2 Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis

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Introduction

This chapter focuses on the 'expression' of ideologies in various structures of text and talk. It is situated within the broader framework of a research project on discourse and ideology which has been conducted at the University of Amsterdam since 1993. The theoretical premise of this study is that ideologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as pictures, photographs and movies. Obviously, ideologies are also 'enacted' in other forms of action and interaction, and their reproduction is often embedded in organizational and institutional contexts. Thus, racist ideologies may be expressed and reproduced in racist talk, comics or movies in the context of the mass media, but they may also be enacted in many forms of discrimination and institutionalized by racist parties within the context of the mass media or of Western parliamentary democracies. However, among the many forms of reproduction and interaction, discourse plays a prominent role as the preferential site for the explicit, verbal formulation and the persuasive communication of ideological propositions.

Theory of ideology

The theory of ideology that informs the discourse analytic approach of this paper is multidisciplinary. It is articulated within a conceptual triangle that connects society, discourse and social cognition in the framework of a critical discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1993b). In this approach, ideologies are the basic frameworks for organizing the social

cognitions shared by members of social groups, organizations or institutions. In this respect, ideologies are *both* cognitive *and* social. They essentially function as the 'interface' between the cognitive representations and processes underlying discourse and action, on the one hand, and the societal position and interests of social groups, on the other hand. This conception of ideology also allows us to establish the crucial link between macrolevel analyses of groups, social formations and social structure, and microlevel studies of situated, individual interaction and discourse.

Social cognition is, here, defined as the system of mental representations and processes of group members (for details, see, e.g., Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Resnick, Levine and Teasley, 1991). Part of the system is the sociocultural knowledge shared by the members of a specific group, society or culture. Members of groups may also share evaluative beliefs, viz., opinions, organized into social attitudes. Thus, feminists may share attitudes about abortion, affirmative action or corporate 'glass ceilings' blocking promotion, or other forms of discrimination by men. Ideologies, then, are the overall, abstract mental systems that organize such socially shared attitudes. The feminist attitudes just mentioned, for instance, may be internally structured and mutually related by general principles or propositions that together define a 'feminist' ideology. Similar examples may be given for racist, anti-racist, corporate or ecological attitudes and their underlying ideological systems.

Through complex and usually long-term processes of socialization and other forms of 'social information processing', ideologies are gradually acquired by members of a group or culture. As systems of principles that organize social cognitions, ideologies are assumed to control, through the minds of the members, the social reproduction of the group. Ideologies mentally represent the basic social characteristics of a group, such as their identity, tasks, goals, norms, values, position and resources. Since ideologies are usually self-serving, it would seem that they are organized by these group-schemata. White racists, for example, represent society basically in terms of a conflict between whites and non-whites, in which the identity, goals, values, positions and resources of whites are seen to be 'threatened' by the Others. They do so by representing the relations between themselves and the Others essentially in terms of us versus *them*, in which we are associated with positive properties and they are associated with bad properties.

Such ideologies of groups and group relations are constructed by a group-based selection of relevant social values. Feminists, on the one hand, select and attach special importance to such values as *independence*, *autonomy* and *equality*. Racists, on the other hand, focus on *self-identity, superiority* of the own group, and hence on *inequality*, while at the same

time advocating the *primacy* of their own group and the *privilege* of preferential access to valued social resources.

The contents and schematic organization of group ideologies in the social mind shared by its members are a function of the properties of the group within the societal structure. The identity category of a group ideology organizes the information as well as the social and institutional actions that define membership: who belongs to the group, and who does not; who is admitted and who is not. For groups who share a racist ideology, this may mean, among other things, resentment, actions and policies against immigration and integration in 'our' culture, country, city, neighbourhood, family or company. Similarly, the *goal* category of groups who share a racist ideology organizes the information and actions that define the overall aims of the group, e.g., 'To keep our country white'. The *position* category defines the relations of the group with reference groups, such as, 'foreigners', 'immigrants', 'refugees' or 'blacks'. In sum, the social functions of ideologies are, among others, to allow members of a group to organize (admission to) their group, coordinate their social actions and goals, to protect their (privileged) resources, or, conversely, to gain access to such resources in the case of dissident or oppositional groups.

As basic forms of social cognitions, however, ideologies also have cognitive functions. We have already suggested that they organize, monitor and control specific group attitudes. Possibly, ideologies also control the development, structure and application of sociocultural knowledge. To wit, feminists have special interest in acquiring and using knowledge about the dominance of women by men. Generally though, we shall assume that ideologies more specifically control *evaluative* beliefs, that is, social opinions shared by the members of a group.

At this mental interface of the social and the individual, however, ideologies and the attitudes and knowledge they control, also - indirectly - influence the personal cognitions of group members, e.g., the planning and understanding of their discourses and other forms of (inter)action. These personal mental representations of people's 'experiences' of such social practices are called *models* (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk, 1987b; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). Models are mental representations of events, actions, or situations people are engaged in, or which they read about. The set of these models represents the beliefs (knowledge and opinions) people have about their everyday lives and defines what we usually call people's 'experiences'. These models are unique and personal and controlled by the biographical experiences of social actors. On the other hand, they are also socially controlled, that is, influenced by the general social cognitions members share with other members of their group. This combined presence of personal and (instantiated, particularized, 'applied') social information in mental models allows us not only to explain the well-known missing link between the individual

and the social, between the micro and the macro analysis of society, but also to make explicit the relations between general group ideologies and actual text and talk. That is, models control how people act, speak or write, or how they understand the social practices of others. We, thus, have the following, highly simplified elements in the relations between ideologies and discourse at various levels of analysis (outlined in Table 2.1):

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Table 2.1
Ideologies and discourse: Levels of analysis

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1 Social Analysis

- Overall societal structures, e.g., parliamentary democracy, capitalism
- Institutional/Organizational structures, e.g., racist political parties
- Group relations, e.g., discrimination, racism, sexism
- Group structures: identity, tasks, goals, norms, position, resources

2 Cognitive Analysis

2.1 Social cognition

- Sociocultural values, e.g., intelligence, honesty, solidarity, equality
- Ideologies, e.g., racist, sexist, anti-racist, feminist, ecological ...
- Systems of attitudes, e.g., about affirmative action, multiculturalism ...
- Sociocultural knowledge, e.g., about society, groups, language, ...

2.2 Personal cognition

2.2.1 General (context free)

- Personal values: personal selections from social values
- Personal ideologies: personal interpretations of group ideologies
- Personal attitudes: systems of personal opinions
- Personal knowledge: biographical information, past experiences

2.2.2 Particular (context-bound)

- Models: ad hoc representations of specific current actions, events
- Context models: ad hoc representations of the speech context
- Mental plans and representation of (speech) acts, discourse
- Mental construction of text meaning from models: the 'text base'
- Mental (strategic) selection of discourse structures (style, etc.)

3 Discourse Analysis

- The various structures of text and talk (see below)

In other words, ideologies are localized between societal structures and the structures of the minds of social members. They allow social actors to 'translate' their social properties (identity, goal, position, etc.) into the knowledge and beliefs that make up the concrete models of their everyday life experiences, that is, the mental representations of their actions and discourse. Indirectly (viz., through attitudes and knowledge), therefore, ideologies control how people plan and understand their social practices, and hence also the structures of text and talk.

Ideologies define and explain the similarities of the social practices of social members, but our theoretical framework at the same time accounts for individual variation. Each social actor is a member of many social groups, each with their own, sometimes conflicting ideologies. At the same time, each social actor has her/his own, sometimes unique, biographical experiences ('old models'), attitudes, ideologies and values, and these will also interfere in the construction of models, which, in turn, will influence the production (and the comprehension) of discourse. Hence, the schema given above may be read top down, or bottom up. The relations involved are dynamic and 'dialectic': ideologies partly control what people do and say (via attitudes and models), but concrete social practices or discourses are themselves needed to acquire social knowledge, attitudes and ideologies in the first place, viz., via the models people construct of other's social practices (including others' discourses) (van Dijk, 1990).

At many points, our theoretical approach to ideology is at variance with classical and other contemporary approaches to ideology (see Eagleton, 1991; Larrain, 1979; Thompson, 1984, 1990). Ideologies in our perspective are not merely 'systems of ideas', let alone properties of the individual minds of persons. Neither are they vaguely defined as forms of consciousness, let alone as 'false consciousness'. Rather, they are very specific basic frameworks of social cognition, with specific internal structures, and specific cognitive and social functions. As such, they (also) need to be analysed in terms of explicit social psychological theories (see also Rosenberg, 1988), which obviously has nothing to do with mentalist reductionism. At the same time they are social, for they are essentially shared by groups and acquired, used, and changed by people *as* group members in social situations and institutions, often in situations of conflicting interests between social formations (Eagleton, 1991). However, ideologies are not restricted to dominant groups. Oppositional or dominated groups also share ideologies. The main problem of most critical approaches to ideology is that they are exclusively inspired by social sciences and rather confused philosophical approaches. They ignore detailed and explicit cognitive analysis, and so they are unable to explicitly link social structures with social practices and discourses of individuals as social members. Ideologies or other social cognitions in our approach are not reduced to or uniquely defined in terms of the social 'practices' they

control (Coulter, 1989), nor to the discourses that express, convey or help reproduce them (Billig et al., 1988; Billig, 1991), or to the institutions in which they are reproduced. (For different but related approaches, see, e.g., Fairclough, 1989, 1992a; Kress and Hodge, 1993.)

Discourse analysis as ideological analysis

The sketch of the theory of ideology presented above provides us with a conceptual framework that also allows us to engage in 'ideological analyses', and, hence, a critique of discursive practices. After all, we have seen that ideologies, though variably and indirectly, may be expressed in text and talk, and that discourses similarly function to persuasively help construct new and confirm already present ideologies. In both cases, this means that there may be discourse structures that are particularly relevant for an efficient expression or persuasive communication of ideological meanings. For instance, headlines in newspapers,, taken as prominent expressions of the overall meaning or gist (semantic macrostructure) of a news report in the press, form a special discourse category that is probably more likely to express or convey ideological 'content' than, for instance, the number of commas in a text.

On the other hand, we have no a priori theoretical grounds to exclude any textual structures from expressing underlying ideological principles. Indeed, virtually all discourse structures are involved in the functional expression of mental models of events or communicative contexts, and, therefore, of the opinions that are part of such mental models. To wit, a racist opinion of a speaker about his black interlocutor, may be subtly expressed (involuntarily or not) by minimal intonation variations, interpreted by the black interlocutor as a racist way of addressing her, while sounding unwarrantably 'insolent' or 'impolite' (for many such examples of everyday racism, see Essed, 1991). Let us now examine these levels and properties of discourse and the ways ideologies may be expressed and conveyed more systematically.

However, before we present a summary of 'preferential' discourse structures for the expression and communication of ideological meanings, we should be clearly aware of what we are looking for. Given the theory of ideology presented above, we need to attend primarily to those properties of discourse that express or signal the opinions, perspective, position, interests or other properties of groups. This is specifically the case when there is a conflict of interest, that is, when events may be seen, interpreted or evaluated in different, possibly opposed ways. The structures of ideologies also suggest that such representations are often articulated along an *us* versus *them* dimension, in which speakers of one group will generally tend to present themselves or their own group in positive terms, and other groups in negative terms. Thus, any property of

discourse that expresses, establishes, confirms or emphasizes a self-interested group opinion, perspective or position, especially in a broader socio-political context of social struggle, is a candidate for special attention in such an 'ideological' analysis. Such discourse structures usually have the social function of legitimating dominance or justifying concrete actions of power abuse by the elites.

Surface structures

The 'surface' structures of discourse refer to the variable forms of expression at the level of phonological and graphical 'realization' of underlying syntactic, semantic, pragmatic or other abstract discourse structures. With a few exceptions, such surface structures of text and talk do not have explicit 'meanings' of their own. They are only the conventional manifestations of underlying 'meanings'. Yet, such surface structures may express and convey special operations or strategies. For instance, special stress or volume or large printed type may strategically be used to *emphasize* or attract attention to specific meanings, as is the case when shouting at people or in 'screaming' newspaper headlines. In the same way, special intonational contours may help express irony, (lack of) politeness or other semantic or interactional meanings and functions.

   These examples already suggest that surface structures may express or control the ways in which events are interpreted by speech participants. A large banner headline may emphasize the biased summary of a news event, about a 'race riot', for instance, and 'insulting' volume or intonation may similarly signal social inequality between speaker and hearer. Theoretically, this means that ideologically controlled models of events or of communicative contexts may represent women or minorities in a negative way, and such opinions will not only influence the meanings of the text but also, indirectly, the sometimes subtle variations of the graphical or phonological surface structures. Indeed, whereas the meanings of the text may not explicitly express or encode prejudice or social inequality, surface structures may let 'transpire' such 'hidden' meanings anyway.

   In general this means that such surface structures must be 'marked'. They must be out of the ordinary and violate communicative rules or principles, i.e., those of 'normal' size headlines, 'normal' volume or intonation in polite speech, and so on. Depending on meaning and context, then, such 'deviant' surface structures may signal, express, or convey similarly 'deviant' properties of models, such as a specially negative opinion about the competence of a woman or a black man. In other words, ideological surface structures primarily function as signals of 'special' meanings or model structures, and may, thus, also contribute to special processing of such interpretations of text and talk.

Special graphical or phonological emphasis may also manage the importance of information or beliefs, and, hence, the hierarchical organization of models in which important information is located at the top. Conversely, meanings and beliefs may be de-emphasized or concealed by non-prominent graphical or phonological structures when they express meanings that are inconsistent with the goals or interests of the speaker. Intonation, such as the tone of racist insults, may also conventionally signal specific social relations, and hence also ideologically based inequality. That is, they also influence the context models of the communicative context. The same is true for other forms of non-verbal communication, such as gestures, facial expression, proximity, and so on, which also may signal interpersonal and social relations, and, therefore, ideological meanings.

Finally, it is well known that 'accented' speech of sociolects or dialects express or convey social class, ethnicity, gender, or social relations of familiarity or intimacy, as has been shown in much sociolinguistic and social psychological research (Giles and Coupland, 1991; Montgomery, 1986). Again, it is obvious that such social relations may also be structured in conflict and inequality, and so presuppose ideological differences. Accents may thus signal or express prestige, accommodation, dominance, resistance or other ideologically controlled social relations.

Syntax

The ideological implications of syntactic sentence structures referred to in the literature are familiar. For example, it has often been shown that word order as well as transactional structures of sentences may code for underlying semantic (or indeed, cognitive) agency (Fowler et al., 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1993). In general, at least in English, responsible agency is associated with grammatical subject, and initial position. This means that ideologically monitored opinions about responsibility for socially positive or negative acts may be differentially expressed in different syntactic forms. Negative properties attributed to outgroups (e.g. black youths) may be enhanced by focusing on their responsible agency (Hamilton and Trolier, 1986). In that case minorities will tend to be subject and topic of the sentence. The same is true for the *positive* actions of *us*. Conversely, the agency of ingroup members who engage in negative actions will be syntactically played down by the use of passive sentences, and their role may be wholly dissimulated by agentless passives or nominalizations. A typical discourse location for this kind of syntactic management of opinions are news headlines (van Dijk, 1991a).

Again, the theoretical explanation of such ideologically based syntactic variation should be given in terms of model structures. Syntactic prominence expresses or suggests semantic prominence, which, in turn, may be related to prominence of actors and their properties in mental

models. If negative properties of outgroups are prominent in the model, this may affect syntactic word order and clause structure in such a way that agency and responsibility of outgroup actors is syntactically highlighted (for details of these relations between discourse structures and models, see van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983).

Another link between syntactic structures and ideology, well-known from sociolinguistic research, is the one between sentence complexity, on the one hand, and education or social position of speakers, on the other hand. Elite speakers and institutions may restrict comprehensibility of their discourses in this way and, thereby, control access to public discourse, e.g., to political and media text and talk. The public may, for example, be excluded from elite debate and decision making (Ghadessy, 1988; Renkema, 1981; Sandig, 1986; Wodak, 1987; Wodak, Menz and Lalouschek, 1989). Medical and legal discourse also restricts access to 'outsiders' through sentence complexity (Halliday, 1988; Edelman, 1977; Fisher and Todd, 1986; Di Pietro, 1982). Alternatively, ideologically based condescension, e.g., with respect to immigrants who do not speak the language well, may be expressed by various forms of simplified 'foreigner talk' (Dittmar and von Stutterheim, 1985). Thus, social power may translate quite directly into language variables that are instrumental in getting symbolic access to the resources of public discourse.

Lexicon

Lexicalization is a major and well-known domain of ideological expression and persuasion as the well-known 'terrorist' versus 'freedom-fighter' pair suggests. To refer to the same persons, groups, social relations or social issues, language users generally have a choice of several words, depending on discourse genre, personal context (mood, opinion, perspective), social context (formality, familiarity, group membership, dominance relations) and sociocultural context (language variants, sociolect, norms and values). Many of these contexts are ideologically based, as is the case for the representation of speech participants, and their mutual relations in context models, and the representation of participants and actions in event models.

Examples abound and need not be discussed in detail. Racist or sexist slurs directed at or used about minorities and women, directly express and enact relationships of power abuse grounded in inegalitarian ideologies (Essed, 1993; Greenberg, Kirkland and Pyszczynski, 1987; Hurtado and Arce, 1987; Schultz, 1975). Political ideologies are variously expressed in differential, if not polarized lexicalization of political actors (as in the 'terrorist' example) (Edelman, 1985; Wodak and Menz, 1990). Other social ideologies, about abortion, for example, may make use of words and slogans such as 'Pro Choice' or 'Pro Life' that emphasize the positive implications of ingroup opinions and values and the negative ones of those

of the Others. The lexicon of military and political discourse may also distinguish between the 'peaceful' nature of our weapons or military operations and the catastrophic and cruel nature of theirs (Chilton, 1985; Geis, 1987a). Euphemisms, such as 'surgical strikes' or 'smart bombs' are well-known here, as was evident in the military propaganda and news reports about the Gulf War (Chomsky, 1992; Media Development, 1991). During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was characterized as the 'Evil Empire'. Similarly, in the Middle East conflict, our opponents are often 'terrorists', whereas especially Muslims and not Christians, are called 'fundamentalists', 'zealots' or 'fanatics'. A similar use of euphemisms is made in elite discourse on ethnic or race relations, in which 'racism' is typically denied, and replaced by less harsh words such as 'xenophobia', 'prejudice', 'discrimination' or 'resentment' (van Dijk, 1993a). On the other hand, the credibility of refugees may be undermined in political and media discourse by calling them 'economic' refugees, or 'illegal aliens' instead of 'undocumented' immigrants. In all these examples, we find the general pattern of ideological control of discourse, viz., a positive self-presentation of the ingroup and a negative other-presentation of the outgroup.

Local semantics

What has been shown for lexicalization is more generally true for the management of meaning. Local coherence depends on models, that is, on ideologically controlled representations of the situation. Biased reasons and causes that define relations in the model may, therefore, appear in partisan local semantics. The attribution by employers of high minority unemployment in the Netherlands to cultural differences, the lack of motivation or knowledge of the language by minorities is an example (van Dijk, 1993a). Well-known socio-cognitive processes underlying positive self-presentation of ingroups and negative presentation of outgroups, such as the fundamental attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979) and blaming the victim (Ryan, 1976), may also translate as 'biased' local coherence in the semantics of text and talk. Conversely, such ideologically shaped discourse semantics may, in turn, affect the biased construction of models by recipients if these have no alternative information sources. In both cases, ideologies and attitudes used in the self-serving 'explanation' of social inequality are assumed to control (or result from) self-serving representations of social events in mental models (Schuman, Steeh and Bobo, 1985).

Another important property of discourse semantics and its relations to underlying mental models (and hence to social cognitions) is implicitness. Since parts of models may be known to recipients, speakers are allowed to presuppose such information. Such normal processes of mutual knowledge may also be ideologically managed when it is suggested that

knowledge is shared even when it is not as when newspapers speak about 'rising crime', or about 'the linguistic deficit of immigrants' (Fowler 1991; van Dijk, 1988a, 1991a). More generally, we find that, in principle, all information that is detrimental to the ingroup will tend to remain implicit, and information that is unfavourable to the outgroup will be made explicit, and vice versa (our negative points and their positive points will remain implicit).

The same holds for the variation in levels of generality and the degrees of specificity in describing events. Not only are 'our' blunders or crimes described in euphemistic terms and attributed to circumstances beyond our control or blamed on our victims, but they are also described in more general, abstract terms. On the other hand, when describing 'their' mistakes, 'we' use specific, low level, 'gory detail'. In both cases, the ideologically controlled goal of such discourse is the management of self-serving and preferred models of social situations.

Underlying ideologies also control communicative contexts, and hence the self-definition and impression management of speakers, who will generally try to make a good impression or avoid a bad impression (Goffman, 1967; Tedeschi, 1981). This is particularly clear in the strategic use of disclaimers. Examples of such semantic strategies in our own research on the reproduction of racism in discourse of such semantic strategies are well-known and comprise such classical moves as the disclaimers of the *apparent denial* ('I have nothing against Blacks, but ...', 'Refugees will always be able to count on our hospitality, but ...'), the *apparent concession* ('There are of course a few small racist groups in the Netherlands, but on the whole ...'), *or blame transfer* ('I have no problem with minorities in the shop, but my customers ...') (van Dijk, 1987a). These moves essentially do two things. They contribute to the overall strategy of positive self-description (viz., 'we are tolerant citizens'), or the avoidance of a negative impression, on the one hand, and of negative other-presentation, on the other hand, because the second term of these moves, introduced by 'but', is always negative about the Others.

More generally, elite ideologies are known to de-emphasize social inequality by semantic strategies that aim to legitimate, justify, naturalize, rationalize, authorize, universalize, or deny injustice, to transfer it to other groups (as when elites attribute racism to 'popular resentment') or to blame the victim (Eagleton, 1991).

Global semantics: Topics

Topics or semantic macropropositions of discourse subjectively define the information in a discourse that speakers find the most relevant or important. This means that topicalization may also be subject to ideological management. Ingroup speakers may be expected to de-topicalize information that is inconsistent with their interests or positive

self-image and conversely they will topicalize information that emphasizes negative outgroup properties. This happened, for instance, in the British media accounts of urban disturbances sparked by the shooting of a black woman during a police raid in Brixton in 1985. The aggression of the police was de-topicalized in favour of an explanation of the 'race riots' in terms of the deviance of young black and crime (drugs, aggression, etc.) (van Dijk, 1991a). Similarly, immigration fraud and minority crimes are prominent topics in the press, but not the (equally documented and accessible) everyday discrimination by 'our' politicians, employers, journalists, police or professors. This difference cannot simply be attributed to preference for 'negative' information or crime in the press. Both topics are negative and represent social crimes. In the same way, the civil war in Bosnia will be readily topicalized (by male journalists) as an 'ethnic conflict' or as a 'tribal war' rather than as a prominent form of male aggression or nationalistic macho-chauvinism or as a likely consequence of the presence of arms and armies and the freedom of the international arms trade. In sum, undesirable interpretations (models) of social and political events will, generally, not be topicalized in ingroup discourse.

Schematic structures

Overall meanings, i.e. topics or macrostructures, may be organized by conventional schemata (superstructures), such as those that define an argument, a conversation or a news report. As is the case for all formal structures, schematic structures are not directly controlled by ideological variation. A reactionary and a progressive story are both stories and should both feature specific narrative categories to be a story in the first place. Similarly, a 'Pro Choice' or a 'Pro Life' editorial or other argumentative discourses are both, formally speaking, editorials and argumentations. So the question is: How do such overall schematic structures of text and talk signal underlying ideologies?

Since schematic categories also define the (canonical) order of discourse, they may signal importance or relevance. Initial summaries, such as *headlines* in the news, for instance, have the crucial function of expressing the topic highest in the macrostructure hierarchy, and, therefore, the (subjectively) most important information of a news report (van Dijk, 1988b). This means that this link between macrostructures and superstructures may be ideologically manipulated. Semantically subordinate topics (that is, topics that organize little local information in the text) may be 'upgraded' and put in the headline, thus assigning more prominence to them, and vice versa. A main topic may be 'downgraded' to a lower level of the schema and realized as a subordinate topic in a *background* category of the news. In one story the same events may be presented as the *circumstances* category of the *setting*, whereas in another

story they may constitute the crucial *complication* of the story. Such possible variations of relevance and importance are, of course, open to ideological control. Information that is inconsistent with the interests of powerful groups may be downgraded, and information about outgroups be given more prominence by assigning it to a more prominent category. Political discourse may also feature specific text schema categories (such as *problem* and *solution*) that highlight ideologically based opinions (Schäffner and Porsch, 1993).

Argumentation is another major domain in which ideological points of view may be expressed. The study of numerous argumentative fallacies has shown that powerful arguers may manipulate their audiences by making self-serving arguments more explicit and prominent, whereas other arguments may be left implicit. Strategic argumentation is a major means of manipulating the minds of the recipients. This may involve many of the features we have studied above: the use of specific lexical items, rhetorical devices, and so on (Kahane, 1971; Windisch, 1990; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992). One analysis of the argumentation of British press editorials on the 'riots' of 1985 is an example. It noted how the racist ideologies of right-wing tabloid editors were revealed by their attribution of the violence to the criminal nature of young male Caribbeans (van Dijk, 1992).

Rhetoric

Specific 'rhetorical' structures of discourse, such as surface structure repetition (rhyme, alliterations), or semantic 'figures' such as metaphors, may be a function of ideological control when information that is unfavourable to us is made less prominent whereas negative information about *them* is emphasized. Many of the figures we know from classical rhetoric have this specific effect as their main function (e.g. over- and understatements, hyperbole (exaggeration), euphemism and mitigation, litotes and repetitions).

The semantic operations of rhetoric, such as hyperbole, understatement, irony and metaphor, among others, have a closer relation to underlying models and social beliefs. Racist, sexist and other inegalitarian ideologies, for instance, may typically be expressed, not only by derogating lexical items referring to minorities or women, but also by demeaning metaphors that belittle, marginalize or dehumanize the 'others'. Thus, Nazi propaganda associated Jews, communists and other ethnic and social minorities with dirty animals (rats, cockroaches) (Ehlich, 1989). Similar tendencies may be observed in the contemporary rhetoric of the right-wing press when it writes about immigrants, minorities, refugees or white anti-racists. The following are some typical examples from the British conservative press in 1985 (for further analysis, see van Dijk, 1991a):

(1) Snoopers (*Daily Telegraph*, 1 August, Editorial)
(2) Unscrupulous or feather-brained observers (*Daily Telegraph*, 30 September)
(3) Race conflict 'high priests' (*Daily Telegraph*, 11 October)
(4) The multi-nonsense brigade (*Daily Telegraph*, 11 January)
(5) He and his henchmen ... this obnoxious man, left-wing inquisitor (*Mail*, 18 October)
(5) Left-wing crackpots (*Sun*, 7 September)
(6) Unleashing packs of Government snoopers (*Sun*, 16 October)

Similarly, political discourse is replete with variously demeaning metaphors that derogate the 'enemy', as when Bush referred to Saddam Hussein as 'Hitler'. However, political metaphors may also have other ideological functions, as when Gorbachev referred to Europe as our 'common European House' (Chilton and Ilyin, 1993) or when the Western press writes about the unification of Europe by using architectural metaphors (Schaffner, 1993). That such variations may be ideologically constrained is also shown by the fact that different groups, cultures or countries may use different metaphors to denote the 'same thing'. France and Great Britain, for example, use different metaphors to refer to 'security' (Thornborrow, 1993). Similarly, press reporting about refugees systematically uses 'flow' metaphors ('stream', 'flood', 'deluge', 'swamp', 'tide', etc.) to emphasize the catastrophic and threatening nature of the immigration of refugees (van Dijk, 1988c). In the Netherlands, the 'natural' response to such metaphors is to 'protect' the country against such floods by building dikes.

Pragmatics

According to our theory of ideological discourse production, the social control of speech acts should operate through context models that represent the communicative situation and its participants, goals, and other relevant appropriateness conditions. For instance, if speakers share sexist or racist attitudes and ideologies featuring propositions that imply the inferiority of women or minorities, such general opinions may also be applied to women and minorities as speech participants. Such negative evaluations, and, generally, relations of inequality between speech participants, also control speech act production. Commands and threats, for instance, presuppose relations of dominance and power, and may be issued to women or minority participants only because of group membership. Prejudices about the intellectual inferiority of Others, similarly, may occasion speech acts such as giving advice or even plain assertions (in situations were none is asked or otherwise appropriate), since both presuppose ignorance of the recipient.

Similar remarks hold for other interactional strategies, e.g. those of politeness, self-presentation, impression management, and so on, as we have already seen above. Obviously, ideologically based inferiorization of Others may lead to inferiorization of speech partners in such a way that normal rules of respect and politeness are not respected (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Evidence from minorities confronted with racist events shows that lack of respect, rudeness, and other forms of impoliteness are routine forms of everyday verbal discrimination (Essed, 1991). Again, the same is true for the ways many men treat women in conversation (Kramarae, 1981; Kuhn, 1992; Tromel-Plötz, 1984).

Dialogical interaction

These examples finally bring us to the ideological structures of discursive interaction. What has been said above for speech acts and politeness more generally holds for interaction and, hence, also for conversation. We have already seen that sexist and racist ideologies generally tend to favour overall strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation implemented by local semantic strategies, such as disclaimers. This will also be apparent in dialogues with and about women and minorities.

Similarly, ideologies define relationships of power, which in turn also may control interaction, i.e., who has more or less access to the use of specific dialogical features, such as setting agendas for meetings, making appointments, opening and closing dialogues, turn management (e.g. interruption), the initiation, change and closure of topics, style selection and variation, and the more general properties of discourse also dealt with above (van Dijk, in print). Recent research on the relations between conversation, institutions and social power has familiarized us with these strategies (see, e.g., Boden and Zimmerman, 1991; Drew and Heritage, 1992; R. Lakoff, 1990; West, 1984).

The more specific interactional nature of dialogue may reflect the ideologically based power of interaction strategies more generally, by which speakers who share egalitarian ideologies may feel entitled to verbally treat their speech partners as inferior. This usually happens when the 'normal' rules of conversation are broken: by irregular interruptions, not yielding the floor or taking very long turns, avoiding or changing 'undesirable' topics, negative meta-comments about the other's style (choice of words) or other attributed 'breaches' of etiquette, using inegalitarian speech acts, as discussed above, and so on.

Virtually all work that has been done on power abuse in talk presupposes tacit assumptions of speakers about their own and the Others' social position and relations. Obviously, underlying ideologically based attitudes about others may not always be conscious, and so the subtle details of dialogical interaction are not always fully controlled and

controllable. Non-verbal as well as subtle interactional, pragmatic and stylistic means of controlling the other speech partner may, therefore, yield valid diagnostics for inferences about underlying inegalitarian ideologies.

Conclusion

Ideologies need to be analysed as the socio-cognitive interface between societal structures, of groups, group relations and institutions, on the one hand, and individual thought, action and discourse, on the other hand. In such a combined cognitive and social approach to ideology, we assume that ideologies are constructed by a biased selection of basic social values and organized by group self-schemata in which categories, such as *identity, task, goal, norms, position* and *resources* play an important role. Such ideologies have social functions. They influence social interaction and coordination, group cohesion, and the organized or institutionalized activities of social members aimed towards reaching common goals.

Similarly, ideologies were found to have important cognitive functions. They organize clusters of social (group) attitudes and monitor their acquisition and change, viz., as a function of group interests. These attitudes, in turn, provide the socially shared opinions that may be 'applied' by social members in the construction of mental models of concrete events and communicative contexts. These interactions of personal and social knowledge and opinions, as represented in mental models, control the production or the comprehension of text and talk. That is, discourse structures express ideologies only indirectly, that is, through their 'instantiation' in concrete models, which are the mental basis of the unique and situated nature of each occasion of text and talk.

Our brief review of ideologically controlled discourse structures at various levels of text and talk first of all shows that both in graphical and phonological surface structures, as well as in syntactic and semantic structures, we encounter similar patterns and strategies of expression and management of biased mental models. Overall, we find that preferred, consistent or otherwise self-serving information will be emphasized, highlighted, focused upon, and made explicit and prominent, whereas the converse is true for dispreferred information. In persuasive communication, this means that such discourse structures have obvious functions in the management of the minds of the recipients. There will be a higher chance that recipients will activate preferred old models or construct new models in agreement with the goals or interests of the speaker, if no alternative information is present.

Surface structures essentially serve to underline important or prominent beliefs, whereas syntactic organization may express and convey the role organization of social actors represented in biased mental models.

As is the case for virtually all strategic choices at the semantic level, such 'forms' will signal and emphasize *our* good actions, and *their* negative actions. What is preferred information in mental models results not only from personal goals and interests, but also from group-based attitudes and ideologies. Such social cognitions will in turn be acquired and reproduced precisely by the discursive structures that allow speakers to manage the minds (models) of recipients, viz., by emphasizing important, relevant or otherwise preferred information, and doing the opposite for disprefened information. The ideological conflict between *us* and *them* may similarly be signalled in many ways in discourse, e.g., by stress and intonation, syntactic word order, and especially semantic disclaimers such as *apparent denials* ('We have nothing against them, but...').

   In sum, ideologies seldom express themselves directly in text and talk, and do so only by general ideological propositions, which, however, may be less efficient in persuasion. More subtle and indirect ideological control and reproduction is effected through general attitudes and specific personal models, which form the basis of discourse production and are the result of discourse comprehension. Thus, ideological control of discourse takes place through the control of mental models, and the same is true for the acquisition, change and reproduction of ideologies themselves. They involve general opinions and values that are represented in the models of the speakers and indirectly inferred from the opinions expressed or signalled in discourse. Adequate ideological analysis should always take into account these various steps or interfaces between discourse structures and ideological structures, as is more generally the case for the relations between discourse and society.