22 Critical Discourse Analysis

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0 Introduction: What Is Critical Discourse Analysis?

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take an explicit position and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately challenge social inequality. This is also why CDA may be characterized as a social movement of politically committed discourse analysts.

One widespread misunderstanding of CDA is that it is a special method of doing discourse analysis. There is no such method: in CDA all methods of the cross-discipline of discourse studies, as well as other relevant methods in the humanities and social sciences, may be used (Wodak and Meyer 2008; Titscher et al. 2000). To avoid this misunderstanding and to emphasize that many methods and approaches may be used in the critical study of text and talk, we now prefer the more general term critical discourse studies (CDS) for the field of research (van Dijk 2008b). However, since most studies continue to use the well-known abbreviation CDA, this chapter will also continue to use it.

As an analytical practice, CDA is not one direction of research among many others in the study of discourse. Rather, it is a critical perspective that may be found in all areas of discourse studies, such as discourse grammar, Conversation Analysis, discourse pragmatics, rhetoric, stylistics, narrative analysis, argumentation analysis, multimodal discourse analysis and social semiotics, sociolinguistics, and ethnography of communication or the psychology of discourse-processing, among others. In other words, CDA is discourse study with an attitude.

Some of the tenets of CDA could already be found in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School before World War II (Agger 1992b; Drake 2009; Rasmussen and Swindal 2004). Its current focus on language and discourse was initiated with the
critical linguistics that emerged (mostly in the United Kingdom and Australia) at the end of the 1970s (Fowler et al. 1979; see also Mey 1985). CDA also has counterparts in “critical” developments in sociolinguistics, stylistics, pragmatics, psychology, and the social sciences, some already dating back to the early 1970s (Birnbaum 1971; Calhoun 1995; Fay 1987; Fox and Prilleltensky 1997; Hymes 1972; Ibáñez and Iníguez 1997; Jeffries 2010; Singh 1996; Thomas 1993; Turkel 1996; Wodak 1996). As is the case in these neighboring disciplines, CDA may be seen as a reaction against the dominant formal (often “asocial” or “uncritical”) paradigms of the 1960s and 1970s, for instance in structural and generative linguistics as well as later text grams and Conversation Analysis.

Critical research on discourse has the following general properties, among others:

- It focuses primarily on social problems and political issues rather than the mere study of discourse structures outside their social and political contexts.
- This critical analysis of social problems is usually multidisciplinary.
- Rather than merely describe discourse structures, it tries to explain them in terms of properties of social interaction and especially social structure.
- More specifically, CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power abuse (dominance) in society.

Fairclough and Wodak (1997) summarized the main tenets of CDA as follows:

1. CDA addresses social problems.
2. Power relations are discursive.
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
4. Discourse does ideological work.
5. Discourse is historical.
6. The link between text and society is mediated.
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory.
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

Against this general background the present chapter focuses on some theoretical issues that are central in CDA, such as the relations between social macro- and micro-structures, domination as abuse of power, and how dominant groups control text and context and thus also the mind. After sketching this multidisciplinary theoretical framework, we review some CDA research on discourse and gender, racist text and talk, and the way power is reproduced in the mass media, political discourse, and the professions.

Since a single chapter must be very selective, I will refer to a large number of other introductions of handbooks in the field (e.g., Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1996; Fairclough 1992a, 1992b, 1995a; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Fowler et al. 1979; Le and Short 2009; Locke 2004; Machin and Mayr 2012; van Dijk 1993, 2008b; van Leeuwen 2005, 2008; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2008; Young and Harrison 2004).
1 Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

Since CDA is not a specific direction of research, it does not have a unitary theoretical framework. Within the general aims and properties mentioned above, there are many types of CDA, and these may be theoretically and analytically quite diverse. Critical analysis of conversation is very different from an analysis of news reports in the press or of lessons and teaching at school. Yet, given the common perspective and the general aims of CDA, we may also find overall conceptual frameworks that are closely related. As suggested, most kinds of CDA will ask questions about the way specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social dominance, whether they are part of a conversation or a news report or other genres and contexts. Thus, the typical vocabulary of many scholars in CDA will feature such notions as power, dominance, hegemony, ideology, class, gender, race, discrimination, interests, reproduction, institutions, social structure, and social order, besides the more familiar discourse analytical notions.

This section focuses on a number of basic concepts and thus devises a triangulated theoretical framework that relates discourse, cognition, and society (including history, politics, and culture) as the major dimensions of CDA and discourse studies more generally.

1.1 Macro versus micro

Language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication belong to the micro-level of the social order. Power, dominance, and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macro-level of analysis. This means that CDA must bridge the well-known “gap” between micro (agency, interactional) and macro (structural, institutional, organizational) approaches (Alexander et al. 1987; Huber 1991; Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981; van Dijk 1980).

In everyday interaction and experience, the macro- and micro-levels (and intermediary “mesolevels”) form one unified whole. For instance, a racist speech in parliament is a discourse at the interactional micro-level of social structure in the specific situation of a debate, but at the same time it may enact or be a constituent part of legislation or the reproduction of racism at the macro-level (Wodak and van Dijk 2000). That such level distinctions are relative may be seen from the fact that this very parliamentary speech may again feature semantic macrostructures (topics) as well as semantic micro-structures such as local propositions and their concepts (van Dijk 1980).

There are several ways to analyze and bridge the societal macro–micro gap, and thus to arrive at a unified critical analysis:

1. Members–groups. Language users engage in discourse as members of (several) social groups, organizations, or institutions; and, conversely, groups thus may act “by” or “through” their members.

2. Actions–process. Social acts of individual actors are thus constituent parts of group actions and social processes, such as legislation, newsmaking, or the reproduction of racism.
3 Context–social structure. Situations of discursive interaction are similarly part, or constitutive of, social structure; for example, a press conference may be a typical local practice of organizations and media institutions as macro-level structures. That is, “local” and more “global” contexts are closely related, and both exercise constraints on discourse.

4 Personal and social cognition. Language users as social actors have both personal and social cognition (personal memories, knowledge, and opinions) as well as those shared with members of their group or culture as a whole. In other words, whereas the other links between societal macro- and micro-structures mentioned above are merely analytical relations, the real interface between society and discourse is sociocognitive because language users as social actors mentally represent and connect both levels. This also resolves the well-known structure–agency dichotomy in sociology.

1.2 Power as control

A central notion in most critical work on discourse is that of power, and more specifically the social power of groups or institutions (among many studies, see, e.g., Lukes 1986; Wrong 1979). Summarizing a complex philosophical and social analysis, I define social power in terms of control (van Dijk 2008b). Thus, groups have (more or less) power if they are able to (more or less) control the acts and minds of (members of) other groups. This ability presupposes a power base of privileged access to scarce social resources, such as force, money, status, fame, knowledge, information, “culture,” or indeed various forms of public discourse and communication (Mayr 2008).

Different types of power may be distinguished according to the various resources employed to exercise such power: the coercive power of the military and other violent people will rather be based on force; the rich will have power because of their money; the more or less “persuasive power” of parents, professors, or journalists may be based on knowledge, information, or authority. Note also that power is seldom absolute. Groups may more or less control other groups, or only control them in specific situations or social domains. A judge controls people only in the courtroom, and a teacher only students in a classroom. Moreover, dominated groups may more or less resist, accept, condone, collude or comply with, or legitimate such power, and even find it “natural.”

The power of dominant groups may be integrated in laws, rules, norms, habits, and even a quite general consensus, and thus take the form of what Gramsci called hegemony (Gramsci 1971). Note also that power is not always exercised in obviously abusive acts of dominant group members, but may be enacted in the myriad taken-for-granted actions of everyday life (Foucault 1980), as is typically the case in the many forms of everyday sexism or racism (Essed 1991). Similarly, not all members of a powerful group are always more powerful than all members of dominated groups: power is only defined here for groups as a whole.

For our analysis of the relations between discourse and power, thus, we first find that access to specific forms of discourse – for example, those of politics, the media, education, or science – is itself a power resource (van Dijk 1996). Secondly, as suggested earlier, action is controlled by our minds. So, as we shall see in more detail in Section 1.2.2,
if we are able to influence people’s minds – for example, their knowledge, attitudes, or ideologies – we indirectly may control (some of) their actions, as we know from persuasion and manipulation. Closing the discourse–power circle, finally, this means that those groups who control most influential discourse also have more chances to indirectly control the minds and actions of others.

Simplifying these very intricate relationships even further for this chapter, we can split the issue of discursive power into three interrelated questions for CDA research:

1. How do powerful groups control the text and context of public discourse?
2. How does such power discourse control the minds and actions of less powerful groups, and what are the social consequences of such control, such as social inequality?
3. What are the properties of the discourse of powerful groups, institutions, and organizations and how are such properties forms of power abuse?

We shall deal with these questions in the theoretical framework presented in the following sections.

1.2.1 Control of text and context of discourse

We have seen that, among many other resources that define the power base of a group or institution, access to or control over public discourse and communication is an important “symbolic” resource, and this is also the case for knowledge and information (Kedar 1987; Mayr 2003; Sarangi and Slembrouck 1996; van Dijk 1996, 2008b, 2014).

Most people have active control only over everyday talk with family members, friends, or colleagues, whereas they are more or less passive targets of public text or talk – for example, of the mass media, teachers, bosses, police officers, judges, or welfare bureaucrats, among other authorities, who may simply tell them what (not) to believe or what (not) to do.

On the other hand, members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the symbolic elites; see van Dijk 1993), have more or less exclusive access to, and control over, one or more types of public discourse. Thus, professors control scholarly discourse, teachers educational discourse, journalists media discourse, lawyers legal discourse, and politicians policy and other public political discourse. Those who have more control over more – and more influential – genres of discourse (and more discourse properties) are by that definition also more powerful. In other words, we have a discursive definition (as well as a practical diagnostic) of one of the crucial constituents of social power (van Dijk 1996, 2008b).

These notions of discourse access and control are very general, and it is one of the tasks of CDA to spell out these forms of power and especially their abuses – that is, forms of domination. Thus, if discourse is defined in terms of complex communicative events, consisting of text and context, access and control may be defined both for the relevant categories of the communicative situation, defined as context, as well as for the structures of text and talk.

The communicative situation consists of such categories as setting (time, place); ongoing actions (including discourses and discourse genres); and the participants in
various communicative, social, or institutional roles and identities, as well as their goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies (for references, see van Dijk 2008a, 2009a). Controlling the communicative situation involves control over one or more of these categories – for example, deciding on the time and place of a communicative event, or on which participants may or must be present, and in which roles or identities, or what knowledge or opinions they should (not) have, and which social actions may or must be accomplished by discourse. More specifically, such control may focus on the subjective definition of the communicative situation – that is, the context models of the participants – because it is the context model that in turn controls the pragmatic appropriateness of the of discourse (van Dijk 2008a, 2009a).

Thus, professors and not students control the setting (time and place) of an exam, and who qualify as participants. Police officers or judges define the overall communicative situation of an interrogation, and who may ask questions or who must reply (Matoesian 1993; Shuy 1998a, 1998b). Institutional speakers may abuse their power in such situations – for example, when police officers use force or threats to get a confession from a suspect (Heydon 2005; Linell and Jönsson 1991; Thornborrow 2002) or when male editors exclude women from writing economic news (Creedon 1989; van Zoonen 1994).

Genres typically have conventional schemas consisting of various categories. Access to some of these may be prohibited or obligatory – for example, some greetings in a conversation may only be used by speakers of a specific social group, rank, age, or gender (Irvine 1974).

Besides the control of speech acts or genres or other properties of the communicative situation, powerful groups may control various aspects of the structures of text and talk. Thus, crucial for all discourse and communication is who controls topics (semantic macrostructures) and topic change, as when editors decide what news topics will be covered in the media (Gans 1979; Lindegren-Lerman 1983; van Dijk 1988), teachers decide what topics will be dealt with in class (Manke 1997), or men control topics and topic change in conversations with women (Okamoto and Smith-Lovin 2001). Publishers and editors may thus give priority to negative topics about immigrants in the media and ignore or ban topics about white elite racism (van Dijk 1991, 1993). In times of crises, also in democracies, politicians may justify censorship of topics or information that is alleged to threaten national security, as was the case in the United States after 9/11 (Graber 2003).

Although much discourse control is contextual or topical, the local details of lexical or syntactic style, propositional meaning, turn-taking in conversation, rhetorical devices, and narrative structures (among many other discourse structures) may be controlled by powerful group members, professionals, groups, organization, or institutions. For instance:

- Powerless speakers may be ordered to “keep their voice down” or to “keep quiet”; thus women may be “silenced” in many ways (Houston and Kramarae 1991).
- In some cultures, while addressing powerful recipients, powerless speakers need to “mumble” as a form of respect (Albert 1972).
- In court, lower-class women may be ordered by a judge to answer direct questions, whereas middle-class men may allowed to give their own version of a traffic violation in a personal story (Wodak 1984).
In sum, many levels and structures of context, text, and talk can in principle be more or less controlled by powerful speakers and institutions, and such power may be abused at the expense of specific recipients, groups, or civil society at large. Thus, we will see below that many studies show how men may control talk of women. It should, however, be stressed that talk and text do not always and directly enact or embody the overall power relations between groups: it is always the context that may interfere with, reinforce, or otherwise transform such relationships. We shall review more research on the control of discourse below.

1.2.2 Mind control

If controlling the contexts and structures of text and talk is a first major form of the exercise of power, controlling people’s minds through such discourse is an indirect but fundamental way to reproduce dominance and hegemony. Indeed, discourse control usually aims at controlling the intentions, plans, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies – as well as their consequent actions – of recipients. A sociocognitive approach in CDA thus examines social structures of power through the analysis of the relations between discourse and cognition. Cognition is the necessary interface that links discourse as language use and social interaction with social situations and social structures (van Dijk 2008b).

The analysis of mind control presupposes the usual distinction between personal or autobiographical memory, on the one hand, and generic, socially shared “semantic” memory, on the other (Tulving 2002). More specifically, we assume that episodic memory represents people’s personal experiences as multimodal mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983). In communication and interaction, mental models (sometimes called situation models; see van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) are the subjective representation of the events, action, or situation a discourse is about – and hence such models have a referential semantic nature. Understanding or interpreting discourse about specific events, as is the case for stories and news reports, consists of the construction of a subjective model of the situation the discourse is about. On the other hand, context models (van Dijk 2008a, 2009a) control the pragmatic properties of discourse, such as speech acts, appropriateness, or politeness. Both semantic situation models as well as pragmatic context models not only represent situations but also feature people’s opinions and emotions about the situation.

Specific discourse structures, such as topics, arguments, metaphor, lexical choice, and rhetorical figures, among many other structures to be dealt with below, may influence the contents and the structures of mental models in ways preferred by the speakers, as in most forms of interaction and communication, as we know from classical rhetoric as well as contemporary persuasion research (Dillard and Pfau 2002; O’Keefe 2002). If such discursive control over the mental models of recipients is in the best interests of the speakers or writers and against the best interests of the recipients, we have an instance of discursive power abuse usually called manipulation (van Dijk 2006).

Speakers of powerful groups may want to control not only specific knowledge and opinions represented in the subjective mental models of specific recipients – as is most typically the case in news reports and parliamentary debates – but also the generic knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies shared by whole groups or all citizens,
for instance through the argumentative structures of editorials or op-ed articles. Via repeated political or media discourse about similar events, and via specific discourse moves of generalization, they may condition the generalization and abstraction of specific mental models to more general structures of knowledge and ideology, for instance about immigration, terrorism, or the economic crisis (see, e.g., Forest 2009). Such general cognitive influence may be in the interests of the recipients, as is the case in useful social information or education, but also may be in the interests of the speakers and against the best interests of the recipients, as is the case for epistemic or ideological manipulation and indoctrination (Winn 1983).

Discursive control of specific situation models and shared generic social representations such as sociocultural knowledge as well as group attitudes and ideologies depend not only on the persuasive structures of text and talk but also on contextual conditions. Thus, recipients tend to accept the beliefs, knowledge, and opinions (unless they are inconsistent with their personal beliefs and experiences) of people or institutions they define (in their context models) as authoritative, trustworthy, or credible sources, such as scholars, experts, professionals, or reliable media (Nesler et al. 1993). In some situations participants are obliged to be recipients of discourse – for example, in education and in many job situations. Lessons, learning materials, job instructions, and other discourse types in such cases may need to be attended to, interpreted, and learned as intended by institutional or organizational authors (Giroux 1981). In many situations there are no public discourses or media that may provide information from which alternative beliefs may be derived (Downing 1984). Finally, recipients may not have the knowledge and beliefs needed to challenge the discourses or information they are exposed to (Wodak 1987).

Besides these contextual influences on interpretation, CDA especially focuses on the ways discourse structures may influence specific mental models and generic representations of the recipients, and especially how beliefs may thus be manipulated. Here are some well-known examples, among many, taken from my own research on dominant discourse on immigration (van Dijk 1984, 1991, 1993):

- **Headlines and leads** of news reports express semantic macrostructures (main topics) as defined by the journalists and may thus give rise to preferred macrostructures of mental models. A demonstration may thus be defined as a violation of the social order or as a democratic right of the demonstrators; similarly, a violent attack may be defined as a form of resistance against the abuse of state power or as a form of terrorism. Negative actions of immigrants or minorities thus tend to be enhanced by their salient expression on the front page and in headlines defining immigration as an invasion of aliens.

- **Implications and presuppositions** are powerful semantic properties of discourse that aim to obliquely assert “facts” that may not be true, as when politicians and the media refer to the violence of demonstrators or the criminality of minorities.

- **Metaphors** are powerful means to make abstract mental models more concrete. Thus the abstract notion of immigration may be made more concrete, and hence more threatening, by using metaphors such as waves of immigrants – thus creating fear of drowning in immigrants among the other citizens.

- **The lexical expression** of mental models in the discourse of powerful speakers may influence not only knowledge but also opinions in the mental models of recipients.
Thus, immigrants may be labeled illegal or undocumented in political discourse, thus influencing public opinion on immigration.

- Passive sentence structures and nominalizations may be used to hide or downplay the violent or other negative actions of state agents (e.g., the military, the police) or ingroups (e.g., we, British). Thus, media or political discourse may speak about discrimination without being very explicit about who discriminates against whom.

In this way many structures of text and talk may influence the way recipients construe their mental models of specific situations, or how they generalize these to form stereotypes or prejudices (van Dijk 1984). The general strategy of dominant discourse and mind control often follows the basic intergroup polarization of underlying ideologies: Emphasizing Our good things, Emphasizing Their bad things, Mitigating Our bad things, and Mitigating Their good things – a strategy I have called the ideological square (van Dijk 1998).

The theoretical framework sketched above for the discursive reproduction of power and domination thus links social structures of groups and institutions to their control of the structures of context, text, and talk of communicative events, and indirectly to the influence of the personal models and the socially shared attitudes, ideologies, and knowledge of individual recipients and whole groups, as represented in Figure 22.1. Personal and social cognition thus influenced may finally in turn control the social actions that are consistent with the interests of powerful groups in general, and of the symbolic elites in particular, thus closing the circle of the discursive reproduction of power and domination.

1.2.3 Discourses of domination

The power of dominant groups shows not only in their control of the discourse of others but also in their own discourse. That is, social power may also be locally enacted by the very properties of discourse of (members of) powerful groups (see also Bradac and Street 1989). Studies of social style have paid extensive attention to the way language
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and discourse may vary and index power differences between speakers and recipients (Eckert and Rickford 2001), such as

- **Morphology.** Men may use diminutives when addressing women as a way to belittle them (Makri-Tsilipakou 2003).
- **Lexicon.** The paradigmatic case of domination is the use of racist slurs when talking to or about ethnic minorities (Essed 1997; van Dijk 1984, 1987) – for example, as a legitimation of neighborhood crimes (Stokoe and Edwards 2007).
- **Pronouns.** Power differences, deference, and politeness between speakers and recipients are typically marked by pronouns and special morphology (Brown and Gilman 1960; Brown and Levinson 1987).
- **Syntax and lexicon.** In rape trials passive syntax and euphemistic lexical items may be used by men to mitigate their responsibility for their violence against women (Ehrlich 2001); male-controlled mass media may similarly mitigate male violence in news reports (Clark 1992; Henley, Miller, and Beazley 1995).
- **Metaphor.** As is the case for mitigating syntax and lexicon, metaphors may also be used in court to suggest that rape victims may be lying (Luchjebroers and Aldridge 2007). Cohn (1987) shows how sex and death metaphors characterize the discourse of the military (see also the critical studies of the use of metaphor by powerful speakers by Charteris-Black 2005; Lakoff 1996, 2002).
- **Storytelling.** Stories in many ways index social identities (De Fina, Schiffrin, and Bamberg 2006) and may also be used to show power, as when some female managers tell stories to show how tough they can be as leaders (Holmes 2006).
- **Conversation.** Many properties of talk show differences of power or status, for instance in turn-taking, sequencing (e.g., opening and closing), interruptions, topic initiation, and change (see, e.g., Hutchby 1996), especially when studied for gender differences. Depending on culture and context, more powerful speakers may speak first (but not in Wolof, where lower ranking speakers must speak first; see Irvine 1974).

These and many other properties not only characterize dominant discourse as such but are also especially powerful because of their social effects and the control of the minds and actions of recipients.

2 Research in Critical Discourse Analysis

After the above account of the theory of a critical approach to discourse, we now briefly review some research in CDA, referring to other chapters in this volume where relevant. For reasons of space, we must limit our review to studies in English, despite the fact that a large body of CDA research is available in French, German, Spanish, and other languages. Also, we shall only focus on some main areas of CDA, such as the study of gender and race, as prototypical examples of critical inquiry and on only a few genres, such as those of the media and politics. Although many discourse studies dealing with aspects of power, domination, and social inequality have not been explicitly conducted under the label of CDA, we shall nevertheless refer to some of these studies.
2.1 Gender inequality

One vast field of critical research on discourse and language that initially was not carried out within a CDA perspective is that of gender. In many ways, feminist work on discourse has become paradigmatic for much CDA, especially since much of this work explicitly deals with social inequality and domination, so much so that there is now a branch of feminist CDA (Lazar 2005). For a review, see Kendall and Tannen (this volume); see also the more recent books authored and edited by (for example) Baxter (2005); Cameron (1990, 1992); Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, (2003); Ehrlich 2008; Holmes and Meyerhoff (2003); Kotthoff and Wodak (1997); Macaulay (2004); McIlvenny (2002); Sunderland (2004); Wodak (1997); for discussion and comparison with an approach that emphasizes cultural differences rather than power differences and inequality, see (for example) Tannen (1994a, 1994c); but see also Tannen (1994b), in which many of the properties of discursive dominance are dealt with, for an analysis of gender differences at work.

Whereas research on discourse and gender initially focused on assumed gender differences of text and talk (such as the use of diminutives or tag questions by women), a more critical approach paid special attention to male access and domination in interaction, such as interruptions and the control of topic introduction and change.

Current research emphasizes that gender differences (if any) are closely related to other aspects of the social and communicative context – such as the social class, status, or role of participants (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2003; see also Macaulay 2004; van Dijk 2008a). Incidentally, it is remarkable that, whereas critical discourse studies of gender and race are numerous, there is as yet very little critical research on dominant and resistant social-class discourse outside sociolinguistics and stylistics (but see, e.g., Fairclough 1989, 1992b, 2000). Thus, Willott, Griffin, and Torrance (2001) show how economic white-collar offenders legitimate their crimes in terms of class status in a prison context with lower-class inmates.

2.2 Ethnocentrism, antisemitism, nationalism, and racism

Many studies on ethnic and racial inequality reveal a remarkable degree of similarity between the stereotypes, prejudices, and other forms of verbal derogation across discourse types, media, and national boundaries (for a review, see Wodak and Reisigl, this volume). For example, in a vast research program that began in the early 1980s, we have examined how minorities and ethnic relations in Europe and the Americas are represented in conversation, everyday stories, news reports, textbooks, parliamentary debates, corporate discourse, and scholarly text and talk (van Dijk 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993, 2005, 2009b; Wodak and van Dijk 2000). The stereotypical topics of difference, deviation, and threat have been studied, as have story structures, conversational features (such as hesitations and repairs in mentioning Others), semantic moves such as disclaimers (e.g., “We have nothing against blacks, but …”), negative lexical description of Others (as “illegals”), and a host of other discourse features. The aim of these projects was to show how discourse expresses and reproduces underlying prejudices about Others in the social and political context.
The major conclusion of this project is that racism is a complex system of social domination reproduced by everyday discriminatory social practices (including discourse) based on, as well as controlling, ethnically biased personal mental models and socially shared prejudices and ideologies, as explained in Section 1. Since the symbolic elites control public discourse they are the most directly responsible for the discursive reproduction of racism in society.

2.3 Media discourse

Today, critical analysis of media discourse has a central place in CDA, but it was first introduced in critical communication studies. The critical tone was set by a series of “Bad News” studies by the Glasgow University Media Group (1976, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1993) on features of television reporting in the coverage of various issues such as industrial disputes (strikes), the Falklands (Malvinas) war, and the media coverage of AIDS. At the same time the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, directed by Stuart Hall, made significant contributions to the critical study of media messages and images and its role in “policing the crisis” and the reproduction of racism (see, e.g., Hall et al. 1980). In a similar critical spirit, Cohen (1980) studied the “moral panic” about the “mods and the rockers” as (re)produced by the British tabloid press (for a review of many other approaches to the study of news, including critical studies, see Allan 2010).

Toward the end of the 1970s, the first critical study of the media in linguistics was introduced by Roger Fowler and his associates (Fowler et al. 1979). These authors showed, among other things, how the very structures of sentences, such as the use of actives or passives, may enhance the negative representation of outgroup actors, such as black youths, and downplay the negative actions of ingroups or the authorities, such as the police (see also van Dijk 1988, 1991). Fowler’s later critical studies of the media continued this tradition but also paid tribute to the British cultural studies paradigm that defines news not as a reflection of reality but as a product shaped by political, economic, and cultural forces (Fowler 1991). More than in much other critical work on the media, he also focuses on the linguistic “tools” for such a critical study, such as the analysis of transitivity in syntax, lexical structure, modality, and speech acts.

In the past two decades CDA approaches to the media have multiplied. These studies have not only investigated the social and communicative contexts of news and other press or broadcast genres, as is the case in critical media studies, but have also related these to a systematic analysis of the structures of media discourse, such as lexicon, syntax, topics, metaphor, coherence, actor description, social identities, genres, modality, presupposition, rhetorical figures, interaction, news schemas, and multimodal analysis of images, among many other structures (for an introduction, see, e.g., Richardson 2007). As is the case in many critical media studies (not reviewed here), these critical analyses are applied to the coverage of pressing social and political issues – such as the Gulf and Iraq wars, the war on drugs, and terrorism (especially the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center) on the one hand, and globalization, sexism, racism, and islamophobia on the other – but from a more discourse analytical point of view (among many other books, see Chilton 1988; Fairclough 1995b; Machin and van Leeuwen 2007; O’Keeffe 2006; Richardson 2004; Talbot 2007; van Dijk 1988, 1991; see also Cotter, this volume and the papers published in the journal Discourse & Society).
2.4 Political discourse

Since CDA is especially interested in the critical study of power abuse – and its resistance – it is not surprising that political discourse has been a central focus in CDA, even before CDA was used as a label, for instance in the early work of Chilton on the nuclear arms debate, Orwellian language, and security metaphors (Chilton 1985, 1988, 1995; see also his introduction to political discourse studies: Chilton 2004; Chilton and Schöffner 2002).

Across many countries, issues, genres, empirical studies, and methods, it has been Ruth Wodak and her collaborators who have played a leading role in the CDA approach to political discourse. In a vast number of books and articles, first in German and later in English, she examined antisemitism, racism, nationalism, the political discourse of and about Waldheim and Haider, and the everyday “making” of politics in Brussels (see, e.g., Wodak 1989, 2009; Wodak et al. 1999; Wodak and van Dijk 2000).

Fairclough’s studies of political discourse, often conducted within a political–economic perspective, have paid detailed attention to issues of globalization (Fairclough 2006) and British politics, such as the discourse of New Labour (Fairclough 2000), following his foundational studies of language and power (Fairclough 1989) and CDA (Fairclough 1995a). His approach to CDA especially emphasizes the need to relate discourse structures and discursive practices to social and political structures at the macro-level.

2.5 Professional and institutional power

The CDA focus on domination and resistance implies special interest for institutional and organizational discourse, as is the case for politics and the mass media as well as for the discourse of members of communities and social groups. There are of course many other social domains in which professional and institutional power and power abuse have been critically studied from a discourse analytical perspective (besides more sociological approaches), such as:

- text and talk in the courtroom (for a review, see Shuy, this volume)
- bureaucratic discourse (Sarangi and Slembrouck 1996)
- medical discourse (for a review, see Jones, this volume)
- educational discourse (Corson 1995; Rogers 2003; see also Adger and Wright, this volume)
- academic and scientific discourse (Bizzell 1992; Martin 1998)
- corporate and organizational discourse (Grant et al. 2004; Fox and Fox 2004; Mumby 1993; see also Mayr, this volume).
- discourse of the unions (Muntigl, Weiss, and Wodak 2000).

In all these cases, power and dominance are associated with specific social domains (politics, media, law, education, science, etc.), their professional elites and institutions, and the rules and routines that form the background of the everyday discursive reproduction of power in such domains and institutions. The victims or targets of such power are usually the public or citizens at large, the “masses,” clients, subjects, the audience, students, and other groups that are dependent on institutional and organizational
power. Unfortunately, their discourses of resistance and dissent have been much less studied in CDA (see Huspek 2009).

3 Conclusion

We have seen in this chapter that critical discourse analyses deal with the relationship between discourse, domination, and dissent. We have also sketched the complex theoretical framework needed to analyze discourse and power, and provided a glimpse of the many ways in which power and domination are reproduced by text and talk.

Yet several methodological and theoretical gaps remain. First, the cognitive interface between discourse structures and structures of the local and global social context is seldom made explicit and usually appears only in terms of the notions of knowledge and ideology (van Dijk 1998). Thus, despite a large number of empirical studies on discourse and power, the details of the multidisciplinary theory of CDA that should relate discourse and action to cognition and society are still on the agenda.

Second, there is still a gap between more linguistically oriented studies of text and talk and the various social and political approaches. The first often ignore concepts and theories in sociology and political science on power abuse and inequality, whereas the second seldom engage in detailed discourse analysis. Integration of various approaches is therefore very important to arrive at a satisfactory form of multidisciplinary CDA.

Third, there are still large areas of critical research that remain virtually unexplored, such as the study of dominant or resistant social-class discourse and of many other discourse genres.

Finally, we need a more explicit analysis of the very notion of what it means to be “critical” in CDA and more generally in scholarship – for example, in terms of legitimacy, violation of human rights, and the basic democratic norms and values of equality and justice. It is ultimately in those terms that CDA may and should act as a force against the discursive abuse of power.

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