international consensus (by accusing that this has been broken by the current government) and a lack of democratic support. Hence, both nationally, as well as internationally, the current socialist government is also accused of lacking legitimacy. In this case, the strategy represents an ideological opposition against a socialist government, and hence implies a positive representation of a conservative policy.

Table 18.3   Representation of immigrants in the discourse of a conservative Spanish politician

Representation of immigrants	Moves of negative Other-presentation
1 (…) a massive regularization process 2 (…) a most serious call effect 3 (…) a problem for all the citizens. 4 (…) large groups assaulting our borders in Ceuta and Mellilla 5 (…) there were 15 dead 6 avalanches of people in the Canary Islands 7 2000 immigrants in one week, 8 and each day 600 people enter at La Junquera and through the mountain passes in the North, 9 and many more through the airports. 10 one million more irregular immigrants in one single year. 11 (…) most serious of all? 12 These avalanches have turned our borders into places where anybody can enter as they please, 13 and criminal gangs have taken advantage of that to enter Spain. 14 Crimes taking place in our homes is due to criminal gangs 15 that traffic with human beings, 16 engage in violent robberies, 17 express kidnappings, homicides. 18 Of course one things leads to another, 19 a problem that increasingly worries the citizens.	• Immigrants come massively → They are a threat. • They come because they are 'called' by permissive immigration policies → They do not come because they have serious economic or political problems. • They are a problems for Us (Spanish) • They are violent ('assaulting') • They threaten our borders → They threaten Our country. • They are responsible for dead people • *Suggestion:* Our dead people and not their own dead people. • *Metaphor:* avalanches → threat of nature • *Number game:* 2000, 600, one million, etc. • *Temporal Hyperbole:* one week, one year • *Accumulation, Climax:* many more … • Irregular → against our rules → deviants • *Metaphor:* Spanish borders described as 'coladero' = sieve • *Identification, denomination, criminalization:* Immigrants described as, identified as, criminal gangs • *Overgeneralization:* All crimes attributed to them • *Personal Threat:* They threaten us at home • They lack humanity, violate human rights: traffic in human beings • They are violent (violent robberies) • They engage in very serious crimes (assassination, kidnapping) • There is a logical relation between their arrival and these crimes • They are a problem for Us (our citizens) → Our citizens are victims.

Although in a parliamentary debate a double-sided polarization by opposition politicians will of course be primarily addressed at the current government, speakers may also express ideological attitudes about other out-groups – in this debate obviously the illegal immigrants, although implicitly and sometimes explicitly, the strategy appears to be directed against all immigrants, especially those from the 'South' and 'East' and thus those who are ethnically different – and hence appears a manifestation of a racist ideology. Table 18.3 shows the moves used to negatively represent the immigrants.

Table 18.3 hardly leaves any doubt about the ideological control of Mr. Acebes' speech by an underlying racist ideology. His representation of immigrants features all the usual racist prejudices, mainly associating (all) immigrants with threats in general, and crime in particular. In order to make sure ordinary people also get his message, he links the criminal threat especially to alleged assaults in private homes, and emphasizes that the massive

numbers of threatening immigrants arriving worry all citizens. Discursively, the threat is specifically formulated with the usual metaphors of the threatening forces of nature (*avalanches*), the number game emphasizing the 'masses' of immigrants, and the accumulation of predicates implying death and violence. By recalling, in terms of an 'assault', a border incident in the Spanish enclaves in Northern Africa, Ceuta and Melilla, he at the same time represents immigrants as a threat to the whole nation, and hence as a security issue – thereby also showing elements of an underlying nationalist ideology.

Note that this is not a discourse merely referring to specific events, and hence inviting the formation of isolated mental models of incidents. Its repeated (over) generalizations directly express and intend to form or confirm the more general underlying ethnic prejudices based on a racist ideology: Immigrants are violent criminals and a threat to Our citizens. This means that the speaker at the same time contributes to the formation of the ideological polarization between Us Spanish and Them immigrants. Except in the passage on Ceuta and Melilla, it is not made explicit that the alleged threat comes from Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America, but this is implied by the reference to the Northern borders and the airport – the speaker knows that the citizens know to whom he is referring.

Bibliographical note

For ideology and **racism**, see Barker (1981); Guillaumin (1995); Römer (1985); van Dijk (1993, 1996, 1998); Wetherell & Potter (1992).

CONCLUDING REMARK

We can see that an analysis of the assumed underlying structures of ideologies allows us to proceed in a systematic and explicit way when analysing ideological discourse. Thus, at each level of discourse, we may find traces of the underlying identity, actions, goals, norms and values, group relations, and interests of the ideological group(s) language that belong to and identify with in the current context. Most obvious here is the general polarization between a positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, and the ways in which positive and negative attributes tend to be emphasized or minimized by the expressions and meanings of text and talk. But we have also seen that other than polarized attitudes can be expressed in ideological discourse, e.g., when the identity, actions, goals, norms and values, and resources of the group are being imposed or discussed, for instance in order to inspire, motivate, propagate cohesion and unity, and hence to strengthen the societal power of a group. The legitimatization of the control of scarce resources and other discursive forms of domination are an especially characteristic way of applying ideological control in the public sphere, typically so in terms of alleged 'higher' powers, such as those of Nature, God, Science, Reason or the People.

We have also recalled that whatever such typical 'ideological structures' of discourse may be, one always needs to analyse them in the current text, context and cognition. That is, *discourse structures do not have ideological functions in isolation*, but only when they are controlled by the underlying ideological structures shared by a social group, and within ideologically-defined texts and contexts, for instance as part of the practices that contribute to the interests of the in-group.

FURTHER READING

There is a vast literature on ideology, comprising thousands of books, especially in the humanities and social sciences. Some of these books have been referred to above in some *Bibliographical notes*. Among the many books on ideology we especially recommend the following ones. We also recommend some articles (for downloading) with concrete ideological analysis.

Billig, M. (1982). *Ideology and social psychology. Extremism, moderation, and contradiction*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
This book is a representative study within the field of discursive psychology by an author who has a long and eminent track record in social psychology, who has written extensively about ideology (e.g., about nationalism) and formulates a 'rhetorical' approach to the 'dilemmas' posed by ideologies.

Eagleton, T. (1991). *Ideology. An introduction*. London: Verso Eds.
For years the classical introduction to the study of ideology. *Very well informed about history and strategies of ideology.*

Fowler, R. (1991). *Language in the news. Discourse and ideology in the British press*. London: Routledge.
A classic collection of studies of ideology in news discourse by the late professor Fowler, the founder, at the end of the 1970s, with Gunther Kress, Tony Trew, and Bob Hodge of 'critical linguistics' — which is at the origin of Critical Discourse Studies. This book is still relevant for hands-on critical news analysis.

Fraser, C., & Gaskell, G. (Eds.). (1990). *The social psychological study of widespread beliefs*. Oxford Oxford New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University Press.
An excellent collection of papers in social psychology dealing with various kinds of social beliefs and that will be relevant to place ideologies among other forms of socially shared representations.

van Dijk, T. A. (1998). *Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach*. London, England UK: Sage Publications.
The only multidisciplinary study of ideology defined as the basis of the socially shared beliefs of a group, and with special interest in the application in the field of racist ideologies. This book elaborated the theory of ideology presented in this chapter.

ONLINE READING

The following articles published in *Discourse & Society* are available at www/sagepub.co.uk/discoursestudies and are recommended as examples of detailed ideological analysis.

Billig, M. (1990). Stacking the cars of ideology: The history of the "Sun Souvenir Royal Album". *Discourse & Society*, 1(1), 17–38.

Bonilla-Silva, E., & Forman, T. A. (2000). "I am not a racist…": mapping White college students' racial ideology in the USA. *Discourse & Society*, 11(1), 50–85.

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